Essays on intrahousehold bargaining, risk-sharing, and the optimal balance between private insurance and the welfare state by Creightney, Cavelle D.
University of Warwick institutional repository: http://go.warwick.ac.uk/wrap
A Thesis Submitted for the Degree of PhD at the University of Warwick
http://go.warwick.ac.uk/wrap/51956
This thesis is made available online and is protected by original copyright.
Please scroll down to view the document itself.
Please refer to the repository record for this item for information to help you to
cite it. Our policy information is available from the repository home page.
ESSAYS ON INTRAHOUSEHOLD BARGAINING, 
RISK-SHARING, AND THE OPTIMAL BALANCE BETWEEN 
PRIVATE INSURANCE AND THE WELFARE STATE 
Cavelle Dawn Creightney 
Thesis Submitted in Fulfilment of the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy in the 




1.1 Household Decision Processes and the Intrahousehold Allocation of R& 
sources ........................ . 
1.2 Risk-Sharing under Repeated Double Moral Hazard 
1.3 Family Insurance and the Welfare State. . . . . . . 
2 Intrahousehold Allocations: Towards a More General Characterization 
of the Household Decision Process 
2.1 Background and Literature Review 
2.2 A Household Bargaining Problem. 








Household Decision Making . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30 
2.3.1 The Choice Set of Feasible and Efficient Utility Allocations. 31 
2.3.2 A Formal Analysis in Utility Space . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38 
2.4 Properties of Collective and Generalized Nash-Bargained Household D& 
mand Systems . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 46 
2.4.1 Collective Demand Systems and Comparative Statics 48 
2.4.2 Generalized Nash-Bargained Demand Systems and Comparative 
Statics ................................ 55 
2.4.3 The Relationship between Alternative Models of Household Deci-
sion Making . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. 65 
1 
2.5 Discussion and Areas for Further Work . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 70 
3 Risk-Sharing Contracts under Repeated Double Moral Hazard 85 
3.1 BackgrOlmd and Literature Review 85 
3.2 The Model. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 99 
3.3 The Constrained-Efficiency (Second-Best) Problem 103 
3.4 Reduction of the Problem of Choosing the Second-Best Contract. 105 
3.5 A Benchmark: The Full-Information First-Best (Efficient) Contract 111 
3.5.1 The Efficient Contract Within a Given Time Period. 112 
3.5.2 Evolution of the Efficient Contract Over Time 115 
3.6 The Second-Best (Constrained-Efficient) Contract . . 117 
3.6.1 The Second-Rest Contract Within a Given Time Period. 118 
3.6.2 Evolution of the Second-Best Contract Over Time. 123 
3.7 Discussion and Areas for Further Work. . . . . . . . . . . 133 
4 Family Insurance and the Welfare State: The Role of Public Insurance 
Schemes in the Presence of Family Risk-Sharing Arrangements 155 
4.1 Background and Literature Review . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 155 
4.2 A Model of Family Insurance under a Welfare State: Exogenous Income 
Distributions ................................. 166 
4.3 The Model with Endogenous Income Distributions and Effort Observable 
Within the Family .............................. 174 
4.4 The Model with Endogenous Income Distributions and Moral Hazard 
Within the Family ........... 184 
4.5 Discussion and Areas for Further Work 194 
2 
Acknowledgements 
I would like to express the greatest thanks to my supervisors, Professors Jonathan 
Thomas and Myrna Wooders, for providing excellent advice on the crucial aspects of this 
research, and to Mr. Tony Addison who also supervised the thesis during its early stage. 
Thanks are also due to Dr. Amrita Dhillon and Professor Martin Cripps who provided 
technical help on some important points. 
I also wish to thank the Department of Economics at the University of Warwick for 
providing financial support through its Graduate Teaching Assistantship programme. 
Finally I would like to express my greatest thanks to my husband, Will Cavendish, 
for his love, patience and support, and for engaging in numerous stimulating discussions 
on almost every aspect of the thesis. 
3 
Abstract 
This thesis comprises three essays in the field of applied microeconomic theory. In 
the first essay we present a generalized Nash model of household decision making that 
does not restrict a priori the household's location on the Pareto frontier and that allows 
the opportunity cost of household membership to influence the intrahousehold allocation 
of resources. This approach generalizes both the collective and the symmetric Nash 
models of household decision making. Formally, we derive the restrictions on household 
demands implied by the generalized Nash model and we show that the collective model, 
the symmetric Nash model and the traditional (unitary) model of the household are all 
special cases of the generalized N a,.."h model. 
In the second essay we analyze the optimal risk-sharing contract to emerge between 
two risk averse individuals under repeated double moral hazard. Several interesting 
properties of the optimal contract emerge. First, the contract is less sensitive to the 
performance of any single individual than would have been the case under single moral 
hazard. Second, a well-known condition describing the optimal level of intertemporal 
consumption smoothing under repeated single agency is generalized to take account of 
the double incentive problem. In particular, when both individuals face binding incentive 
constraints then the expectation of the ratio of person i's to person j's marginal utility 
in period t is strictly greater than the known ratio of person i's to person j's marginal 
utility in period t - 1, i, j = 1,2, i =1= j. 
In the final essay we examine the optimal balance between the provision of income 
insurance through family networks and provision through the redistributive tax system. 
We demonstrate that even when there is full risk-sharing within the family there are nev-
ertheless further welfare gains to be achieved through an appropriate level of government 
intervention. We also demonstrate that where intra-family moral hazard implies that 
only partial risk-sharing is achieved within the family, the existence of further welfare 
gains from government intervention will depend on the effects of such intervention on the 




This thesis comprises three essays, each one addressing a different topic in the field of 
applied micro economic theory. The first essay (presented in Chapter 2) looks at the 
decision making processes within hou""ehold" and attempts to improve upon the way this 
question has been treated in the conventional economics literature to date. The second 
essay (presented in Chapter 3) develops a model of risk-sharing between two individuals 
when there is repeated interaction and double-sided moral hazard. The third and final 
essay (presented in Chapter 4) examines the question of the optimal balance, from a social 
welfare point of view, between the provi"ion of income insurance through family networks 
versus provision through a compulsory public insurance scheme (i.e. the redistributive 
tax system or welfare state). 
Although each essay represents an independent and self-contained piece of work and 
can be read without recourse to any of the other essays, there are nevertheless three 
separate, unifying themes running throughout the thesis. The first theme is the role 
and importance of groups, rather than individuals, in the proper treatment of certain 
economic questions. Recognition of the economic implications of group interactions is now 
gaining widespread currency in the economics literature and each of our essays are in this 
tradition. An example of this is the literature on intrahousehold resource allocation that 
addresses one of the main problems of the traditional approach towards the household, 
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that of treating the household as if it were a single individual maximizing a single neo-
classical utility function. ill terms of our first theme the first essay is concerned with how 
to characterize the decision making process within the household, taking account of the 
group nature of such decisions. In this essay we offer a more general characterization of 
such processes than has so far been provided by either of the two major intrahousehold 
decision models, namely the collective model and the symmetric Nash model. 
There are several examples of economic relationships or contractual arrangements 
between individuals (or between individuals and organizations such as the firm) that act 
a'3 a device for dealing with risk. In chapter 3 we discuss some of these arrangements and 
the way they are characterized in the theoretical literature, while in chapter 4 we discuss 
the growing evidence to support the existence of risk-sharing within families. In terms of 
our first theme the second essay examines the question of risk-sharing between two risk 
averse individuals and describes features of the optimal risk-sharing contract when these 
individuals interact repeatedly and when there is double moral hazard. Although this 
essay is not concerned with intra-family risk-sharing per se, interestingly the essay began 
as an attempt to characterize the nature of risk-sharing within families. It soon became 
apparent however that any such characterization could have applications well beyond the 
family context and so in this essay we provide a more general treatment of this question. 
With regard to the question of designing government policy for dealing with risk, 
there is increasing recognition of the problems of formulating such policy on the basis 
of models that ignore the existence of risk-sharing within certain groups, communities 
and networks in society. Again in terms of the first theme, our final essay discusses and 
references the literature in this area and examines the question of the optimal design 
of the welfare state in light of the presence of income-sharing activities within family 
networks. 
The second theme, shared by our second and third essays, is the problem of risk 
and its various private and government responses. In the second essay individuals get 
together to form a risk-sharing arrangement because it is in their mutual interest to do 
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so. This is essentially a private response to the problem and occurs without government 
intervention. The private solution however is imperfect in welfare terms (i.e. perfect 
risk-sharing is never achieved) becau'3e of the presence of moral hazard. Furthermore 
because of the presence of double moral hazard the private solution is worse, in welfare 
terms, than the solution that arises when there is only single moral hazard (see for 
instance proposition 10 in chapter 3). We obtain several interesting ft'.atures of the 
optimal contract under repeated double moral hazard and show that there are clear 
differences between the behaviour of this contract and the behaviour of the optimal 
contract under repeated single moral hazard. This is important because while there are 
many real world circumstances that can be characterized by single moral hazard (i.e. the 
classic principal-agent problem) we argue that there are also several circumstances for 
which double moral hazard provides a more accurate depiction of reality. (As a result our 
work in this art'.a suggests an interesting avenue for future rest'.arch, namely an empirical 
investigation of the extent to which actual risk-sharing arrangements, in double moral 
hazard contexts, conform to the sort of risk-sharing that is predicted by our model). 
In the third essay the existence of private responses to the problem of ri'3k (this time in 
the context of simple income-sharing arrangements between family members) is taken as 
given and we then ask how can government intervention be designed so as to raise social 
welfare above the level of social welfare that would otherwise be achieved in the absence 
of government intervention. Note that this question is different from the question posed 
by other authors as to whether family risk-sharing arrangements can be socially harmful 
when there are market alternatives. For instance Arnott and Stiglitz (1991) show that 
tmder certain circumstances this can indeed be the case and so outlawing the existence 
of family risk-sharing may sometimes be desirable on social welfare grounds. We argue 
that there are several problems with outlawing family insurance as a policy initiative 
and so in our third essay we concern ourselves with the question of how policy can be 
designed to improve welfare given the presence of income-sharing within families. Again 
we obtain results that are interesting, particularly in light of the on-going political debate 
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about the appropriate role of the state vis-a-vis family institutions. We demonstrate 
that even in those circumstances where there is full risk-sharing within the family, there 
are nevertheless further welfare gains to be achieved through appropriate government 
intervention. We also demonstrate that where the presence of intra-family moral hazard 
implies that only partial risk-sharing is achieved within the family, there may be further 
welfare gains to be achieved via government intervention. However the existence of such 
gains will depend crucially on the effect of government intervention on the intra-family 
income transfer and on effort incentives. 
The third theme, this time shared by our first and third essays, pertains to certain 
questions arising out of the economics of the family. Understanding the economic behav-
iour of families is an important research agenda for several reasons. First all individuals, 
to a greater or lesser extent, exist within some family group. Their economic choices and 
behaviour are therefore influenced by the interactions that take place inside this group. 
This may be true even of individuals who live alone if such individuals maintain economic 
relations with family members residing elsewhere. (Take, for instance, the remittances 
sent home by economic migrants, the alimony and/or child support payments made be-
tween divorced couples, and the housing and job location choices made by professional 
couples). There is growing evidence, both in industrialized and developing economies, to 
suggest that many 'individual' decisions are taken not in isolation but within the context 
of a wider family group. Second, if indeed many individual decisions are taken within 
such a broader context, then this fact should be taken into account when designing public 
policies that seek to influence individual behaviour. (Note that the idea of a 'family' can 
be interpreted more broadly as any relevant community, network or group that i'3 relevant 
to the problem being examined. The point is whether, and to what extent, a person's 
belonging to such a group affects their economic behaviour). 
In terms of the third theme our first essay argues that a richer theory of household 
decision making would take account of the formation and dissolution of households, and 
of the effect that a person's outside opportunities may have on the internal household 
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decision process. Also our third essay provides an example of the optimal design of 
government policy, in the context of policies for dealing with risk, taking into account 
the contractual arrangements that may already exist within families for coping with risk. 
In the remainder of this chapter we offer a more detailed summary of each of the three 
essays, highlighting the main contributions made in each case. 
1.1 Household Decision Processes and the Intrahouse-
hold Allocation of Resources 
In our first essay we explore existing models of the intrahousehold allocation of resources 
and we offer a more general characterization of the household decision process than 
has so far been provided in the literature. The symmetric Nash model of the household 
represents an improvement over traditional approaches in that it addresses the important 
question of bargaining within a household. It nevertheless remains a highly restrictive 
model in that given the preferences of individual household members, the symmetric 
Nash model effectively specifies a priori the precise location of the household on the 
Pareto frontier. In response to this problem the collective model of the household was 
offered as a generalization of the simple Nash approach. Under the collective model, the 
only assumption made is that intrahousehold allocations must be Pareto efficient. In 
other words no a priori restrictions are placed on a household's precise location on the 
efficiency frontier. 
In this essay we argue that one of the main weakness of the collective model is that it 
takes the existence of the household as given and therefore ignores questions to do with 
the formation and dissolution of households and with the potential for disagreement 
within any given household. In doing so it also ignores the effect of individuals' outside 
economic opportunities on a household's internal decision making process and on the 
precise allocations that are achieved. However this was precisely one of the strengths of 
the symmetric Nash model. Through specification of a pair of 'disagreement utilities' 
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(i.e. the utility payoffs received by household members in the event of a disagreement) 
the symmetric Nash model effectively included a theory of household dissolution, albeit 
a very simple theory. 
Under the symmetric Nash model a person's disagreement utility is taken to be the 
utility payoff they would receive if they were not a member of the household and if they 
acted alone. By including these disagreement utilities the symmetric Nash model allows 
for a person's outside opportlllities to influence the outcome reached within the house-
hold. AB we shall see the particular specification of the disagreement utilities employed 
in the literature to date embodies quite strong assumptions about the cultural and legal 
framework governing the dissolution of a household, about the nature of divorce, about 
the enforcement of laws, and about individual preferences over their marital state. Nev-
ertheless the development of household models that take account of the potential for 
disagreement helps to focus attention on the need for a proper treatment of the forma-
tion and dissolution of households, which can then provide the basis for obtaining a more 
appropriate specification of the disagreement utilities. 
In this essay we argue that by adopting a generalized (as against asymmetric) Nash 
model of intrahousehold decision making we are able to preserve the main strengths of 
both the collective and the symmetric Nash models. Under a generalized Nash model we 
take account of the fact that a person's 'bargaining power' can vary as the parameters 
of the model vary, and that the degree of bargaining power may also differ from one 
household member to the next. This contrasts with the symmetric Nash model which 
not only fixes the extent of each person's bargaining power but also equalizes bargain-
ing power across household members. Furthermore under a generalized Nash model a 
pair of disagreement utilities, dependent on the parameters of the model, are specified. 
This contrasts with the collective model in which questions to do with disagreement and 
with the role of outside opportlllities are not addressed. We demonstrate that such a 
generalized Nash approach retains the essential charac~eristics of the collective approach, 
i.e. it does not restrict a priori the household's location on the Pareto frontier. In 
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this regard it avoids the main criticism of the symmetric Nash model. Furthermore the 
generalized Nash approach retains the main strength of the simple Nash modeL By 
specifying a pair of Nash disagreement utilities it allows for the possibility of disagree-
ment among household members and for the opportunity cost of a person's household 
membership to influence any cooperative intrahousehold outcome. A generalized Nash 
approach therefore, by allowing a 'theory of household dissolution' to be incorporated and 
to influence household decisions, offers a more general characterization of the household 
decision process than that offered under the collective framework. Also by not restricting 
the household's location on the Pareto frontier, the generalized Nash model also offers a 
more general characterization of the household decision process than that offered under 
the symmetric Nash model. In this essay we demonstrate this claim formally. Specifically 
we derive the main restrictions on household demands implied by the generalized Nash 
model and we show that the collective model, the symmetric Nash model, as well as the 
traditional (unitary) model of the household are all special cases of the generalized Nash 
modeL 
1.2 Risk-Sharing under Repeated Double Moral Haz-
ard 
In our second essay we extend existing models of repeated moral hazard and analyze 
the optimal risk-sharing contract to emerge between two risk averse individuals in a sit-
uation of repeated double moral hazard. Under double moral hazard both individuals 
have income distributions that are contingent on their own level of effort, however nei-
ther individual can observe the level of effort chosen by the other. Such a generalized 
framework allows us to address questions related to how the optimal long-term contract 
deals with the trade-off between an efficient level of risk-sharing and the simultaneous 
provision of two sets of incentives. It is the analysis of these trade-offs, in the context 
of an infinitely repeated agency problem, that represents the key departure of this essay 
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from the existing literature. Throughout our analysis we adopt recursive methods in 
order to establish the key qualitative features of the optimal long term contract. 
In characterizing the optimal contract under repeated double moral hazard we ex-
amine both the contract's within-period characteristics as well as its evolution from one 
period to the next. It is a feature of the optimal contract that each individual's current 
consumption as well as their future expected discounted utility is monotonically increas-
ing in their current level of income. Although we do not offer a full characterization of 
the optimal contract we identify several interesting properties. 
First, note that given the expected discounted utility payoff received by the agent 
in the current period, the optimal contract consists of the principal's effort, the agent's 
effort, a single schedule of income transfers and a single schedule of future expected dis-
counted utility payoffs, each of the schedules being dependent upon the realised incomes 
of both individuals. It is a feature of the optimal contract that this contract must offer 
incentives to both individuals simultaneously. As a result we show that such a contract 
is less sensitive to the performance of any single individual than would have been the 
case if there were only one person with an incentive problem (as in the case of repeated 
single agency). This result reiterates the predictions of on&period double agency mod-
els, however we show that in the infinitely repeated framework, it applies not only to the 
within-period incentives on offer, but also to the incentives that are offered over time. 
Second, a well-known condition describing the optimal level of intertemporal con-
sumption smoothing under repeated single agency is generalized to take account of the 
double incentive problem. In the literature on repeated single agency it is shown that 
the expected ratio of person i's to person j's marginal utility in any period must always 
equal the known ratio of person i's to person j's marginal utility in the previous period, 
where i, j = 1,2, i =I=- j, and only j faces a binding incentive constraint. However when 
the single agency setting is generalized to take account of the double incentive problem, 
under the optimal contract there is some deviation from the level of intertemporal con-
sumption smoothing that would have been optimal under repeated single agency. We 
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show that this deviation can be characterized in terms of its benefits and costs. 'Ve ai'30 
show that when both individuals face binding incentive constraints then the expectation 
of the ratio of person i's to person j's marginal utility in period t must always be strictly 
greater than the known ratio of person i's to person j's marginal utility in period t - 1, 
i,j = 1,2, i i- j. 
1.3 Family Insurance and the Welfare State 
In our final essay we examine the optimal balance between the provision of insurance 
through family networks and the provision of insurance through the redistributive tax 
system or welfare state. Our approach to this question is to take the existence of intra-
family insurance arrangements as given and then ask what level of assistance, if any, 
should additionally be provided through the welfare state. Specifically we address three 
main questions. First, what is the effect of an expansion of the welfare state on the 
level of income transferred between family members and on the overall level of insurance 
available to individuals? Second, what is the mechanism through which these intra-family 
income transfers are affected? Third, what role exists for public insurance schemes to 
increase welfare when insurance is also provided within family networks? 
We assume that a simple income-sharing arrangement exists within families that 
consist of two risk averse people. Each family member receives a stochastic income, and 
to make the analysis tractable we assume that family members interact only once and 
that any ex ante commitments are binding ex post. Unemployed family members receive 
public transfers from the state while employed family members pay taxes to the state. 
In carrying out our analysis we consider three different scenarios. First we examine the 
simplest case of no moral hazard so that each person's income distribution is exogenously 
given. Here we show that although increases in the size of the public transfer lead to 
an unambiguous reduction in the level of income transferred between family members, 
maximizing social welfare requires the provision of full insurance by the state along 
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with the complete elimination of intra-family insurance. This result is quite intuitive. 
Since there are no incentive problems, a risk neutral government can implement income 
transfers across families up to the point where each individual is guaranteed a constant 
level of consumption in each state of the world. We also show that the extent to which 
a more generous welfare state succeeds in crowding out the intra-family income transfer 
will depend upon the proportion of employed and unemployed people in the economy. 
For instance if the proportion of employed individuals is large, then a given increase in 
the size of the public transfer paid to each unemployed will require only a small increase 
in the tax paid by each employed, in order for the government's budget to remain in 
balance. Therefore for any given increase in the size of the public transfer, the reduction 
in the net (after-tax) income of employed individuals will be relatively small. However 
since the family transfer is just half the difference between family members' realized net 
incomes (i.e. family members offer each other full insurance) then such changes to the 
tax and public transfer will have a relatively small crowding out effect on the family 
transfer. The opposite is true if the proportion of employed individuals in the economy 
is small. 
Under the second scenario we introduce moral hazard so that each person's income 
distribution now depends upon their chosen level of effort. Here we assume that the 
government cannot observe effort but that family members are able to observe each 
other. We show that unless an increase in the transfer received by the unemployed 
requires, for balancing the government's budget, a reduction in the level of the tax paid 
by the employed by an equal or greater amount than the increase in the tax, then such 
an increase in the public transfer must lead to a reduction in the level of the family 
income transfer. We also show that when the government cannot observe individual 
actions, maximizing social welfare requires the state to provide less than full insurance 
to individuals. Finally we also show that under this scenario, regardless of whether or 
not family transfers are crowded out by increases in the size of the welfare state, there 
is always a clear role for public insurance schemes to improve welfare beyond the level 
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that would be achieved if only family insurance were available. Specifically we show that 
when insurance is available within family networks, as long as effort is observable within 
the family then a social welfare maximum can never entail zero government intervention. 
Under the third and final scenario, we relax the assumption that effort is observable 
within families and assume that family members are also unable to observe each others 
actions. We therefore have a problem of moral hazard both between the government 
and family, as well as within each family. Under this scenario we show that the optimal 
welfare state must offer less than full insurance to individuals. However this time the 
case for having any public insurance scheme at all is not so clear cut. Here we identify 
conditions under which increasing the size of the welfare state, from a position of no 
government intervention, will be welfare reducing. Under these conditions a social welfare 
maximum exists locally at the point of no government intervention. This means that for 
sufficiently small levels of government intervention there is no scope for improving welfare 
via the redistributive tax system, and hence there is a social welfare (local) maximum 
that entails the provision of no public insurance. An alternative interpretation of this 
result is that for sufficiently small levels of government intervention it will be preferable 
for the government to offer no public insurance at all. The occurrence of this outcome 




[1] ARNOTT, R. and J. E. STIGLITZ (1991). 'Moral Hazard and Nonmarket Insti-
tutions: Dysfunctional Crowding Out or Peer Monitoring?' American Economic 
Review, Vol. 81, No. 1 (March 1991), pp. 179-190. 
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Chapter 2 
Intrahousehold Allocations: Towards 
a More General Characterization of 
the Household Decision Process 
2.1 Background and Literature Review 
Although the behaviour of households with two or more individuals must be the outcome 
of group decisions, most economic models treat the household 'as if' it were a single 
agent maximizing a single, neoclassical utility function. This traditional approachl and 
its empirical implications have been extensively analyzed and is now well understood (see 
Ashenfelter and Heckman, 1974; Barten, 1977; Goldberger, 1967; Leuthold, 1968; and 
Wales and Woodland, 1976). 
Nevertheless, despite its familiarity and simplicity2, there are some major drawbacks 
1 There is a plethora of terms used in the literature to refer to these single agent models of the 
household. These include the 'traditional' model, the 'classical' model, the 'neo-classical' model. the 
'common preference' model and the 'unitary' model. In each case they refer, essentially, to household 
models which involve the constrained maximization, by a single individual, of a single utility function. 
2Economists have always analyzed individual consumer behaviour in this way and so a direct applica-
tion to the analysis of household decision problems represented a simple and natural extension. Several 
examples abound in the literature. For instance, Barnum and Squire (1979) and Singh, Squire and 
Strauss (1986a, 1986b) apply the traditional approach to analyze the behaviour of agricultural house-
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to the traditional model. First, under this approach, the household remains a black box 
in that although we are able to characterize the relationship between a household and 
the wider economy which represents its environment, we are unable to study the internal 
decision making process and the allocation of resources inside the household. This is 
primarily because the traditional model does not take account of the group or collective 
aspect of the household decision process, nor of the fact that household members may 
have different preferences3 • AB Manser and Brown (1980) point out, ' .... if the utility 
functions of the members of the household differ, then an assumption forcing them into 
this aggregate framework may not be acceptable in all cases.' Related to this is the 
question of household formation and dissolution. The traditional model does not offer a 
framework within which to analyze these questions. 
Second, the traditional model does not allow us to consider whether, and to what ex-
tent, a person's economic opportunities outside the household affect the decisions reached 
inside. In Manser and Brown (1980) and McElroy (1990), the authors refer to a person's 
'threat point' as the maximum utility a person would receive if they were no longer a 
member of the household. The greater a person's threat point, the more their preferences 
are reflected in the household's overall demand functions. The variables that determine 
this opportunity cost of household membership may include a vector of prices faced by 
the individual, their wage and non wage income (the latter might be broadly interpreted 
to include the individual's holdings of stocks, pension flUlds, parental trust flUlds or 
even their expected future inheritance), a person's employment and promotion prospects 
linked to their education and state of health, and any other variable that might affect 
holds involved simultaneously in production and consumption, while McKay and Taffesse (1994) apply 
this approach to examine the supply response of agricultural households under various market imperfec-
tions. Also the standard tools of optimal tax and benefits analysis, welfare analysis, and labour supply 
analysis are readily applicable. Examples of such applications include Blundell et al (1986), Blundell 
and Walker (1986), King (1983), Pollak and Wales (1981) and Ray (1982). 
3Note that strictly speaking, the traditional approach can be used to examine the allocation of 
resources within the household. This can be done by including, among the arguments of the single 
neoclassical utility function, the consumption and leisure demands of each individual household member. 
However it is the fact that the resulting resource allocation within such a framework is not the outcome 
of group decision making that represents the main criticism of the traditional approach. 
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an individual's economic opportunities outside the household. Of crucial importance too 
are the laws (and the extent to which they are enforceable) governing the division of 
financial assets and the custody of children which come into effect upon the dissolution 
of a household. Any model of household decision making would ideally incorporate such 
considerations. 
Finally, very little evidence has been found to support one of the main predictions of 
the traditional model, namely that the nonwage incomes of individual family members 
do not enter the household demand equations separately. Papers by Altonji, Hayashi and 
Kotlikoff (1989), Cai (1989), Horney and McElroy (1988), Schultz (1990) and Thomas 
(1990) have all found evidence against income-pooling within the family. 
In recent years several alternative lines of research have developed in response to these 
concerns about the traditional model. One promising approach has been the application 
of the tools of cooperative bargaining to the analysis of household decision problems. In 
papers employing this approach (see Brown and Manser, 1977, 1978; Manser and Brown, 
1978, 1980; McElroy, 1990; and McElroy and Horney, 1981), overwhelming attention has 
been given to applying the symmetric Nash bargaining solution to the analysis of house-
hold decision problems. In these papers the authors examine the resulting Nash system 
of household demand equations and their comparative static properties, highlighting the 
main differences between these and the traditional demands and comparative statics. In 
Manser and Brown (1980), the dictatorial and the Kalai-Smorodinsky bargaining solu-
tions are briefly considered while in Creightney (1997), an egalitarian solution is also 
examined. 
The cooperative bargaining approach enables us to overcome many of the weaknesses 
of the traditional model. Under cooperative bargaining household members are allowed to 
have different preferences. Also, a 'disagreement utility' or 'threat point' can be specified 
for each household member so that the utility payoff to any member under the cooperative 
bargaining outcome is restricted to being at least as large as a person's disagreement 
utility. As we argue later, these disagreement utilities need not be arbitrarily chosen 
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utility payoffs but may be the payoffs predicted by some suitable theory of household 
dissolution. Finally, the cooperative bargaining approach leads to an alternative to the 
income-pooling hypothesis. 
Under a separate line of inquiry and in response to both the traditional and the 
cooperative bargaining approaches, Chiappori (1988, 1992) (hereafter referred to as CH) 
proposed a collective approach to analyzing household decision problems. Under the 
collective approach household members have their own individual preference orderings 
and the decision process is assumed to be cooperative in that all outcomes are Pareto 
efficient (CH refers to this as the efficiency approach). 4 However no additional restrictions 
are imposed a priori as to which point on the efficiency frontier the household will 
ultimately choose. CH also presents an equivalent formulation of the collective decision 
process as the constrained maximization of a weighted sum of individual utilities, where 
the weights are taken to vary continuously with the exogenous parameters of the model. 
We will refer to this formulation of the collective hypothesis as the (weighted) sum of 
utilities approach. Under this sum of utilities interpretation, by allowing each person's 
utility weight in the collective decision process to vary continuously with the exogenous 
parameters, all points on the Pareto frontier can be traced out. In this way no particular 
point is selected a priori. Under the collective line of inquiry CH characterizes the set of 
efficient intrahousehold allocations and develops a set of empirical restrictions that must 
be satisfied by any system of household demands if the efficiency hypothesis is true. 
At this stage we raise two main points about the collective approach and its relation-
ship to other cooperative approaches that employ a specific bargaining solution. First, 
4 Chiappori offers an alternative interpretation of the efficiency approach under which the household 
decision process is essentially a two-stage budgeting one (the sharing rule approach). In the first stage, 
household members allocate the total household nonlabour income among themselves according to a pre-
determined sharing rule. In the second stage, once nonlabour income has been allocated, each household 
member then chooses their own consumption and labour supply through constrained maximization 
of their own individual utility subject to their individual budget constraint. Under this alternative 
interpretation, the way in which the sharing rule is determined remains outside the analysis. Chiappori 
argues that both the efficiency and the sharing rule approaches are equivalent in that household decisions 
are efficient if and only if a sharing rule exists. 
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as CH points out, the collective approach uses knowledge of individual utilities and the 
household budget constraint to generate only a continuum of Pareto efficient outcomes. 
Since no particular outcome is selected, it therefore does not allow the derivation of a 
system of household demand equations. This is in contrast, say, to the symmetric Nash 
model which implicitly assmnes that household members have fixed and equal weights 
in the household decision process. Under the symmetric Nash model therefore, a specific 
point is selected on the Pareto frontier, namely the point that distributes the gains to 
cooperation equally between the household members. McElroy and Homey (1981) and 
McElroy (1990) (hereafter referred to as MHM) accordingly derive the corresponding sys-
tem of symmetric Nash household demands, along with its comparative static properties, 
in which individuals' utility weights are fixed with respect to changes in the exogenous 
parameters. 
In this chapter we argue, however, that under the sum of utilities interpretation of 
the collective model it is possible to derive a system of collective household demands 
in which the individual utility weights, as functions of the exogenous parameters, are 
included among the arguments of the demand functions. This follows since each pair of 
utility weights (in a 2- person household) corresponds to a distinct utility allocation (or 
a distinct consumption allocation if the analysis is carried out in consumption space). 
In deriving such a system of conditional demands for the collective model we are also 
able to derive the model's comparative static properties, taking into account both the 
direct effect of parameter changes on household demands as well as the indirect effect 
that occurs through changes in the individual utility weights. 
Second, CH offers a set of restrictions (referred to as restrictions on collectively ra-
tional egoistic agents, or CREA) that should characterize any efficient intrahousehold 
allocation. Since the solution to a symmetric Nash bargain is always efficient, we ex-
pect that such a solution will also satisfy CREA. CH also points out that the collective 
approach of generating only a continumn of efficient outcomes should encompass the 
symmetric Nash-bargained approach of selecting a particular efficient outcome, and so 
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the symmetric Nash framework must be a special case of the collective framework. CH 
therefore conjectures that the synunetric Nash should impose additional structure on the 
system of household demands, beyond that represented by CREA. However no formal 
proof of this has yet been offered. 
In this chapter we offer a more general characterization of the household decision 
process than has so far been offered under either the collective or the symmetric Nash 
approaches. We take the symmetric Nash model of MHM and develop a generalized 
version that explicitly takes account of differences between and variations in the 'bar-
gaining strength' of each family member. We demonstrate that such an approach retains 
the essential characteristics of the collective approach, namely that it does not restrict a 
priori the household's location on the Pareto frontier. In so doing it avoids one of the 
main criticisms of the symmetric Nash model. This approach also allows us to derive 
a system of household demands conditional upon location (as is also the case under the 
collective model). However our generalized Nash approach has the additional advantage 
of retaining one of the main strengths of the simple symmetric Nash model. Specifically, 
through specification of a pair of Nash disagreement utilities, the generalized Nash model 
allows for the possibility of disagreement among household members and for the oppor-
tunity cost of a person's household membership to influence any cooperative outcome. 
A generalized Nash approach therefore, by allowing a 'theory of household dissolution' 
to be incorporated into the intrahousehold resource allocation model and to have some 
influence over household decisions, as well as by avoiding the a priori restriction of the 
household's location on the Pareto frontier, offers an even more general characterization 
of the household decision process than that offered under either the symmetric Nash or 
the collective frameworks. 
This chapter is structured as follows. In section 2.2 we present a simple household 
bargaining problem with 2 household members, m and f. In section 2.3 we argue that 
a generalized Nash model (without the specification of a pair of disagreement utilities) 
is equivalent to the collective model in so far as both models use knowledge of the 
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individual utilities and of the household budget constraint to generate a continuum of 
efficient utility allocations, without restricting the household a priori to any particular 
point on the Pareto frontier. hi developing this argument we first discuss the set of utility 
allocations from which the household chooses under the collective and the generalized 
Nash frameworks. Under the collective model presented in CH, the household chooses a 
utility allocation from among the entire set of feasible utility allocations. The minimum 
utility payoffs are therefore just the minimum feasible utility payoffs. However under 
the symmetric Nash model of MHM (and the generalized version presented later on), a 
pair of disagreement utilities, interior to the set of feasible utilities, are specified for each 
household member. These disagreement utilities effectively form the minimum utility 
payoffs that are acceptable to the household members under any cooperative agreement. 
Under the generalized Nash model therefore, the household is restricted to choosing from 
a subset of the set of feasible utilities. We argue that if both the generalized Nash and 
the collective models specify the same minimmn acceptable utilities for each household 
member, then in both models the household will choose from the same (sub ) set of feasible 
utilities. More specifically, in both models the household will select an allocation from 
among the set of efficient allocations that lie upon exactly the same portion of the Pareto 
frontier. 
Formally, we state our equivalence result as follows: given individual preferences, a 
particular representation of those preferences and a set of exogenous parameters, then 
subject to certain restrictions on the disagreement utilities of the generalized Nash model, 
the collective and the generalized Nash classes of household preference orderings will 
rationalize the same set of household utility allocations. We then present a formal analysis 
of this point, in utility space. We specify the same, fixed, minimum utility payoff for each 
household member, and then following Pollak (1977), we formally define what is meant 
by the rationalization of an allocation (set of allocations) by a preference ordering (class 
of preference orderings). We then show that both the generalized Nash and the collective 
classes of household preference orderings must rationalize the same set of efficient utility 
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allocations, when both models specify the same minimum utility payoffs. Specifically, we 
show that for every possible efficient utility allocation, there is a distinct relative utility 
weight for which the generalized Nash model will yield this given utility allocation as a 
solution. Likewise we also show that, for every possible efficient utility allocation, there 
is a distinct relative utility weight for which the collective model will yield this given 
utility allocation as a solution.5 
Let J.l represent the weight attached to person f's utility relative to that of person 
m's utility in the collective household objective, and let the mapping J.l (a) represent 
the relationship between J.l and a vector, a, containing the exogenous parameters of the 
household decision problem. Likewise let 'Y represent the weight attached to person f's 
utility relative to that of person m's utility in the generalized Nash household objective, 
and let the mapping 'Y (a) represent the relationship between I and the parameter vector, 
a. An important corollary of our result is that, for any mapping f.l (a), we can find a 
mapping 'Y (a) = I (J.l (a) ,a) such that, for any given parameter vector a, both the 
collective and the generalized Nash models choose precisely the same utility allocation. 
We make two points with regard to this corollary. First, our result on the equivalence 
of the generalized Nash and the collective frameworks does not hinge on the relative 
utility weight 'Y (J.l ( a) , a) being used in the generalized Nash model whenever the relative 
weight J.l (a) is used in the collective model. By arguing that these two approaches are 
equivalent we are merely saying that both approaches generate a continuum of efficient 
household utility allocations and that neither approach restricts the household a priori 
to a particular location on the Pareto frontier. Second, if the generalized Nash utility 
weights are nevertheless chosen according to I (J.l (a) , a), then both models also yield 
the same particular utility allocation, for any parameter vector a. 
In section 2.4 we argue that a generalized Nash approach, when it allows for the 
possibility of disagreement among household members and for the opportunity cost of 
5Throughout this chapter we work with 2-person household models. 'Relative utility weight', there-
fore, refers to the utility weight of one family member, relative to that of the other, in the overall 
household objective. 
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each person's household membership to influence the cooperative outcome, in fact offers 
a more general characterization of the household decision process than that offered under 
the collective model of CH. We approach this formally by examining the properties ex-
hibited by both the collective and the generalized Nash demand systems, and by showing 
that the collective model of CH in fact entails more structure on household demands 
than the generalized Nash model presented below. 
In developing the analysis we follow the approach of J\1HM and Manser and Brown 
(1980) and allow each person's disagreement utility, in the generalized Nash problem, 
to be given by the maximized value of their individual utility in a private constrained 
maximization problem. Each disagreement utility therefore depends upon the parameters 
of the corresponding private optimization problem. Also we follow CH and allow the 
household, in the collective model, to choose from among the entire set of feasible utilities. 
We derive the fundamental matrix equations of comparative statics for both the col-
lective and the generalized Nash models and interpret them, as in J\1HM, as a complete 
statement of the empirical content of the respective models. We then derive the main 
properties of the collective and the generalized Nash demand systems. In particular we 
obtain Slutsky equations for both models and show that these equations are identical 
except for the presence of an extra term in the generalized Nash Slutsky equation. This 
extra term represents the effect of an increase in the price of good k, compensated by an 
increase in income, on the generalized Nash disagreement utilities, and the consequent 
effect this has on the intra-household demand for good j, Vj, k. We also show that re-
stricting the generalized Nash model so that its disagreement utilities are constant with 
respect to any change of parameter implies that the generalized Nash comparative sta-
tics collapse to the collective comparative statics and both models become empirically 
indistinguishable. 
In section 2.5 we recap some of the results obtained in MHM who analyzed the 
traditional and the symmetric Nash models and demonstrated that if the symmetric 
Nash fundamental equations were restricted so that its disagreement utilities no longer 
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varied with the exogenous parameters, then the comparative statics of the symmetric 
Nash demand system would collapse to those of the traditional demand system. The 
symmetric Nash demand system was therefore shown to generalize the traditional demand 
system so as to take account of the disagreement utilities and their possible dependence 
on the exogenous parameters. We combine the results of l\1HM with our own results to 
establish the following relationship between all four models: the comparative statics of 
the traditional model are nested within those of the symmetric Nash model which in turn 
are nested within those of the generalized Nash model. Also the comparative statics of 
the traditional model are nested within those of the collective model which in turn are 
nested within those of the generalized Nash. Section 2.6 concludes this chapter with a 
discussion of areas for further work. 
2.2 A Household Bargaining Problem 
We adopt the simplest formulation of a household bargaining problem6 and assume that 
the household consists of 2 members indexed h = m, f. 7 Let Xl be a good consumed 
by m, x2 a good consumed by j, x3 the leisure time of m and X4 the leisure time of f. 
Let XO represent a private consumption good which is shared whenever m and j form a 
household. We take XO to represent a pure public good so that consumption of XO by one 
individual does not diminish the amount available for consumption by the other. Then 
x is the (5 X 1) vector of household consumption goods and leisure (XO, xl, x2 , x\ x4 )' , 
with p the corresponding (5 X 1) vector of prices (pO,pl,p2,p3,p4)' . We refer to xl as 
the (3 X 1) consumption vector of j, (XO, x2, x4)' , and xm as the (3 X 1) consumption 
vector of m, (XO, Xl, x3)' . Finally, we index individual consumption goods and leisure by 
i,j,k = 0,1, .. ,4. 
60ur formulation is essentially the same as that adopted by MHM, CH and by Manser and Brown 
(1980), although it should be noted that in CH, no shared goods are included within the household 
members' consumption baskets. 
7 A more general analysis with n (> 2) household members can be developed, e.g. Creightney (1997). 
26 
Assumption 1. xi > 0, Vi. 
Family member h has non wage income yh (h = m, f) and a time endowment given by 
T. Then y is the (2 xl) vector of nonwage incomes (yrn, yf)' . Also we define a (rJ, y') 
as a vector containing all the parameters of the household's decision problem. The 
household's full income constraint is given by 
or equivalently 
where q is the (5 xl) vector of excess demands 
( ° 1 2 3 T 4 T)' (0 1 2 3 4)' X ,x ,x ,x - ,x - = q ,q ,q ,q ,q . 
Individual preferences are represented by the egoistic utility functions urn = urn (Xrn) = 
urn (XO, xl, x3) and Uf = Uf (xf) = U f (xO, x 2 , X4), for m and f respectively. Also U: 
and U~Z2 (h = m, f) represent, respectively, the first and second partial derivatives of 
Uh with respect to members of the vector x. 
Assumption 2. Uh (h = m, f) is twice continuously differentiable; also U! > ° V 
Z E xf; u;:: > ° V W E xrn; U£Z2 < 0, V ZI, Z2 E xf; and U:::;'W2 < 0, V WI, W2 E xrn. 
Given the household economy just described, the set of feasible consmnption alloca-
tions, X, is given by 
X = { x E R! : yrn + yf - p' q > o} , 
while the set of feasible utility allocations, U, is given by 
The following lemma presents some standard results on cooperative bargaining. 
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Lemma 1. The set of feasible utility allocations, U, is closed, bounded and strictly 
convex. 
Proof See Appendix .• 
The next two results demonstrate the role of the shared good, xo, in defining a non-
degenerate household bargaining problem. We first define the function V h (.) as person 
h's indirect utility function (h = m, f). The arguments of this function are just the 
parameters of person h's individual constrained maximization problem. We take V h to 
represent the value of h's indirect utility function for any given value of the parameters. 
Let x?n and x~ represent the quantities of the shared good, xo, consumed by m and f 
respectively when m and f act privately. Then 
vm vm (pO, pI ,p3, ym) 
.~ax {um (x~,xt,x3) /pox~ + plXl + p3X3 < ym + p3T} (2.1) 
x~,~=0,1,3 
and 
Vf Vf (pO,p2,p\ yf) 
i~ax {Uf (x~, x2, x4) /pox~ + p2X2 + p4X4 < yf + p4T}. (2.2) 
x ,1.=0,2,4 
In the absence of a shared good the corresponding indirect utilities are given by 
"om "om (pI, p3, ym) 






In general the indirect utilities (or disagreement utilities), vm and V f, where (vm, V f) E 
U, are the utilities received by m and f respectively in the event of a disagreement within 
the joint household. These utilities can be interpreted as the respective individual's pri-
vately optimal utility payoff or as their opportunity cost of household membership. In 
other words vm and V f represent the utility received by m and f, respectively, in their 
next best alternative.8 Suppose, in the joint household, individuals are able to reject any 
household allocation that leaves them less well off than they would otherwise be by acting 
privately. If this were indeed the case then any household bargain must offer individuals 
at least their privately optimal utility payoffs. Our next result demonstrates that if there 
are no shared goods then there can be no 'utility gains' to be had from membership of a 
joint household over and above the privately optimal utility payoffs just specified.9 
Lemma 2. Suppose there are no shared goods. Let (0, Xh, X3*) and (0, X2*, x4*) 
represent the consumption bundles that are privately optimal for m and f respectively, 
i.e. (0, Xh, X3*) is the solution to (2.3) while (0, X2*, x4*) is the solution to (2.4). Let Vom 
and V; represent the corresponding utility payoffs. Then there exists no (Um , Uf ) E U 
such that um > 110m and Uf > VJ. 
Proof. See Appendix .• 
Note that we must have vm > Von and Vf > VJ, since relaxation of the constraint 
x~ = ° cannot make person h worse off and may well make him/her better off (h = m, f)· 
The next result demonstrates that the presence of a shared good means that there are 
8Note however that the particular disagreement utilities we have specified in (2.1) - (2.4) are by no 
means the only candidates for such an interpretation. A different 'model' of household dissolution may 
well yield different utility levels (v, w) E U for individuals when they are no longer members of the joint 
household. We elaborate on this point later. 
9This simple formulation of course ignores any non-pecuniary benefits to being a member of a joint 
household. Implicit in our result is the assumption that individual utilities are independent of the 
'marital state'. 
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utility gains to be derived, from joint household membership, over and above what can 
be achieved privately. 
Lemma 3. Let vm, VI, Vom and VJ be as defined in (2.1) - (2.4). If there is a shared 
good and there are interior solutions for this shared good when individuals act privately, 
then there exists (Um, UI ) E U such that Um > vm > Yom and UI > VI > VJ. 
Proof. See Appendix .• 
Lemmas 2 and 3 are important for demonstrating the importance of including a shared 
good in our analysis of the household resource allocation problem. If household members 
are able to reject a joint household allocation in favour of some privately optimal utility 
payoff, such as the payoffs vm and V I, then the existence of a shared good will be both 
necessary and sufficient to ensure that an interesting bargaining problem exists, i.e. that 
the solution to the household bargaining problem is not degenerate. We have chosen to 
illustrate the point with reference to the particular feasible payoffs (vm, VI) , defined by 
(2.1) and (2.2). Note however that all we really require for a non-degenerate bargaining 
problem is that there exists (Um , UI) E U such that Um > v and Ul > w, for some 
(v, w) E U that represents the household members' 'disagreement utilities', however these 
disagreement utilities may be defined. If there were no feasible utility allocations that 
made at least one person better off by joining the household than by acting alone (and 
no one worse off), then there would be no incentive for household members to cooperate. 
2.3 Equivalence of the Generalized Nash and the 
Collective Approaches to Household Decision Mak-
• lng 
In this section we provide support for our claim, made in section 2.1, that given individual 
preferences, a particular representation of those preferences and a set of exogenous para-
meters, then subject to certain restrictions on the disagreement utilities of the generalized 
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Nash model, the collective and the generalized Nash classes of household preference or-
derings will rationalize the same set of household utility allocations. In Section 2.3.1, we 
discuss the household's choice set under the collective and under the generalized Nash 
frameworks. We argue that if both models specify the same minimum acceptable utilities 
for each household member, then in both cases the household will choose from the same 
(sub)set of feasible utilities. More specifically, in both cases the household will select 
an allocation from among the set of efficient allocations that lie upon exactly the same 
portion of the Pareto frontier. 
In Section 2.3.2 we formalize our analysis and present a formal definition of the 
rationalization of an allocation (set of allocations) by a preference ordering (class of 
preference orderings). Under this definition we show that both the generalized Nash 
and the collective classes of household preference orderings must rationalize the same set 
of efficient utility allocations, if both models specify the same minimum utilities. We 
then present a corollary of this result which says that for any relationship between the 
relative utility weight of the collective model and the exogenous parameters, we can find 
a relationship between the relative utility weight of the generalized Nash model and the 
exogenous parameters such that both models always select the same utility allocation for 
any given parameter vector. 
2.3.1 The Choice Set of Feasible and Efficient Utility Alloca-
tions 
Once individual preferences and the parameters of the problem have been specified, it is 
obvious that the set of feasible utility allocations, U, and the corresponding set of efficient 
utility allocations must be the same under the generalized Nash model as they are under 
the collective model. Nevertheless, there may be good reasons for excluding some of the 
allocations in U from consideration when solving the joint household's decision problem. 
If a joint household allocation leads to an individual receiving a utility payoff that is lower 
than some privately optimal payoff, then it may be reasonable to expect this allocation to 
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be rejected by the individual and therefore not to be chosen by the joint household, even 
if it is feasible. Furthermore we could model a pair of minimum payoffs in such a way 
as to capture the opportunity cost of household membership, and these payoffs could be 
the outcome of an appropriate theory of household dissolution. Such an approach would 
allow us to take account of possible noncooperative behaviour and to examine the way 
in which this influences the outcome within the cooperative setting. 
Under the symmetric Nash model of MHM, a pair of disagreement utilities, interior 
to U, are specified for each household member. These disagreement utilities are taken 
to be the utility payoffs that a household member would receive if s/he acted privately, 
and serve to restrict the set of utility allocations under consideration to a subset of U. 
In contrast, under the collective model of CH, no such disagreement utilities are speci-
fied and therefore any allocation in U can be considered by the household members when 
choosing a solution to the household bargaining problem. However if, in the collective 
model, we specified a payoff for each household member that was individually rational 
and which then formed that member's minimum acceptable payoff in the joint household 
agreement, and if these payoffs were taken to be the same as the disagreement utilities 
in the Nash-bargaining model, then the resulting restricted set of feasible utility allo-
cations would be identical in both models. Also, the set of efficient utility allocations 
corresponding to this restricted set would be the same in both cases. 
The Collective Model - Efficiency Interpretation 
Under the collective model specified by CH, household behaviour is a solution tolD 
~a~ {Um (xm) /U f (xf) > u f , ym + yf - pq > o} , 
x\Vt 
(Cl) 
for some feasible utility, uf , where u f is taken to be a function of the parameters of the 
model. Under this framework, the household Pareto frontier is defined, for any parameter 
lOHere we have modified the model presented in CH to include the shared good, xo, among the basket 
of goods consumed by household members. 
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vector a, by 
Given a, the set of efficient household allocations obtains as u f varies within its domain. 
Also, as a varies, the shape of the Pareto frontier also varies. Throughout we will use the 
notation F' (uf , a) and F" (uf , a) to refer, respectively, to the first and second partial 
derivatives of F with respect to u f , for a given a, i.e. F' (uf , a) = Fuf (uf , a) and 
F" (uf , a) = Fufuf (uf , a). Also we let Fw (uf , a) represent the derivative of F with 
respect to any element w in the parameter vector a. 
CH does not specify the domain of u f but it is clear that under the joint household 
full income constraint, the maximum feasible utility for f, ufnax, must be the utility that 
would accrue to f if m is constrained to zero consumption of Xl and x 3 , and f maximizes 
her individual utility subject to the joint budget constraint.ll Then 
If Uf = ufnax then since, in the solution to (2.6), the budget constraint is binding, we 
must have um = u:in = Um (x~*, 0,0) , where x~* is the level of XO chosen under (2.6). 
Alternatively, u~n = F (ufnax, a) . 
By a symmetric argument, the maximum feasible utility for m must be 
u:
ax 
= plax {Um (xm) /poxo + p1X1 + p3X3 < ym + yf + (p3 + p4) T}, (2.7) 
x ,'/.=0,1,3 
while the corresponding minimum feasible utility for f must be utrun Uf (x~, 0, 0) , 
where this time x~ is the level of XO chosen under (2.7). Alternatively utrun = F- 1 (u:ax , a) .12 
11 Note that although there are other consumption allocations for f that would yield the same utility 
as u f these would not be affordable given the strict concavity of Uf . 
12 Gi~~n any parameter vector a, the function describing the Pareto frontier, F ( u f , a) , is invertible 
since, as we will show later, it is monotonically decreasing in u f , i.e. F' (u f , a) = Fuf (u f , a) < 0, \luf . 
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Furthermore, since Uf (axf + (1 - a) x/) is continuous in a, Va E [0,1] and for any 
two feasible consumption allocations xf and x/, then Uf (axf + (1 - a) xl) vanffl con-
tinuously from Uf (xf) to Uf (xf) as a varies from 0 to l. 
Therefore the set of feasible utilities uf must be the compact interval [uf u f ] 
min' max , 
while the set of feasible utilities urn must be the compact interval [urn. urn ] We can 
mIn' max . 
therefore equivalently define the set of feasible utility allocations, U, as 
U = {(urn uf ) /urn E [urn. urn ] uf E [u f . uf ]} 
, mill' max , mill' max . 
Under the collective model, no assumptions are made concerning the behaviour of 
household members should they fail to reach a cooperative agreement, nor are any re-
strictions imposed on the minimum utility payoffs that are acceptable to either household 
member under a joint agreement (aside from the minimum and maximum feasible utilities 
just defined). Nevertheless under the rationality postulate and given a sufficient degree 
of individual freedom on the part of household members to refuse certain outcomes, it 
seems reasonable to ask whether household members will indeed accept a cooperative 
outcome that provides them with less than some individually rational outcome, however 
that may be defined. 
For example suppose we consider the individual constrained maximization problems 
for persons m and f under the worse possible scenario of a zero wage and zero nonwage 
mcome. Then it is easy to verify that the utility payoff to m under this scenario would 
be 
while the utility payoff to f would be 
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regardless of the prices pO, pI and p2 of the shared good and of the two consumption good". 
However if Vi (P0,p2, 0, 0) > ufnm then f would always do better by acting privately than 
she would in a cooperative agreement that offered less than V I (po, p2, 0, 0) . Similarly for 
m. In this example therefore as long as household members are always free to 'go it alone', 
it would seem reasonable, in the collective framework, to restrict the joint household to 
choose from the set UC C U given by 
We wish to make two points concerning this arglilllent. First, such a restriction of 
the joint household's choice set in the collective framework would entail the assumption 
that household members were indeed willing and able to reject certain offers. Second, the 
utility payoffs vm (po, pI , 0, 0) and V I (pO, p2, 0, 0) are by no means the only candidates for 
the individually rational payoffs in a collective model. Indeed any utility that would be 
available to a household member in his/her 'next best alternative' and that offers strictly 
more than the minimum feasible utility could be taken to be that household member's 
individually rational payoff. 
A Generalized Nash-Bargaining Model of Household Decisions 
In this section we present a generalized Nash-bargaining model of intrahousehold allo-
cations. This model is an extension of the symmetric Nash model of MHNI that takes 
account of differences between and variations in the 'bargaining strength' of individ-
ual household members. For each h, let {3h E [0,1] represent the weight attached to 
person h's utility gain in the Nash product function. {3h is taken to be a function of 
the exogenous parameters a, and I:h {3h = 1. We can interpret {3h as a measure of the 
bargaining strength of person hi the higher (3h the greater the 'influence' of person h's 
preferences in the solution to the joint household problem. Let I = g~ E [0,00) represent 
the utility weight of person f relative to that of person m. Finally, let (vm, VI) E U 
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represent the disagreement utilities for m and j, defined by (2.1) and (2.2) respectively 
and which we interpret as the minimum utilities that m and j would be willing to ac-
cept under the joint household decision. Note that these are the same disagreement 
utilities used by MHM, Manser and Brown (1978, 1980) and Brown and Manser (1977, 
1978) in their symmetric Nash-bargaining models of the household. Therefore for a 
given parameter vector a, the generalized Nash product function, N (x'; a) , is given by 
[um (xm) - vm] [UI (xl) - VI]'Y(a) and the joint decision problem becomes 
where vm and VI are given by expressions (2.1) and (2.2) respectively.13 
Since, under both the symmetric and the generalized Nash models, household mem-
bers are assumed to reject any allocation that offers less than the disagreement utilities, 
the effect of this assumption is to ensure that under a Nash cooperative agreement, 
household member h will receive no less than utility level V h (h = m, j). Under the 
Nash models therefore, the joint household is effectively restricted to choose from the set 
un c U, given by 
Discussion 
We have argued that under the symmetric and the generalized Nash-bargaining models 
the household is restricted to choosing from a subset, un, of the feasible utility allocations, 
U. We have additionally argued that under the collective framework there may be good 
reasons for also restricting the set of utility allocations from which a household can 
13 Note that we have transformed the usual Nash product function 
[Um (xm) _ vm],87l> (0:) [Ul (xl) - VI],8f(o:) by raising it to the power ,877>\0:). This represents a 
positive monotonic transformation and therefore does not alter the household's overall preference 
ordering nor the solution to the programme GN. 
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choose, say to a set such as UC. Note however that the sets un and UC could be defined 
more generally as 
UN = {(Um , Uf ) : x EX, Um > u~, Uf > u~} 
and 
U C = {(Um Uf) : x E X Um > um Uf > u f } 
, ,- C' - C , 
respectively, for some appropriately chosen (u~, u~) and (u~, un which belong to the 
interior of U . Under the symmetric Nash models of MIllvI, Manser and Brown (1978, 
1980) and Brown and Manser (1977, 1978) and under the generalized version presented 
here, (u~, u~) is given by 
(vm (0 13m) VI (0 2 4 f)) P ,p ,p ,Y , P ,p ,p ,Y . 
Under the collective model of CH we effectively have (um uf ) o-iven by (um . uf .) 
c, C b L IDln' mIn , 
although we also suggested that at the very least we might have (u~, un given by 
In fact there are any number of possibilities for choosing (u~, u~) and (u~, ut). First, 
we could simply take them to be (urin' u'fnin) as is already implied llllder the collective 
framework. Note that strictly speaking there is nothing in the Nash model to prevent 
the disagreement utilities also being given by (urin' u'fnin) . However as argued earlier, if 
a household member's next best alternative offers more than his/her minimum feasible 
payoff, this begs the question as to why he/she would choose to accept an outcome, llllder 
the joint household agreement, that offered less than the outcome obtainable llllder some 
alternative arrangement. Second, if the utility payoffs from the worse possible private 
scenario, vm (pO,p\ 0, 0) and V f (pO,p2, 0, 0), were strictly greater than uriu and u~n' 
respectively, we could take (u~, u~) and (u~, un to be these worse case private outcomes. 
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Third, we could take (u~, u~) and (u~, un to be (vm (pO, pI ,p3, ym), Vf (p0,p2,p\ ym)) 
as is the case under existing models of Nash-bargained hOll..-;;ehold behaviour. Finally, we 
might offer some alternative theory of household dissolution and allow the disagreement 
utilities, in any household bargaining problem, to be predicted by this theory. 
The discussion in this section highlights the fact that however we choose to specify 
the allocations (u~, u~) and (u~, un, it is clear that once individual preferences and the 
exogenous parameters have been specified, the choice set of utility allocations (and the 
corresponding set of efficient allocations) facing a household will be identical under the 
generalized Nash and the collective models as long as we specify (u~, u~) = (u~, un . 
2.3.2 A Formal Analysis in Utility Space 
Before proceeding further we summarize the following results of the household bargain-
ing problem specified in section 2.2 and the corresponding Pareto frontier specified in 
equation (2.5) .14 
Lemma 4. (i) X is convex. (ii) The set of feasible utilities, u f , is a compact interval. 
(iii) F' (uf , a) < 0, F" (u f , a) < 0 and F (uf , a) is continuously differentiable. (iv) 
For each u f in its domain there is a unique consumption allocation x E X for which 
Proof. See Appendix .• 
Suppose we set the minimum acceptable utilities in the generalized Nash model equal 
to those in the collective model. Then (u~,u~) = (u~,un = (um,uf ) E U. The 
household's choice set is therefore 
14These results and their proof are analogous to those obtained by Thomas and Worrall (1988, p. 545) 
in a different (dynamic) context. 
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while the corresponding set of efficient allocations is given by 
Since F' < 0, the maximum utility for m is given by ilrn = F ( uf , a) and the maximum 
utility for f is given by ilf = F-l (urn, a) . We can now state the following definitions.15 
Definition 1. Given a choice set, U', a joint household preference ordering, R, is said 
to rationalize a utility allocation (urn, uf ) E U' if and only if the allocation that would 
be chosen under R coincides with (urn, uf ), i.e. 
U* 
Since U' must be strictly convex, then llllder the appropriate concavity assumptions 
over R, the set U* must be a singleton. fu this case the preference ordering R strongly 
rationalizes (urn, uf ) . If U* is multi-valued, then R weakly rationalizes (urn, uf ) if and 
only if (urn, uf ) E U*. We extend definition 1 as follows. 
Definition 2. Let the choice set, U', and the corresponding set of efficient allocations, 
U~, be given. Let RW represent a class of household preference orderings such that for 
every value of the parameter w E [0,00) , RW chooses a distinct utility allocation from the 
choice set U'. A class of household preference orderings, RW, is said to rationalize the 
set of efficient utility allocations, U~, if and only if for every (F (u f , a) ,uf ) E U~ there 
is a distinct value of w such that the allocation that would be chosen llllder RW coincides 
15Definition 1 adapts the definitions in Pollak (1977), on the weak and strong rationalization of a 
demand system by an individual's preference ordering, to the current context. Definition 2 extends 
definition 1 to a class of preference orderings. 
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with (F (u!, a) ,u!) . Fonnally, V (F (u! , a) ,u!) E U~, there exists w such that 
(F ( u! , a) ,u!) 
U* e 
{(F (u!,a) ,u!) E U~: (F (u!,a) ,u!) RW (F (u/,a) ,f/) V (F (v/,a) ,u!) E u~}. 
Let (F (u!, a) ,u!) and (F (u!, a) ,u!) be any two allocations in u~ such that (F (u!, a) ,u!) 
is chosen under RW and (F (u! , a) ,u!) is chosen under RW. Then 
(F (u!, a) ,u!) =1= (F (u!,a) ,u!) if and only if w =l=w. 
As before since ur is strictly convex, then under the appropriate concavity assump-
tions over RW, Vw, the set U: must also be a singleton. 
We now present the main results of this section. Let, E [0, 00) represent the relative 
utility weight in the generalized Nash model GN with (vrn, V!) replaced by (urn, u!) . 
We can now state the following result: 
Proposition 1. Let the parameter vector, a, and the corresponding Pareto frontier, 
F (', a), be given. For every allocation (F (u!, a) ,u!) on the frontier, there exists a 
unique value of , (u!, a) E [0,00) for which the allocation (F (u!, a) ,u!) would be 
chosen under the generalized Nash model. Suppose (F (u!, a) ,u!) and (F (il/, a) , il/) 
are any two allocations on the Pareto frontier such that (F (u! , a) ,u!) is chosen when 
,=, (u!, a) and (F (u!,a) ,u!) is chosen when, =, (u!,a) =:y. Then 
(F (u!,a) ,u!) =1= (F (u!,a) ,u!) if and only if, (u!,a) =1=, (il/,a). 
Finally, as u! rises from u! to its maximum value, il/, (and as F ( u! , a) correspondingly 
falls from ilrn to urn) , (u!, a) varies from ° to 00. 
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Proof· The generalized Nash model GN can be equivalently specified' til' hr 




Any solution to this problem must satisfy 
or 
F' (uf a) (Uf _ uf)'Y + ,(F (Uf,a) - ~m) (Uf - ~f)'Y = 0 
,- (Uf - u f ) . 
Dividing through by (Uf - uf)'Y implies 
and re-arranging gives us 
(2.8) 
For every value of Uf and corresponding utility allocation (F (Uf, a) ,Uf) , expression 
(2.8) tells us the value of, for which the allocation (F (Uf, a) ,Uf) would be an optimal 
solution to GNu. Alternatively, if the value of, is determined exogenously, then (2.8) 
tells us the utility allocation (F (Uf, a) ,Uf) that represents an optimal solution to GNu. 
Furthermore, since 
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UI -ul F"(f) -
- U ,a F(Uf,a) _ urn 
is always strictly positive, then , (U f, a) must be a positive monotonic function of U f. 
This implies that for any two allocations (F (uf , a) ,ul ) and (F (it/ , a) ,it/) on the 
Pareto frontier, we must have (F (u l , a) ,ul ) =1= (F (it/, a) ,it/) if and only if , ( u l , a) i= 
, (it/, a). Therefore for every allocation (F (U I, a) , U f) there is a distinct value of 
,(UI,a) for which (F (UI,a) ,UI) would be chosen under GNu. 
Finally, it is easy to verify that whenever UI = ul , ,(UI,a) = 0. Also, as UI rises 
. towards v/, F (U f , a) approaches urn and F' (U f, a) becomes more negative. Therefore 
,(Uf, a) approaches 00 .• 
We mentioned in section 2.1 that in CH, the collective decision process is sometimes 
formally represented as the constrained maximization of a weighted sum of individual 
utilities, with the weights taken to be a function of the exogenous parameters of the 
household's decision problem. Under this interpretation household decisions are a solu-
tion to 
(C2) 
where f.1 (a) E [0, 00 ). Here f.1 is interpreted as the weight of person f's utility in the 
household's decision, relative to that of person m. The next result shows that for every 
efficient utility allocation, there is a distinct value of f.1 E [0,00) for which the given 
allocation will be a solution under the smn of utilities interpretation of the collective 
model. 
Proposition 2. As before, let a and the corresponding frontier F (., a) be given. For 
every allocation (F (u l , a) ,uf ) on the frontier, there exists a unique value f.1 ( u l , a) E 
[0,00) for which (F (uf , a) ,uf ) would be chosen under the sum of utilities collective 
model. Suppose (F (u l , a) ,ul ) and (F (it/, a) ,it/) are any two allocations on the fron-
tier such that (F (uf , a) ,uf ) is chosen when f.1 = f.1 (uf , a) and (F (it/, a) ,iJ/) is chosen 
42 
when f-t = f-t (ill, a) = ji,. Then 
(F (uf , a) ,uf ) =I- (F (iJ/, a) ,ill) if and only if f-t (uf , a) =I- f-t (ill, a) . 
Finally, as uf rises from uf to its maximum value, iJl, (and F (uf , a) correspondingly 
falls from ilrn to urn) f-t (uf , a) varies from 0 to 00. 
Proof· The sum of utilities collective model C2 can be equivalently expressed, in 
utility space, as 
or equivalently, 
(C2u) 
It is easy to verify that any solution to this problem must satisfy 
f-t = f-t (Uf,a) = -F' (Uf,a). (2.9) 
For every value of U f and corresponding utility allocation (F (U f , a) , U f) , expression 
(2.9) tells us the value of f-t for which (F (Uf, a) ,Uf) would be an optimal solution to 
C2u . Alternatively, if the value of f-t is determined exogenously, then (2.9) tells us the 
utility allocation (F (Uf, a) ,Uf) that represents an optimal solution to (2.9). 
Furthermore, since aI-£1~t') = -F" (Uf,a) is always strictly positive, f-t (uf,a) must 
be a positive monotonic function of U f. This implies that for any two allocations (F (uf , a) ,uf ) 
and (F (ill, a) ,ill) on the Pareto frontier, we must have (F (u f , a) ,uf ) =I- (F (ill, a) ,ill) 
if and only if f-t (uf , a) =I- f-t (ill, a) . Therefore for every allocation (F (Uf, a) ,Uf) there 
is a distinct value of f-t (U f , a) for which (F (U f , a) , U f) would be chosen under C2u. 
Finally, as U f rises towards ilf, f-t ( uf , a) approaches 00 .• 
Propositions 1 and 2 support our conjecture that, given individual preferences, a 
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particular cardinal representation of those preferences and a set of exogenous parameters, 
the generalized Nash and the collective classes of household preference orderings will 
rationalize the same set of efficient household utility allocations. Combining propositions 
1 and 2 gives us the following corollary. 
Corollary 1. Suppose the value of /-t in the collective model is some function of the 
parameter vector a, with the mapping /-t (a) being positive and differentiable. Then we 
can find a positive, differentiable mapping ,(/-t (a) ,a) such that, for every parameter 
vector, a, and for every positive, differentiable mapping, /-t (a), the allocation chosen 
under the collective model with relative utility weight /-t (a) coincides with the allocation 
chosen under the generalized Nash model with relative utility weight, (f..L (a), a). 
Proof. Choose any positive, differentiable mapping /-t (a) from the parameter space 
into [0, (0) and pick a particular parameter vector & from the set of all possible parameter 
vectors. Let the resulting value jl = /-t (&) be the relative utility weight in the collective 
model and let F (., &) represent the Pareto frontier corresponding to the parameter vector 
&. Proposition 2 demonstrated that the collective model will select, as a solution, the 
allocation (F (U f , &) , U f) that satisfies jl = - F' (U f , &) . Denote the chosen allocation 
by (F (Uf*, &) ,Uf*) . Then jl = -F' (Uf*, &) . From proposition 1 we know that we can 
find a value , E [0, (0) for which the allocation (F (U!*, &) , U f*) would also be chosen 
under a generalized Nash model with relative utility weight ,. The required value of" 
denoted by ~, is given by 
Repeating this procedure for every possible parameter vector a allows us to define the 
positive, differentiable mapping 
(2.10) 
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with Ut on the right hand side chosen according to 
~ (a) = -F' (Ut , a) , (2.11) 
for any positive, differentiable mapping ~ (a). Let G (., a) = F'-l (., a) ,Va, and ;: = 
-~ (a). We can therefore express (2.11) equivalently as 
ut F,-l (-~ (a) ,a) 
G (z,a), z = -~(a), (2.12) 
and the mapping , (~ ( a) , a) can thus be expressed entirely in terms of a and ~ (a): 
G (z a) - ut ,(~ (a), a) = -F' (G (z, a), a) F (G (z,'a) , a)-- 'J!.m' 
where z = -~ (a) .• 
We can also state the following result. 
(2.13) 
Corollary 2. For any positive, differentiable mapping ~ (a) representing the relative 
utility weights in the collective model, if the relative utility weights in the generalized 
Nash model are chosen according to the mapping ,(~ (a), a), as specified in (2.10) or 
(2.13), then both models will always yield the same solution for any given parameter 
vector a. 
Proof. Choose any positive, differentiable mapping ~ (a) and set, (U t , a) = , (~ (a) , a) 
on the left hand side of expression (2.8). Then on the left hand side of (2.8) we must 
have Ut chosen according to (2.11). But this is just the solution to the collective model. 
It follows that Ut on the right hand side of (2.8), i.e. the solution to the generalized 
Nash model, must also satisfy (2.11), the solution to the collective model. • 
Suppose the parameter vector a is given so that the Pareto frontier is fixed. Then 
for any value of ~ (obtained under alternative mappings ~ ( a)) and corresponding utility 
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allocation (F (Uf, a) ,Uf) determined by (2.11) or (2.12), expressions (2.10) and (2.13) 
can be interpreted as telling us the value of, under which the generalized Nash model 
will yield the same utility allocation. On the other hand, suppose the parameter vector 
a is allowed to vary for a given mapping J-L (a) . Again expressions (2.10) and (2.13) can 
be interpreted as telling us the value of, under which the generalized Nash model will 
yield the same utility allocation. 
Corollary 2 demonstrates that if the generalized Nash relative utility weights are 
chosen according to, (J-L (a) ,a) , as specified in (2.10) or (2.13), then both the generalized 
Nash and the collective models will always choose the same utility allocation along the 
Pareto frontier. It follows that the total effect of a change in the parameter w E a on the 
chosen utility allocation must also be the same under both models. Note, however, that 
our result on the equivalence of the generalized Nash and the collective frameworks does 
not hinge on the relative utility weight ,(J-L (a) , a) being used in the generalized Nash 
model whenever the relative weight J-L (a) is used in the collective. By arguing that the 
two approaches are equivalent we are merely saying that both approaches rationalize the 
same set of efficient utility allocations whenever they specify the same minimum utility 
payoffs. Both approaches therefore generate the same continuum of efficient household 
utility allocations, and neither approach restricts the household a priori to a particular 
location on the Pareto frontier. 
2.4 Properties of Collective and Generalized Nash-
Bargained Household Demand Systems 
We now investigate the properties of the household demand systems implied by the 
collective and the generalized Nash frameworks. Suppose both approaches make the same 
specifications with regard to each person's minimum utility payoffs. Then the resulting 
generalized Nash and collective demand system..<:; will exhibit the same properties. This 
will be true regardless of how the minimum utilities are specified. In this regard there 
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are ffi.~entially three alternatives: either no minimum payoffs are specified so that the 
household chooses from the entire set of feasible utilities; or a pair of minimum utilities, 
different from the minimum feasible utilities, are specified for each player and are assumed 
to be constant; or a pair of disagreement utilities are specified which depend on certain 
parameters of the household decision problem. The point here is that it does not matter 
what assumptions we make regarding these minimum utilities. As long as both models 
make the same assumptions, then both approaches will yield demand systems that exhibit 
the same properties. 
Under the symmetric Nash-bargaining approach developed in MHM and Manser and 
Brown (1980) (and the generalized version presented below), any cooperative outcome 
must offer, to each individual, a utility payoff that is no less than that individual's 
'opportunity cost' of household membership as represented by their disagreement utility. 
In these models each person's disagreement utility is given by the maximized value of their 
individual utility in a private constrained maximization problem and therefore depends 
upon the parameters of this private optimization problem. On the other hand, under the 
collective approach offered by CH the household chooses from among the entire set of 
feasible utilities. 
In the remainder of this chapter we demonstrate that this collective approach entails 
greater restrictions on household demands than is entailed by a generalized Nash approach 
that takes account of the opportunity cost of household membership and of how this 
opportunity cost is related to the parameters of the hou~hold decision problem. Section 
2.4.1 derives the nmdamental matrix equations of comparative statics for the collective 
model and derives the structural properties of the collective system of household demands. 
Section 2.4.2 carries out a similar analysis for the generalized Nash model. In section 2.5 
we discuss the relationship between the collective and the generalized Nash approaches 
and demonstrate that the collective model presented in CH entails more restrictions on 
household demand systems than the generalized Nash approach presented below. We also 
summarize the comparative statics of the traditional and the symmetric Nash demand 
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systems and demonstrate a nesting stnlcture between all four models. 
2.4.1 Collective Demand Systems and Comparative Statics 
For any parameter vector a and a corresponding value J.L (a) E [0, (0) , collective house-
hold decisions must be the solution to 
(C2) 
The set of feasible consumption allocations, X, is convex (lemma 4), closed (since all 
feasible allocations must satisfy the budget constraint), bounded from below in the x's 
and contains the null vector (assumption 1). Also, under assumption 2, the collective 
household objective function, U (x'; a) , given by 
U (x'; a) = Um (xm) + J.L (a) Uf (xf) , 
is twice continuously differentiable and strictly concave on X, as well as increasing in 
each Xi. Therefore the solution to C2 exists and is unique. If, in the solution to C2, we 
have xi* = xi* (a, J.L (a)) > 0, Vi, (an interior solution) and ,\* = ,\* (a, J.L (a)) > 0, where 
,\ is the Lagrange multiplier on the joint household budget constraint in the problem C2, 
then the first order conditions for this programme can be written as16 




which are the conditions obtained in CH (p. 82) for an efficient allocation of the private goods. Also, 
1!:M t 1 
the condition for XO implies {-U;J (xm) + J-L.xa U!o (xl) = pO, where ~ = um1xm ),i = 1,3, and>: = 
A ",t 






ym + yf - p' q = O. (2.18) 
To obtain the fundamental equations of comparative statics, totally differentiate con-
ditions (2.17) and (2.18) with respect to each of the parameters in a. (See the Appendix 
to this chapter for a complete derivation). The resulting equations can be arranged into 
a system of matrix equations, evaluated at the solution xi* = xi* (a, J1 (a)), Vi, and 


















-A] + Uxp Uxy UxJ.t 
(5x5) (5x5) (5x2) (5xl) 
-q' i' 0 
(lx5) (lx2) (lxl) 
= 0 . 
(6x8) 
(2.19) 
To understand the members of (2.19), first define Ux as an array of the gradients of 
(5x2) 
each person's utility function, 
[
auf. aum] (£~) - axi : axi ; 
(5xl) (5xl) 




as a (1 X 2) vector of the partial derivatives of J1 with respect to the non wage 
(lx2) 
(2.16) is the standard condition for an efficient level of provision of a public good, such as xo, and is 




[all. all] (txY2) - aym: Byf . 
Then the members of (2.19) are given by Uxx , the (5 X 5) Hessian of the collective 
(5X5) 
objective function U (x'; a) , 
auf 
Uxp - axi IIp ; 
(5x5) (5xl) (lx5) 
auf 
Uxy - axi Ily ; 
(5x2) (5xl) (lx2) 




The matrices p and q are given by p = [Pi], P = [pi] and q' = [qh]; i' 18 a 
(5xl) (lx5) (lx5) (lx2) 
(1 X 2) vector of ones; >"1 is the (5 X 5) identity matrix multiplied by the Lagrange 
(5x5) 
multiplier >..*; Xp is the (5 X 5) matrix of llllcompensated price effects, 
(5x5) 




and XJ.L is a (5 X 1) vector of the effect of J-t on consumption demands 
(5x 1) , 
XJ.L = [8:"] . 
(5x 1) f"" 
We also have Ap , Ay and AJ.L given, respectively, by [0>. ~ J ' [0>';': 8>.; 1 and [0>.' J . 
(1X5) (1x2) (1x1) 8p 8y 8y OJ.L 
Finally, 0 and 0 are, respectively, the scalar zero and (6 X 8) matrix of zeros. 
(1x1) (6X8) 
We are now in a position to examine the structural properties of observed demand 
functions as implied by the collective model. Given a parameter vector a and a corre-
sponding value J-t (a) E [0, 00 ) , the solution to the programme C2 is a system of collective 
demand equations xi* = xi* (a,J-t(a)) , Vi, as well as a solution for ,\* = ,\* (a,J-l(a)). 
These collective demands describe the response of household demands not only to vari-
ations in prices and nonwage incomes but also to variations in the value of J-l, i.e. to 
changes in the internal 'distribution of bargaining power'. However as Browning and 
Chiappori (1996) argue, we do not in fact observe variations in the value of J-l nor do we 
observe the response of household demands to such variation. Instead we observe some 
demand system Xi (a) ,Vi, defined by Xi (a) = xi* (a, J-t (a)) . We also observe the response 
of these demands to variations in prices and non wage incomes, for some specific, unob-
servable mapping J-t (a) that characterizes the distribution of bargaining power within the 
household in question. We are interested in obtaining the structural properties, implied 
by the collective framework, of such observable demands. First we make the following 
assumption: 
Assumption 3. The rank of p' = 1. 
(1x5) 
Since the collective household objective function, U (x; a), is twice continuously dif-
ferentiable and strictly concave on X, it follows that the Hessian of U (x; a) , the (5 X 5) 
matrix Uxx = [oo~:: .J ,must be symmetric and negative definite. Since Uxx is symmetric (5x5) x~ xJ (5x5) 
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is also symmetric. 
Therefore, since Uxx is negative definite and, under assmnption 3, the rank of p' = 1, 
(5x5) (lx5) 
Uxx -p 






and can be partitioned as (5x5) (5xl) 
g~ kc 





















-.AI + Uxp Uxy UXJ.L 




(lx5) (lx2) (lxl) 
From (2.20) we see that 
X U '1 Y = - ac xy - gc 1, 
(5x2) (5x5)(5x2) (5xl)(1x2) 
Poot-multiplying by [ ~ 1 ] implies 
XYm - X y ! 
(5xl) (5xl) 
_ ac UXY [ 1 ] 
(5x5)(5x2) -1 
- a c UXJ.L J-Ly [ 1 ] 
(5x5)(5xl)(lx2) -1 
(2.20) 
17See Takayama, A. (1994, pp. 130). See also Caratheodory, C. (1967, pp. 195-96) and Samuelson, P. 
A. (1947, pp. 378-79). 
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XJ.L /-Ly [ 1 ] 
(5xl)(lx2) -1 
(2.21) 
Condition (2.21) tells us that lUlder the collective framework, as long as changes in Yrn 
and y! have different effects on the value of /-L, then XYm - X y ! =I- 0 and there will be no 
(5xl) (5xl) 
income-pooling lUlder the collective model. In this case each family member's nonwage 
income will enter the collective demand equations separately. 
Now solving for 9c implies 
(5xl) 
1 [ au!] 9c = -- Xy + ac --. J-Ly 
(5xl) 2 (5x2) (5x5) ax? (lx2) (5xl) 
'l 
(2xl) 
From (2.20) we also have 
Xp = - ac 
(5x5) (5x5) [ au! ] -)..] + -. J-Lp + 9c q . (5x5) ax? (lx5) (5Xl)(lx5) (5xl) 
Replacing 9c in this expression and re-arranging gives us 
(5xl) 
1 
Xp +- Xy i q 
(5x5) 2 (5x2)(2xl)(lX5) 
au! {I } ac )..] - ac --. J-Lp +- /-Ly i q 
(5X5)(5x5) (5x5) (~;;) (lx5) 2 (lX2)(2Xl)(lX5) 
{
I. f} 
= ac )..] + XJ.L /-Lp +- /-Ly 'l q . 
(5x5)(5X5) (5xl) (lx5) 2 (lX2)(2xl)(lX5) 
(2.22) 
We follow Browning and Chiappori (1996) and interpret (2.22) as follows. If ~~~ = 
:/*, '\Ij, then the left hand side of (2.22) reduces to Xp + X y q ,where X y = [8;;*] 
(5x5) (5xl)(lx5) (5xl) 
and Y = ym + yf. This is the usual Slutsky matrix, with Y representing aggregate 
household income. If ~~::. =I- :;, '\I j, the left hand side of expression (2.22) represents 
the Slutsky matrix, generalized to take accolUlt of possible differences in the response 
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of household demands to variations in individual income. Suppose the price of good k 
increases by dpk, with the change compensated by an increase in household income of 
qk*dpk. The effect of this on good j is 
which represents the elements in the Slutsky matrix on the left hand side of (2.22). Con-
dition (2.22) therefore tells us that this effect consists of two components: a substitution 
effect, given by the corresponding term in the symmetric and negative semi definite ma-
trix, ac ),,1, and which holds household utility and the relative utility weight constant; (5x5)(5x5) . 
and an effect on the value of /1, given by 
which in turn will affect the consumption of good j by an amount 
We can now summarize the main restrictions on any system of household demands 
implied by the collective framework as follows: 
1. The Slutsky matrix Xp +~ Xy i q need not be symmetric and negative 
(5x5) (5x2)(2xl)(lx5) 
semi definite. 
2. The Slutsky matrix is decomposed according to 
1 , 'I X { 1 ., } Xp +- Xy i q = ac /\ + J-t /1p +- /1y 'I, q . 
(5x5) 2 (5x2)(2xl)(lX5) (5X5)(5X5) (5xl) (lx5) 2 (lX2)(2xl)(lX5) 
(2.22) 
3 AB long as ~ -'- ~ collective decision making implies the absence of income 
. 8yfn r 8yf' 
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pooling within the household, i.e. 
XYrn - X y ! = XJ1- /-ly [ 1 ] i= O. 
(5xl) (5xl) (5xl)(lx2) -1 
(2.21) 
This completes our analysis of the restrictions on household demand systems implied by 
the collective model of household decision making. We now turn to an analysis of the 
generalized Nash-bargaining model. 
2.4.2 Generalized Nash-Bargained Demand Systems and Com-
parative Statics 
For any parameter vector a and a corresponding value for ,(a) = :~~~ E [0, 00) , any 
system of Nash-bargained household demands must be a solution to 
where the disagreement utilities are given by 
vm vm (pO,pl,p3,ym) 
plax {um (xm) /pox~ + plXI + p3X3 < ym + p3T} 
x ,t=O,I,3 
and 
Vi Vi (pO,p2,p\yl) 
.I!lax {Ul (xl) /pox~ + p2x2 + p4X4 < yl + p4T}. 
X~,t=O,2,4 
Under assumption 2, the generalized Nash product function, 
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is twice continuously differentiable on X. Since , (a) E [0, 00 ), N (x'; a) is increasing in 
the x's. Furthermore since f3h (a) E [0,1], Vh, and Lh f3h (a) = 1, N (x'; a) is strictly 
quasi-concave (and hence quasi-concave) on U. Therefore since the set X is convex, 
closed, bounded from below in the x's and contains the null vector, the solution to GN 
exists and is unique. 
Suppose, in the solution to GN, we have 
(an interior solution) and 
where A is the Lagrange multiplier on the joint household budget constraint in the prob-
lem GN. Then by differentiating the appropriate Lagrangian we obtain the first order 
conditions18 
18Since conditions (2.23) imply 
[u f (xl) - v'f(a) U;J (xm) + I' (a) [f; ~:~? ~ ~~] [Uf (xl) - v'f(a) U;o (xl) 
[UI (xl) - Vlr(a) U;; (xm) A(a)pi,i = 1,3, 
and 
( ) [um (xm) - vm] [Ul ( I) _ Vl]')'(a) Uf (xl) = \() i· 2 4 I' a [UI (xl) _ VI] x x' A a p ,'/, = , , 
then combining the conditions on Xi, i = 1, .. ,4, gives us the same conditions as (2.14) and (2.15), 
shown in CR to characterize an efficient allocation of the private consumption goods. Conditions 
(2 23) I . I 1 Um (m) 1 ( ) [Urn(xm)- V m ] Ul ( I) - ° h 1 - pi i 1 3 d . a so Imp y :x xo x +:xl' a [UI(xl)- VI) xO X - P ,were :x - u:;i(xm) , = , , an 
l = [urn (.,rn( V 7Tl J I I' j = 2,4. We therefore have 
')'(a) [ul(.,f)-vf) u.,j (x ) 
U;J (xm) U;o (xl) 
_-=--'-_....,. + = pO, Vi = 1,3, j = 2,4, 
U;; (xm) /pi U!xj (xl) /pj 
which is the same condition as (2.16) and which characterizes an efficient level of the shared good xO. 
As expected, the generalized Nash model of household decisions leads to an efficient allocation, within 






To obtain the fundamental equations of comparative statics, totally differentiate con-
ditions (2.23) and (2.24) with respect to each of the parameters in a. (Again see the 
Appendix to this chapter for a complete derivation). We can arrange the resulting equa-
tions into a system of matrix equations, evaluated at the solution 
Ai Ai ( () vm (0 13m) Vf (0 2 4 f)) \:1' x = x a" a, p ,p ,p ,Y , P ,p ,p ,Y ,1" 
and 
This gives us: 
Nxx -p Xp Xy Xv X, -AI + Nxp Nxy Nxv Nx, 
(5x5) (5xl) (5x5) (5x2) (5x2) (5xl) + 
(5x5) (5x5) (5x2) (5x2) (5xl) 0 -
-p' 0 Ap Ay AV A, -ej i' 0 0 (6xlO) 
(lx5) (lxl) (lx5) (lx2) (lx2) (lxl) (lx5) (lx2) (lx2) (lxl) 
(2.25) 
To understand the members of (2.25) define Ux , as before, as the (5 X 2) array of the 
(5x2) 
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gradients of each person's utility function, 








f (')I - 1) ~; gl, (gf)'Y (-1), f gl, (gf)'Y (-1) ] 
ftr(gf)'Y(-l), 0 
respectively, where gf = Uf (xf) - Vf and gm = Um (xm) - vm represent the respective 
utility gains to f and m in the solution to GN; Vp as the (2 X 5) matrix containing the 
(2x5) 
effects of price changes on the disagreement utilities, 
8V' ] &p4 . 
, 
o 
fp as a (1 x 5) vector of the partial derivatives of f with respect to the prices, 
(lx5) 
fp [:~] ; 
(lx5) P 











and 'y as a (1 x 2) vector of the partial derivatives of , with respect to the nonwage 
(lx2) 
Incomes, 
rv =[kL .!!l] Iy - ayfn ayf . 
(lx2) 
Then we can write the members of (2.25) as Nxx , the (5 X 5) Hessian of the Nash product 
(5x5) 
function N (x; a), 
Nxp , the (5 X 5) matrix of second partial derivatives of N (x'; a) with respect to the 
(5x5) 
pnces, 
N xp - [arP: k] = Ux [Bl Vp + B2 ,p]; 
(5x5) x'" 'P (5x2) (2x2)(2x5) (2xl)(lX5) 
Nxy , the (5 X 2) matrix of second partial derivatives of N (x'; a) with respect to the 
(5x2) 
nonwage mcomes, 
Nxv , the (5 X 2) matrix of second partial derivatives of N (x'; a) with respect to the 
(5x2) 
disagreement utilities, 
and N x" the (5 X 1) vector of second partial derivatives of N (x'; a) with respect to" 
(5xl) 
The p matrices are given by p = [Pi] and p' = [pi], while this time we have q = [(tJ; 
(5xl) (lx5) (lx5) 
i' is a (1 X 2) vector of ones; AI is the (5 X 5) identity matrix multiplied by the 
(lx2) (5x5) 
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Lagrange multiplier.x; Xp is the (5 x 5) matrix of uncompensated price effects, 
(5x5) 
Xy is the (5 x 2) matrix of the marginal impacts of nonwage incomes on demands, 
(5x2) 
Xv, the (5 x 2) matrix of the effects of changes in the disagreement utilities on demands, 
(5x2) 
and X"f , the (5 xl) vector of the effect of changes in , on demands, 
(5xl) 
Finally we have Ap , the (1 x 5) matrix of the effects of price changes on the Lagrange 
(lx5) 
multiplier, 
Ay , the (1 x 2) matrix of the effects of changes in non wage incomes on the Lagrange 
(lx2) 
multiplier, 





a5. a5.] . 
avm avf ' 
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and A"( , the effect of changes in I on the Lagrange multiplier, 
(lxl) 
Also note that 0 is just zero, while 0 and 0 are, respectively, the (1 X 2) vector 
(lxl) (lx2) (6xIO) 
of zeros and the (6 X 10) matrix of zeros. 
Note that we can express the equations in (2.25) equivalently as 
Nxx -p Xp Xy Xv X"( 
(5x5) (5xl) (5x5) (5x2) (5x2) (5xl) 
+ 
-p' 0 Ap Ay Av A"( 
(lx5) (lxl) (lx5) (lx2) (lx2) (lxl) 
-AI + Ux [B' v" + Bo "i p ] Ux [ B, v" + Bo "iy ] Ux BI Ux B2 (5x5) (5x2) (2x2)(2x5) (2XI)(IX5) (5x2) (2X2)(2x2) (2XI)(lx2) (5x2)(2x2) (5x2)(2xl) 
-q' i' 0 0 
(lx5) (lx2) (lx2) (Ixl) 
0 
(6xlO) 
Throughout the ensuing discussion we alternate between (2.25) and (2.26) as facilitates 
a clearer exposition. 
We now tum to an analysis of the properties of observed demand functions implied by 
the generalized Nash model. Given a parameter vector a, a corresponding value I (a) E 
[0, 00) and a pair of disagreement utilities vm (pO, pI, p3, ym) and V I (pO, p2 ,p4, yl) , the 
solution to the programme GN is a system of generalized Nash demand equations 
A i Ai ( () vm (0 13m) VI (0 2 4 I) ) '<iF x = x a, I a, P ,p ,p ,y , p ,p ,p ,y ,1" 
as well as a solution for 
A A ( () vm (0 I 3 m) VI (0 2 4 I)) A = A a" a, p ,p ,p ,y , p ,p ,p ,y . 
61 
(2.26) 
These generalized Nash demands describe the response of household demands to vari-
ations in prices, nonwage incomes, the value of the Nash relative utility "f, and the 
disagreement utilities. However, following our earlier argument, note that we do not 
observe variations in the value of "f nor in the disagreement utilities, nor do we observe 
the response of household demands to such variation. Instead we observe some demand 
system Xi (0:) , Vi, defined by 
i ( ) _ Ai ( () lTffi (0 13m) VI (0 2 4 I)) X 0: - X O:,"f 0: , v p,p,p,y , p ,p ,p,y . 
We also observe the response of these demands to variations in the prices and non-
wage incomes, for some unobservable distribution of bargaining power, "f (0:), and pair 
of disagreement utilities, V m (p0,pl,p3,ym) and VI (pO,p2,p4,yl). We now derive the 
structural properties, implied by the generalized Nash framework, of such observable 
demands. 
Since the Hessian matrix, Nxx , in (2.26) is just a matrix of second partial derivatives of 
(5x5) 
a continuously differentiable and quasiconcave objective function, the partitioned inverse 
of the bordered Nash Hessian can be expressed as 
an gn 
(5x5) (5x 1) 
, where the standard 
g~ kn 
(Ix5) (IxI) 
proof of the symmetry and negative semi definiteness of an applies. 
(5x5) 
re-arrange the matrix equations (2.26) to obtain 
Xp Xy Xv X'Y 
(5x5) (5x2) (5x2) (5xI) 
Ap Ay Av ~ 







We can therefore 
->"1+ Ux [Bl Vp + B2 IP] 
(5x5) (5x2) (2X2)(2x5) (2Xl)(lx5) Ux [Bl Vy + B2 ,y] (5x2) (2X2)(2x2) (2Xl)(IX2) Ux Bl Ux B2 (5X2)(2x2) (5X2)(2xl) 
-ej if 
(lx5) (lx2) 
Let B = [Bl : B2] . From (2.27) we have 
(2x3) (2x2) (2x 1) 
Vy 
(2x2) Xy = - an Ux B 
(5x2) (5X5)(5x2)(2x3) 
·f 
- gn 'I, , 
(5Xl)(IX2) Iy 
(lx2) 
and post-multiplying this expression by [ ~ 1 ] implies 
Xym - Xyf = [Xv Vy + X"{ I Y] [1 ] 
(5xl) (5xl) (5X2)(2x2) (5xl)(lx2) -1 . 
Condition (2.28) tells us that as long as 
and 
then 
afij aV! 8fij 8vm 
aV! By! -1= aVm Bym 
Xym - Xyf -1= O. 
(5xl) (5Xl) 
o 
(lx2) o (Ix 1) 
(2.28) 
ill this case there is no income-pooling under the generalized Nash model and individual 
non wage incomes enter the Nash demand functions separately. However comparing (2.28) 




in general, differ between the generalized Nash and the collective models. 
Vy 
To solve for gn ,post-multiply Xy = - an Ux B 




- gn i' by i 
(5Xl)(lx2) , (2xl) 
and re-arrange to get 
1 Vy (2x2) gn = -- Xy + an Ux B 
(5x 1) 2 (5x2) (5x5)(5x2)(2x3) Iy 
(lx2) 
From (2.27) we also have 
X p =- an 
(5X5) (5x5) 








+ gn q' . 
(5x1)(lx5) 
Substituting for gn in this expression and re-arranging implies 
(5x1) 
1 ., Xp +- Xy 'l q 
(5x5) 2 (5x2)(2X1)(lx5) 
\1 X {I '} { 1 , } an /\ + 1 Ip +- IY i q + Xv Vp +- Xv Vy i q .
(5X5)(5x5) (5X1) (lx5) 2 (lX2)(2X1)(lX5) (5x2)(2X5) 2 (5X2)(2x2)(2xl)(1x5) 
(2.29) 
Condition (2.29) has exactly the same interpretation as condition (2.22), the only differ-
ence being the presence of the extra term, Xv Vp +~ Xv Vy i q', on the right 
(5x2)(2x5) (5X2)(2X2)(2X1)(lX5) 
hand side of (2.29). This term represents the effect of a price change, compensated by 
an increase in income, on the disagreement utilities, and the consequent effect this has 
on household consumption and leisure demands. Note also that the matrix an AI is 
(5x5)(5x5) 
the symmetric and negative semi definite matrix of substitution effects, with household 
utility, the relative utility weight I and the disagreement utilities held constant. 
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We can now summarize the main restrictions on any system of household demands 
implied by the generalized Nash model as follows: 
1. The Slutsky matrix Xp +t Xy i if need not be symmetric and negative 
(5x5) (5X2)(2Xl)(lx5) 
semi definite. 
2. The Slutsky matrix is decomposed according to 
X l. , p +- Xy z q 
(5x5) 2 (5X2)(2Xl)(lX5) 
{ I} {I } an ),,1 + X'Y Ip +- X'Y Iy i q' + Xv Vp +- Xv Vy i q' . (5x5)(5x5) (5xl)(lx5) 2 (5Xl)(lX2)(2Xl)(lx5) (5X2)(2X5) 2 (5X2)(2x2)(2xl)(lx5) 
(2.29) 
3 A I 8{ti 8V! -i 8{ti 8V= d J!l -i ..!!:L al' d N h b .. . . 
. song as 8V! By! r 8V= 8y= an By= r By!, gener lZe as argmmng lIDphes 
the absence of income pooling within the household, i.e. 
[ ] [ 1 ] X
y= - X y! = Xv Vy + X'Y Iy =1= o. 
(5xl) (5xl) (5x2)(2x2) (5xl)(lx2) -1 
(2.28) 
This completes our analysis of the restrictions on household demand systems implied by 
the generalized Nash model of household decision making. 
2.4.3 The Relationship between Alternative Models of House-
hold Decision Making 
Before we discuss the relationship between the collective and the generalized Nash models, 
we recap some standard results from the traditional and the symmetric Nash models of 
household decision making. McElroy (1990) derived the fundamental comparative static 
equations for a traditional model of the household19 • Her equations were augmented to 
take account of the effect of 'extrahousehold environmental parameters', or EEPs, on 
19See McElroy (1990), p. 569, equation (12). 
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the traditional household demand system. EEPs are parameters, apart from prices and 
non wage incomes, that may also affect the household consumption and leisure demands. 
However disregarding the effects of changes in these EEPs it is easy to verify that the 
traditional comparative static equations are given by 
Uxx -p Xp Xy -AI 0 
(5x5) (5xl) (5x5) (5x2) 
+ 
(5x5) (5x2) 
= 0 , 
-p' 0 Ap Ay -if i' (6x7) 
(lx5) (lxl) (lx5) (lx2) (lx5) (lx2) 
(2.30) 
where Uxx represents the traditional Hessian matrix containing the second partial deriv-
(5x5) 
atives of the single, neo-classical, utility function that represents household preferences. 
The remaining members of (2.30) are analogous to those defined earlier. From (2.30) it 
is easy to see that under the traditional model: 
1. The Slutsky matrix is decomposed according to 
Xp + X y q = a AI, 
(5x5) (5xl)(lx5) (5x5)(5x5) 
where a AI is a symmetric and negative semi definite matrix. 
(5x5)(5x5) 
2. There is income-pooling within the household, i.e. 




McElroy (1990) also obtained the fundamental equations for a symmetric Nash model 
of the household20 which we reproduce here, again ignoring the effects of changes in the 













20See McElroy (1990), p. 568, equation (11). 
66 
.. 






(lx2) o (lx2) 
(2.33) 
where N;x represents the symmetric Nash Hessian and Bf - [0 1 J . The remain-
~x~ ~x~ 1 0 
ing members of (2.33) are analogous to those defined earlier. Under the symmetric Nash 
model we have: 
1. The Slutsky matrix Xp +~ Xy i q need not be symmetric and negative 
(5x5) (5X2)(2Xl)(lx5) 
semi definite. 
2. The Slutsky matrix is decomposed according to 
Xp +~ Xy i q' = a~ AI + {Xv Vp +~ Xv Vy i q'} 
(5x5) 2 (5x2)(2Xl)(lx5) (5x5)(5X5) (5x2)(2x5) 2 (5X2)(2x2)(2Xl)(lx5) , 
where a~ AI lli a sYlIllIletric and negative sellu defuute IIlatrix. 
(5x5)(5X5) 
(2.34) 
3. Symmetric Nash bargaining implies the absence of income-pooling within the 
household, i.e. 
[ 1 J XYrn - X y! = Xv Vy =1= O. (5xl) (5xl) (5X2)(2X2) -1 (2.35) 
We are now in a position to examine the relationship between all four models discussed 
in this chapter, namely the traditional, the symmetric Nash, the generalized Nash and 
the collective models of household decision making. Suppose, in the generalized Nash 
model, we set fpk = fyh = 0, Vk, h. This restricts the generalized Nash utility weight 
to being a constant with respect to changes in the exogenous parameters and effectively 
restricts the household to some arbitrary point on the Pareto frontier. Furthermore if 
we set f (0:) = 1, each person's preferences receive equal weight in the overall household 
objective, thus equalizing the utility gains across household members in the solution 
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to the model. Under these restrictions of the generalized Nash model we obtain the 
symmetric Nash model of MHl\f. Comparing (2.28) with (2.35) and (2.29) with (2.34) 
wc see that llllder a constant relative utility weight, the generalized Nash comparative 
statics collapse to those of the symmetric Nash framework. fu other words llllder these 
restrictions of the generalized Nash model, both the generalized Nash and the symmetric 
Nash models imply the same structural properties for household demand systems. 
MHl\f demonstrated that restriction of the symmetric Nash model so that ~ 8p 
8Vm 8V! 8Vm 0 \-Ik (. t t dis t tili" ). Ii ha h 8pk = ay! = 8ym = ,v , I.e. cons an agreemen u bes nnp es t t t e com-
parative statics of the symmetric Nash model collapse to those of the traditional model 
and both models imply the same restrictions on household demand systems. Compare 
(2.31) with (2.34) and (2.32) with (2.35) to see that this is indeed the case. 
N . h al' d N h d I 8V! 8vm 8V! 8vm k ow suppose, In t e gener lZe as mo e, we set 8pk = 8pk = 8y! = ByTTl = 0, V". 
fu this case the generalized Nash comparative statics collapse to the comparative statics 
of the collective model. Compare (2.28) with (2.21) and (2.29) with (2.22). Finally 
suppose, in the collective model, we set ;pIJ.: = :y'i. = 0, V k, h. This restricts the relative 
utility weight of the collective model, f.-L (a) , to being a constant with respect to changes 
in the exogenous parameters and therefore restricts the household to being at a particular 
point on the Pareto frontier. Comparing (2.21) with (2.32) and (2.22) with (2.31) we see 
that when f.-L (a) is constant, the comparative statics of the collective model collapse to 
those of the traditional framework. 
We can therefore combine the results of MHM with our own results to establish the 
following relationship between all four models: the comparative statics of the traditional 
model are nested within those of the symmetric Nash model, which in turn are nested 
within those of the generalized Nash model. Also the comparative statics of the tradi-
tional model are nested within those of the collective model, which in turn are nested 
within those of the generalized Nash. 
Our analysis suggests that, of the four models discussed in this chapter, the general-
ized Nash model offers the most general analysis of the intrahousehold decision process 
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and is the least restrictive of the household demand systems. The generalized Nash 
model preserves the main characteristic of the collective model: it uses knowledge of the 
individual utilities and of the household budget constraint to generate a continuum of 
Pareto efficient outcomes and it does not restrict the household a priori to any particular 
point on the Pareto frontier. In this respect it eliminates one of the main restrictions 
of the symmetric Nash model. In addition, the generalized Nash model generalizes the 
household decision problem even further by effectively eliminating one of the main re-
strictions of the collective approach: the generalized Nash model allows for the possibility 
of disagreement among household members and for the opportunity cost of a person's 
household membership to influence any cooperative outcome. In this respect the gen-
eralized Nash model offers a way towards an even more general characterization of the 
household decision process, by allowing a 'theory of household dissolution' to be incorpo-
rated and to have some influence over household decisions. This possibility is not allowed 
for within the collective fralnework <:IE currently specified. 21 
We may interpret the collective approach to household decisions as being any ap-
proach that generates a continuum of outcomes along the Pareto frontier but excludes 
the possibility of household dissolution and the role that the opportunity cost of house-
hold membership may play in influencing the household's final location on the Pareto 
frontier. On the other hand we may interpret the generalized Nash approach, presented 
here, as not only generating the Pareto frontier but also as allowing for the possibility 
of disagreement and the effect this may have on the household decision process. The 
collective approach is concerned solely with cooperative behaviour within the household, 
21 However it is not difficult to extend the collective model to incorporate a pair of disagreement 
utilities. In this case the household decision problem, stated in C2, may look something like 
where vm and VI are the disagreement utilities of m and j, respectively, and are functions of the 
relevant exogenous parameters. In terms of its implied properties of observable household demands,. a 
collective model thus defined would be exactly equivalent to the generalized Nash model presented III 
GN. 
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whereas the generalized Nash approach incorporates both the full range of possible c0-
operative outcomes as well as a possible noncooperative outcome. It also allows for a 
meaningful specification of the minimum cooperative payoffs in terms of the individual 
rationality of each player, rather than on pure feasibility criteria. 
We raise one final point with regard to the interpretation of our results. Throughout 
we have argued that a person's disagreement utility can be interpreted as their oppor-
tunity cost of household memhership, i.e. as the utility/satisfaction they could receive 
under some alternative household arrangement. Also we have shown that in the gener-
alized Nash model, these disagreement utilities appear as arguments in the household 
demand functions and therefore influence the household decision process. However, first 
note that there may be quite a large variation in the value of the disagreement utilities 
with no corresponding effect on the intrahousehold allocation. This idea becomes clearer 
if we think of the household problem geometrically, in utility space. Second, there is no 
reason why the generalized Nash utility weight, " cannot depend directly on each indi-
vidual's opportunity cost of household membership. Note, however, that if we allow, to 
depend on these opportunity costs and we dispense with the disagreement utilities, then 
we are back to a purely cooperative approach with no role for disagreement and house-
hold dissolution. This would still be a more restrictive approach than the generalized 
Nash approach advocated here. 
2.5 Discussion and Areas for Further Work 
The analysis of this chapter suggests several interesting avenues for future research. First 
among these must be to develop tests of the collective framework presented in CH vis-a-vis 
a framework, such as the generalized Nash model presented here, that explicitly allows 
for disagreement and opportunity costs to influence the final intrahousehold outcome. 
In this chapter we have derived the Slutsky equations associated with the collective 
and the generalized Nash models and have demonstrated that the decomposition of the 
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compensated price effects will be different in both cases. It remains to translate this 
difference into empirical tests that allow us to distinguish between the collective approach 
and an approach such as the generalized Nash. In particular we want to establish whether , 
and to what extent, outside options influence decisions within the household. We also 
want to understand more about the nature and the content of these outside options, what 
role there may be for state-dependent preferences, and the influence of social customs 
and of the legal system. Finally we also want to establish which outside factors have a 
strong significance and which ones less so. 
Second, is the broader question of the formation and dissolution of households. In 
this chapter we see that whereas the Nash approach explicitly addresses the question 
of the household's failure to reach a cooperative agreement, albeit in a very simplified 
fashion, the collective approach ignores this question altogether. Our 'model' of household 
dissolution followed the literature at large in assrnning (a) a very simple division of the 
total household nonwage income (i.e. each family member takes prcciscly what they 
contributed in the first place), and (b) that individual utility is independent of the 'lnarital 
state'. However such an approach entails particular and strong assumptions about the 
cultural/legal framework governing separation, about the nature of divorce and of family 
dissolution in general, about the enforcement of laws, and about individual preferences 
over their marital state.22 The develoPlnent of a proper treatInent of the formation and 
dissolution of households, from which we can derive an appropriate set of disagreement 
utilities, presents another exciting area for future research to improve our understanding 
of household decision processes. 
APPENDIX 
Proof of Lemrrta 1. (i) U closed follows from X being closed. (ii) U is bounded as 
long as all elements in X yield a finite utility to both members. (iii) Strict convexity of U 
22lt is also implicit in the Nash analysis that family members are individually rational a~d can choo~e 
not to accept the cooperative solution if that is in their interest. Therefore the Nash solutIOn must offer 
a utility payoff that is no less than some privately optimal level. 
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follows from the strict concavity of the individual utility functions and the convexity of 
X. Let the vectors x, xm and xl be as defIned earlier. Let x, xm and xt be corresponding 
vectors in which Xi is replaced by Xi, Vi. Then strict concavity of Uh (h = m, f) implies 
that for any pair of consumption allocations x, X E X and for all a E [0,1], we have 
and 
Consider any two feasible utility allocations 
and 
Then the consumption allocations x and x must both belong to X and we must have 
and 
Now consider the average of the feasible consumption allocations x and x, given by 
ax + (1 - a) x 
(axO + (1 - a) xO, axl + (1 - a) xl, ax2 + (1 - a) x 2 , ax3 + (1 - a) x 3 , ax4 + (1 - a) x4 ) . 
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Since the set X is convex we must have 
p' (ax + (1 - a) x) 
Lpi (axi + (1 - a) Xi) 
i 
a Lpixi + (1- a) LpiXi 
i i 
ap'x + (1- a)p'x 
< ym + yf + (p3 + p4) T, 
and therefore ax + (1 - a) x E X. llut then it follows that 
Frolll the strict concavity of Uh (h = 1n, f) we have 
and 
uf (axf + (1 - a) 1/) > aUf (xf) + (1- a) Uf (1/) . 
Therefore we must have 
(aUm (xm) + (1 - a) Um (im), aUf (xf) + (1 - a) Uf (1/)) 
a (Um (xm), Uf (xf)) + (1- a) (Um (xm), Uf (xf)) 
E U, 
Va E [0,1]. 
We have just shown that, for any pair of feasible utility allocations 
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and 
and for any a E [0,1] , we must have 
[a (Um (xm), Uf (xf)) + (1 - a) (Um (xm), Uf (xf))] E U . 
• 
Proof of Lemma 2. Under the solutions to (2.3) and (2.4) note that the individuals' 
budget constraint must be binding since utility maximization requires all wage and non-
wage income to be spent. Suppose m and f now form a joint household. Then m and 
f pool their resources to form the joint household full income constraint which is just 
the sum of their individual budget constraints. Since "\.'om and VJ were the private utility 
payoffs to m and f, respectively, we assume that neither household member will accept 
a cooperative outcome that offers less than their respective private payoff. 
We now show that if, in the joint household, person f receives V J, then person m 
A 
must receive a payoff, vm, that is exactly equal to "\.'om. Since there are no shared goods 
in the joint household, ym must be defined by 
(2.36) 
Suppose, in the solution to (2.36), (x2 ,X4 ) is such that Uf (0,X2,X4) = VJ and p2X 2 + 
p4X4 = yf + p 4T. Then, [roIll the sh'ict concavity o[ Uf (xf) and the convexity o[ f's 
private budget constraint, (x2 , x4 ) must equal (x2*, x4*) , the solution to (2.4). In this 
case (xl, x3 ) , in the solution to (2.36), must also equal (xh , x3*) , the solution to (2.3), 
and we must have Um (0, xl, x3 ) = "om = ym. Suppose, instead, in the solution to (2.36), 
person f receives some other allocation (x2 , x4 ) =I- (x2*, x4*) such that U f (0, x2 , x4 ) = V J. 
Then, again from the strict concavity of Uf (xf) and the convexity of f's private budget 
constraint, it must be the case that (x2 , x4 ) lies outside of f's set of privately feasible 
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consmnptioll allocations, i.e. we Inust have p25-;2 + p45-;4 > yf + p4T. However f:)llice 
the joint household budget constraint is binding in the solution to (2.36), then (xl, x3) , 
in the solution to this problelll, Inust be such that ym + p3T > (pIX I + p3x3). But 
any (xl, 5-;3) such that ym + p3T > (pIXI + p3X3) must lead to a lower utility payoff to 
m than Yom = Um (0, Xh , x3*). This follows from the strict concavity of Um (xm) and 
the convexity of 'In's private budget constraint. It follows that Um (0, Xl, x3) < Yom = 
Um (0, Xh, x3*). Intuitively, remember that m's private budget constraint was binding 
under the solution to m's privately optimal problem. This solution led to a utility payoff 
Yom = Um (0, Xh, x 3*) for rn. Any tightenllig of 'Tn'S individual constrallit (or, equivalenUy, 
any leaving of income unspent) must lead to a new allocation that reduces the utility 
payoff to m. 
We have now shown that if, in the solution to (2.36), f receives a consumption 
allocation that yields V J, then m must receive a consumption allocation that yields Yom 
or less. However, since m will not accept any utility payoff that is strictly less than Yom, 
then m will receive Yom exactly. It is therefore not feasible for m to receive strictly more 
than Yom if f receives V cf. Following a symmetric argument, we can also show that it 
is not feasible for f to receive strictly Inore than VJ if Tn receivef:) Yom. We have now 
shown that whenever f receives V cf, m receives Yom exactly, and whenever m receives 
Yom, f receives V J exactly. In both cases, m and f receive the consumption allocation 
(xh, x3*) and (x2* , x4*) ,respectively. In other words nl, and f receive the allocations that 
are solutions to (2.3) and (2.4), respectively. 
Now suppose f receives a consumption allocation that yields strictly more than V cf· 
Then it is easy to see that this can only be achieved if m receives a consumption allocation 
that yields strictly less than Von. By a symmetric argument, if m receives a consumption 
allocation that yields strictly more than Yom, then f must receive a consumption allocation 
that yields strictly less than VJ. Therefore in the absence of shared goods we have shown 
that the utility allocation (Von, vd') must lie on the Pareto frontier. When there are no 
shared goods there are therefore no utility payoffs to be obtained in a joint household, 
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over and above the utility payoffs that are privately achievable .• 
Proof of Lemma 3. We establish the strict inequalities. When there are shared goods 
then, within the joint household, we lllust have x~ = x~ = xo. Hence if Tn and f fornl a 
joint household their joint decision problem can be represented by 
max 
x i ,i=O,1, .. ,4 
um (XO, xl, x 3 ) / 
U f (XO, x 2 , x 4 ) > Vi and 
ym + yl + (p3 + p4) T > p' x 
(2.37) 
Let (x~, xl, x3 ) and (x~, x2 , x4 ) represent the solutions to the private constrained max-
imization problems in (2.1) and (2.2), respectively, with vm and Vi representing the 




and we must have (vm, VI) E U. Combining (2.38) and (2.39) implies 
(2.40) 
Let xi*, i = 0, ... , 4, repn~ent the solution to the joint household probleIIl (2.37). Then 
this solution must satisfy 
(2.41) 
Now consider the joint household allocation, X, given by Xi = Xi, i = 1, ... , 4, and XO = 
x~ + x~. Such an allocation is clearly feasible under the joint household budget. However 
note that as long as x~ > 0 (h = m, f) then we must also have XO > x~ (h = m, f)· 
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Therefore there exists a feasible household allocation, the allocation x, that provides 
each person with exactly the same quantities of Xi, i = 1, ... ,4, consumed privately, and 
each person with strictly more of X O than was privately consumed. The utility payoffs 
to m and f from this feasible allocation, x, are given by (;m = Um (i;~ + i;~, i;l, i;3) and 
(; f = U f (i;~ + i;~, i;2 , i;4) , respectively. Since individual utilities are strictly increasing 
in each of their arguments, then these utility payoffs must provide the household members 
with strictly greater utility than the utility they obtained privately. It follows that 
( (;m, (; f) E U and (;h > V h (h = m, f) . Therefore we have just shown that if there 
is a shared good and there are interior solutions for this shared good when individuals 
act privately, then there exists a feasible, non-empty set of utility allocations, under the 
joint household, that provides each person with strictly more than their privately optimal 
utilities .• 
Proof of Lemma 4. (i) X convex follows from the linear household budget constraint. 
(ii) That u f belongs to the compact interval [u~in' u~ax] was demonstrated in section 
2.3.1. (iii) That F (., a) is decreasing in u f can be seen by applying the Envelope theorem 
to (2.5). The strict concavity of F (., a) in u f follows from the strict convexity of U. 
Let il represent some feasible utility payoff to person f, i.e. il E (u~in' u~ax) , and let 
J-t (il, a) be the value of the multiplier on f's utility constraint in the solution to (2.5), 
piufn 
where this problem is evaluated at u f = il. We can verify that J-t (il, a) = piui > 0 
"'~ 
(i = 2, 4 and j = 1, 3) , where the right hand side of this expression is evaluated at the 
solution to (2.5). Now since u~ax > U~in' there exists u f E (u~n' u~ax) such that uf i= il. 
Since F (', a) is defined on (u~n' u~ax) then F (', a) must be differentiable at il. To see 
that this must be true note that as u f = il + du varies, 
lim F (u f ) - F ( il) = lim _F......,:.( u_A _+_d.-..:u ) __ F--,-( il-,-) 
uf -+11. u f - il du-+O du 
exists and is given by 
F' (il, a) = -J-t (il) < O. 
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Since F (. , a) is differentiable at it it must also be continuous at U. But since F (', a) is 
monotonic in u f then F (', a) must be continuously differentiable. (iv) This is obvious 
given the strict concavity of the individual utilities and the convexity of X .• 
Derivation of the Collective Comparative Static Equations. To obtain (2.19), totally 
differentiate each of the first order conditions in (2.17) and (2.18) with respect to each 
of the parameters in (a, /-t (a)) . This gives us the following set of equations, evaluated at 
the solution xi* (a,/-t(a)) , Vi, and"\* (a,/-t(a)): 
0, Vi, k, 
where z A, Vi = k, 






These equations can be arranged into the matrix equations (2.19). 
Derivation of the Generalized Nash Comparative Static Equations. To obtain the 
comparative static equations for the generalized Nash model, i.e. equations (2.25) and 
(2.26), totally differentiate each of the first order conditions (2.23) and (2.24) with respect 
to each of the parameters in 
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evaluating the resulting equations at the solution to GN given by 
and 
This gives us 
0, Vi, k, 
where z A, Vi = k, 


























8 { (gf) "f(Q)} 
8pk 
a {gm, (a) (gf) "f(Q)-l } 
8yh 
a { gm, (<» (g')'< oH } au' + a { (g')'<O)} aU'" 
8pk 8xi apk axi ' 
a {gm, (<» (g,)'<O)-l} au' + a { (g')'<O)} aum 
8yh 8xi ayh 8xi ' 
gm 1 auf 1 aum 
, (, - 1) 91 gf (gf) "f (-1) axi +, gf (gf) "f (-1) 8xi ' 
1 f "f auf 8um 
, gf (g) (-1) 8xi + O. axi ' 
g~ (g')' (1 + , In gl) ~U' + (g')'<o) In g' aUm 
g x'" ax"" 
{ I ( f)"f } avf {( f)"f f} a, - 'gf g (-1) 8pk + g Ing apk,Vk, 
_ {, (, _ 1) gm ~ (gf)"f (-I)} avf + {,~ (gf)"f (-I)} avm gf gf 8yh gf 8yh 
+ {~~ (g')' (1+, In g') } ~~, Vh, 
8 {(gf)"f(Q)} _ 
{ I ( f)"f ( } av
f {( f)"f f} a, 
'gf g -1) 8yh + g Ing ayh,Vh. ayh -
It is now easy to see that these equations can be arranged into the matrix equations 
(2.25) and (2.26). 
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Risk-Sharing Contracts under 
Repeated Double Moral Hazard 
3.1 Background and Literature Review 
In the simple, one-period model of risk-sharing, risk averse individuals are endowed with 
state-contingent incomes. These individuals enter into binding contracts which specify a 
transfer of income between individuals in each state of the world. Because individuals are 
risk averse, Pareto improving transfers exist and the set of equilibrium contracts is just 
the intersection of the set of Pareto efficient and the set of ex ante individually rational 
contracts. In such models with binding contracts, an efficient allocation of risk requires 
the marginal rate of substitution between state-contingent incomes to be equalized across 
individuals. When the game is finitely or infinitely repeated, this condition is simply 
required to hold each period. 
When binding contracts are not available and the game is played a finite number of 
times, any equilibrium contract must also be ex post individually rational. While the 
initial endowment of state-contingent incomes may not be ex ante efficient, it will be the 
only ex post efficient allocation. This is because once the state of nature is observed, 
any transfer of income will raise one person's consumption only by reducing that of 
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the other. However in the absence of binding contracts, this must induce the latter to 
renege. Therefore when binding contracts are not available and the game is played a finite 
number of times, individuals will remain at their initial endowments since no equilibrium 
contracts exist. 
In the absence of binding contracts, Pareto improving transfers may exist if we con-
sider self-enforcing contracts, contracts with the property that no one ever wishes to 
renege ex post. The existence of such equilibria requires the game to be infinitely re-
peated (or at least that there is always a positive probability that the game will be 
played once more). The incentive never to renege once the state of nature is observed 
is achieved by imposing the requirement that at each period, any short-term gain from 
reneging must be outweighed by the long-term benefits of cooperation. In this vein are 
the papers by Coate and Ravallion (1993), Kimball (1988), Ligon, Thomas and Wor-
rall (1997) and Thomas and Worrall (1988) in which the authors characterize the set of 
equilibrium contracts that can be sustained in this way (i.e. the self-enforcing contracts). 
These risk-sharing models, whether static or repeated and whether under binding or 
self-enforcing contracts, share a number of common features. First individuals are en-
dowed with state-contingent incomes. This means that an individual's ex post income, 
the income he receives once a state has occurred, is completely determined by the occur-
rence of that state. More importantly it implies that there is no role for individual effort 
to influence the level of income received in a given state1. Second, each individual's prob-
ability distribution over states (or incomes) is given2 • This means that an individual's ex 
ante income is also completely determined and once again there is no role for effort in 
influencing their probability distribution of income. Third, the income received by each 
individual (and the state of the world in which it is received) is common knowledge. 
Allowing individual effort to affect the likelihood of obtaining different outcomes, with 
each person's effort being privately held information, leads to the well known agency prob-
1 Ex post, different effort levels do not yield different incomes. 
2These probabilities may be either the known probabilities attached to the occurrence of each state, 
or individuals' subjective probabilities. 
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lem (or moral hazard problem or principal-agent problem).3 In the standard (one-period) 
version of this problem (e.g. Holmstrom, 1979) a risk averse agent chooses a privately 
costly input (usually his own effort) into a production process. The output of the produc-
tion process is lmcertain and accrues to a risk neutral principal. Since the agent's effort 
is unobservable to the principal, and since it detennines the likely occurrence of different 
output levels, the principal must choose a contract - consisting of a payment schedule 
and a particular effort level for the agent - that is both in the principal's best interest and 
would be accepted by the agent. The equilibrium contract must be ex ante individually 
rational and incentive compatible. This contract differs from the full-information first-
best contract under which the agent's effort is fully observed by the principal. Under the 
first-best contract, a risk neutral principal assumes all the risk of the production process 
and makes a constant payment to the agent. Under a limited information contract, the 
agent is also required to bear some of the risk. This inefficiency reflects the conflict that 
exists between reducing the agent's risk and increasing his incentive to work for a higher 
rather than a lower return. 
Individuals may take advantage of a repeated principal-agent relationship in order 
to reduce the inefficiency of short-term contracts. A repeated agency problem is one in 
which the one-period situation is repeated again and again, and there are several ad-
vantages of such long-term relationships. First, repetition of the one-period situation 
provides an opportunity to observe outcomes over a longer period of time and to improve 
ones inferences as to whether or not appropriate actions had been taken in the past. Sec-
ond, a long term relationship creates the opportunity to reinforce the 'punishments' and 
'rewards' that are offered for apparent deviations from the appropriate actions. Third, 
individuals' strategies can be designed to take account of past outcomes, i.e. of the his-
tory of the relationship. This creates additional opportunity for insuring against random 
3Early work on moral hazard include Alchian and Demsetz (1972), Arrow (1963, 1965), Harris and 
Raviv (1976, 1978), Holmstrom (1979), Mirrlees (1974, 1975 1976), Pauly (1974), Ross (1973), Shavell 
(1979), Simon (1951) and Wilson (1969). More recent contributions include Grossman and Hart (1983), 
Mayers and Smith (1981), Myerson (1983), Radner (1985) and Stiglitz (1983). 
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fluctuations in outcomes that were unrelated to actions, thereby reducing risk without 
harming incentives. Finally, in the theory of repeated games, conditions under which the 
noncooperative equilibria of the entire sequential game produce the cooperative outcomes 
of the component subgames can be identified and analyzed. 
This final point was addressed in one of the early papers on repeated moral hazard. 
Radner (1981) examined a finitely repeated principal-agent relationship and showed that 
if the number of repetitions is sufficiently large (but finite), then there are approximate 
noncooperative equilibria4 of the entire repeated game that produce the cooperative 
outcome of each subgame. In particular, for any Pareto-optimal cooperative outcome 
of the one-period game that dominates the one-period noncooperative outcome, and 
any c > 0, there exists for every sufficiently large T a noncooperative equilibrium of 
the T - period game that yields each player an average expected utility that is no less 
than his expected utility from the one-period cooperative game, minus c. In order for 
noncooperative behaviour to produce cooperative outcomes in a repeated game, there 
must exist a statistical method for inferring the existence of inappropriate actions (when 
actions are not directly observed), and for doing so sufficiently rapidly to deter them. 
Furthermore, such a method must have a low probability of generating false alarms. 
Radner (1981) shows that such a method exists. 
In a paper by Rubinstein and Yaari (1983), the authors move away from the common 
emphasis on rewards and penalties for inducing efficient outcomes. In the context of a 
simple (repeated) insurance problem, full-indemnity insurance contracts are offered at a 
pre-specified price. Hence the rewards and penalties incurred by the insured in any given 
period do not reflect the values taken by the observed variables in that period. However 
the price of the insurance contract can be changed over time to reflect the insured's past 
record. The authors show that as long as the insured is risk averse, introducing such 
flexibility into the temporal structure of rewards and penalties means that it is possible 
4 Approximate noncooperative equilibria in finite repetitions models is called an epsilon equilibrium 
if each player's strategy is within epsilon of being the best response to the other players' strategies. 
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to find an enforceable long-term contract that eliminates the inefficiency associated with 
moral hazard. 
Raciner (1985) focuses on the role of discounting in determining the effectiveness of 
the threat of future punishment as a deterrent to deviant behaviour. He points out that 
in a repeated principal-agent relationship, the players' strategies in anyone repetition 
can be allowed to depend on the previous history of the game. This gives the principal 
an opportunity to observe the results of the agent's actions over several periods, to 
use statistical inference to 'establish' whether or not the agent had been choosing the 
appropriate actions, and to use the threat of punishment to deter the agent from deviant 
behaviour. However the effectiveness of such deterrents depends on the extent to which 
the agent discounts the future. Since the accumulation of reliable statistical evidence 
takes time, the threat of future punishment becomes a less effective deterrent the more 
the agent discounts the future. Radner (1985) demonstrates formally that in an infinitely 
repeated game, the less the players discount future utility the more they can approach 
the one-period efficient outcome with equilibria of the supergame. At the limit when 
there is no discounting, players can approximate the one-period efficient outcome with 
equilibria of the supergame. 
In a finitely repeated agency relationship where both principal and agent discount the 
future, Lambert (1983) demonstrates that each period's sharing rule can be expressed 
in the same form as the sharing rule obtained by Holmstrom (1979) for the one-period 
model. He also show's that each period, both the agent's current compensation as well 
as his utility next period are increasing functions of the first period cash flow. This has 
the interpretation that the principal uses not only current but also future incentives to 
motivate the agent's effort in any given period. Finally, Lambert shows that the agent's 
compensation each period depends not only on his performance that period but also on 
his performance in previous periods. Specifically it is shown that the expected ratio of the 
principal's to the agent's marginal utility, in any period, must equal the known principal-
agent marginal utility ratio in the previous period. One interpretation of this result 
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offered by Lambert is that the optimal long-term contract tries to smooth the agent's 
consumption over time. An alternative interpretation is that the principal spreads the 
risk of the first period outcome over as many periods as possible. 
Rogerson (1985a) examines a finitely repeated principal-agent relationship in which 
the principal is risk neutral and the agent is risk averse. The principal is assumed to be 
able to borrow and save at a fixed interest rate but the agent has no access to the credit 
market. Also the agent discounts future consumption. The author shows that under 
the optimal contract, a simple relationship must hold between the wages offered in any 
two adjacent periods. fu particular, the inverse of the agent's marginal utility of income, 
evaluated at any wage, must equal the expected value of the inverse of next period's 
marginal utility of income, conditioned upon last period's wage. Based on this result 
Rogerson offers the intuition that a repeated incentive problem provides the opportunity 
for intertemporal consumption smoothing and that the optimal contract will always take 
advantage of this. Also memory plays an important role in the optimal contract in that 
whenever an outcome affects the current wage it also affects the future period's wages. 
Another implication of Rogerson's result is that because of the incentive problem, the 
agent does not achieve the optimal level of consumption smoothing and is thus left 
with a residual desire to intertemporally self-insure through the use of credit markets. 
Therefore restriction of the agent's access to credit markets is necessary to achieve the 
Pareto-optimal outcome. 
Thomas and Worrall (1990) apply the repeated incentive problem to examine the be-
haviour of debt/credit contracts over time. fu a repeated unobserved endowment economy 
with legally enforceable loan contracts, the income of a single risk averse borrower (the 
agent) cannot be observed by a single risk neutral lender (the principal). fu this setting 
the authors examine how debt contracts can be used to stabilize consumption for any 
finite or infinite time horizon and any discount factor between zero and one. It is shown 
that under the second-best contract, in order to reduce the cost of inducing incentive 
compatibility, it is necessary to reduce future utility by increasing future consumption 
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variation. Specifically it is shown that if the time horizon is infinite, the borrower's future 
utility becomes arbitrarily negative (with probability one). The borrower gets deeper and 
deeper into debt and consumption falls as debt increases. Despite this the authors show 
that it is possible to approach the first-best constant-consumption contract. ill particular 
they demonstrate that as the discount factor tends to one and the time horizon tends to 
infinity, the second-best Pareto frontier converges pointwise to the first-best frontier. 
This 'immiserization' result obtained by Thomas and Worrall (1990) is interesting 
and was also obtained by Green (1987) who showed that with a continuum of agents 
associated with an incentive problem (unobserved income endowments), the efficient so-
cietal arrangement involves almost all agents' consumption diverging to negative infinity. 
Although the papers by Green (1987) and Thomas and Worrall (1990) would seem to 
suggest that there is something about repeated moral hazard that ultimately causes a re-
duction in the utility/consumption of agents associated with an incentive problem, later 
papers cast doubt upon such an interpretation. Under different assumptions it is possi-
ble to create environments where the agent's consumption distribution does not exhibit 
a negative drift (Atkeson and Lucas, 1992), or their consumption distributions converge 
to a bounded limiting distribution (Wang, 1995). However as Phelan (1998) points out, 
it is difficult to identify, based on these papers, which characteristics of the moral hazard 
environment are relevant in determining the long run consumption of the agents. Phe-
lan addresses this issue by isolating the roles of the different assumptions made in these 
models and arguing that it is the characteristics of the utility function that is the key 
determinant of agent's long run consumption. 
As we have mentioned earlier and is now well known, a key feature of contracts 
formed in a repeated relationship is the dependence of agents' strategies on the previous 
history of outcomes (see Lambert, 1983; and Rogerson, 1985a). Such non-stationary 
strategies are in contrast to stationary strategies under which the action prescribed at 
time t depends only on the time t outcome. However the analytical intractabilities 
associated with history-dependent strategies often mean that it is very difficult to discern 
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important qualitative features of equilibrium contracts when these contracts are formed in 
repeated relationships. Spear and Srivastava (1987) address this issue by using recursive 
methods to reduce the dynamic problem of characterizing equilibrium contracts to a 
simple static problem in the calculus of variations. Their reformulated static problem 
is equivalent to the original dynamic problem but is much simpler to solve. It enables 
the equilibrium contract to be completely described by a set of functions that define a 
stationary Markovian solution, in which the expected discounted utility offered to the 
agent under the contract, conditioned on the previous history of outcomes, serves as the 
state variable. 
Spear and Srivastava use this approach to analyze the optimal contract emerging 
from a standard repeated moral hazard problem. Under the optimal contract there is a 
critical level of output each period which, if exactly realized by the agent that period, 
means that next period's contract will be identical to the contract offered this period. 
However if the agent performs well (badly) this period by achieving an output that is 
greater (lower) than the critical output, then the agent is rewarded (punished) with a 
higher (lower) consumption today as well as a higher (lower) expected discounted utility 
payoff tomorrow. Furthermore if tomorrow's output is at its critical value, then the 
compensation paid tomorrow will be exactly what was paid today, and so forth. In this 
setting understanding the evolution of the contract requires an understanding of how the 
critical output level changes over time. However in their model it was not possible to 
unambiguously predict the direction of such changes. 
We now return to our discussion of one-period agency problems but change our focus 
towards a discussion of double moral hazard (or double agency) problems, a situation 
in which the principal also makes choices that affect the likelihood of various outcomes. 
Several papers analyze economic problems that arise from a situation of double moral 
hazard and offer characterizations of the optimal contract under such circumstances. One 
of the key features of optimal contracts under double moral hazard is that the agent's 
reward is less sensitive to outcomes than would have been the case under a single agency 
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problem. When there is double moral hazard, outcomes are influenced by the actions 
of both principal and agent and so changes in outcomes convey only partial information 
about the agent's hidden actions. 
In situations where both the principal and the agent are risk neutral, Bhattacharyya 
and Lafontaine (1995) and Romano (1994) show that the optimal contract is a simple 
linear contract in which both principal and agent proportionally share the output after 
a certain amount of transfer is made between them. However when the principal is risk 
neutral and the agent is risk averse, Kim and Wang (1998) show that the optimal contract 
is generally not linear. Also as the agent's risk aversion approaches zero (i.e. as the agent 
becomes less risk averse and more risk neutral), they show that the optimal contract does 
not approach a simple linear contract. The authors interpret this result as implying that 
under double moral hazard linear contracts are not a good approximation of the optimal 
contract when the agent is almost risk neutral. 
There are several economic applications for the problem of double moral hazard. In 
the context of a firm with a risk neutral owner (the principal) and a risk averse worker 
(the agent), Demski and Sappington (1991) show that the double agency problem can 
be completely and costlessly resolved if the principal (who can observe but cannot prove 
that the agent shirks) has the option of requiring the agent to purchase the enterprise at 
a prenegotiated price. Such buyouts mean that the worker would become the residual 
claimant for the firm's stream of profit. The threat of having to purchase an enterprise 
whose value has been diminished by his own shirking provides the incentive for the worker 
to choose the efficient level of effort. Furthermore, knowing that the worker has worked 
diligently, the owner is also motivated to do likewise, rather than to shirk and transfer 
the enterprise to the worker. In their model it is the threat rather than the exercise of 
the buyout option that induces both parties to act efficiently. 
Another application of the double moral hazard approach is to the analysis of war-
ranties. Here both the producer and the consumer of a product take privately observed 
actions that affect the failure rate of the product. A producer can save costs by choosing 
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shoddy materials, thereby producing a less durable product. Furthermore product dura-
bility is only indirectly observed by consumers via the failure rate. On the other hand 
consumers can benefit by neglecting to maintain the product, thereby increasing failures. 
Also the consumer's actions in this regard are unobservable to the producer. A warranty 
is a payment from the producer to the consumer in the event of a breakdown. Such 
warranties increase the producer's incentives for durability and decrease the consumer's 
incentives for maintenance, hence the double moral hazard problem. 
Papers that have analyzed the optimal warranty under such circumstances include 
Cooper and Ross (1985, 1988), Dybvig and Lutz (1993), Emons (1988) and Mann and 
Wissink (1988). Emons (1988) identified circumstances under which warranties solve 
the classic 'lemons' problem and induce firms to offer high-quality products. Therefore 
Shapiro's (1983) claim that warranties do not serve as a quality-assuring mechanism is 
not always valid. Using a continuous time model, Dybvig and Lutz (1993) showed that 
the optimal warranty is a block warranty that concentrates all payments as early as pos-
sible. Also if there is no upper bound on the size of the warranty payment, then the 
first-best outcome can be approximated by offering very large warranties for a very short 
period of time. However in equilibrium the maximum warranty may be bounded by the 
exogenously determined repair cost: if warranty payments are greater than the cost of 
repair, consumers have an incentive to repeatedly abuse the product and pocket the dif-
ference between the warranty payment and the repair cost. Cooper and Ross (1988) show 
that under certain conditions, a two-period warranty can induce the full-information first-
best outcome. Finally Mann and Wissink (1988) show that efficient contracts exist when 
uncertainty is moderate, while inefficiencies result from either excessive or insufficient 
uncertainty. 
Other applications of double moral hazard include the analysis of optimal contracts 
in agriculture (see Agrawal, 1999; Bhattacharyya and Lafontaine, 1995; Eswaran and 
Kotwal, 1985), and the analysis of royalty contracts in franchising (see Lafontaine and 
Shaw, 1996; Lutz, 1995; Mathewson and Winter, 1985; Rubin, 1978). 
94 
In this chapter we go beyond existing models of risk-sharing and of (repeated) moral 
hazard and examine a problem of risk-sharing tUlder repeated double moral hazard. Specif-
ically, we consider two risk averse individuals, labelled 1 and 2, involved in an infinitely 
repeated relationship and who both discotUlt the future by a common discotUlt factor. 
At each period, each agent chooses an effort level and then receives a stochastic income 
drawn from a time-invariant income distribution contingent on their own choice of effort. 
The income received by each agent is common knowledge. However the effort choice of 
each agent is private information. As with standard agency models, the problem is set 
up to ensure that neither agent's effort choice can be inferred with certainty from the 
observed income levels. At each period, once incomes are observed, a transfer of income 
from agent 2 to agent 1 is made and the game moves on to the next period. (Throughout 
the chapter we sometimes refer to agent 1 as the principal and to agent 2 as the agent. 
Nevertheless the model is perfectly symmetric with respect to both individuals and these 
individuals are identical). We assume that contracts are binding and so the problem of 
ex post rationality is not treated. There are no opportunities for individuals to borrow 
from or lend to outside parties, and so they are constrained to consume the aggregate 
endowment received each period. This generalized framework allows us to analyze how 
the optimal long-term contract deals with the trade-off between an efficient level of risk-
sharing and the simultaneous provision of two sets of incentives. It is the analysis of 
these trade-offs, in the context of an infinitely repeated agency problem, that represents 
the key departure of this chapter from the existing literature. 
Throughout our analysis we adopt the recursive methods used by Spear and Srivas-
tava (1987) in order to establish the key qualitative features of the optimal contract 
tUlder repeated double moral hazard. In a similar vein to their paper, suppose agent 2 
is promised utility level w at time t. Two functions al (w) and a2 (w) specify, respec-
tively, the effort level of agent 1 and agent 2 at t. Once time t income levels (Yl, Y2) 
are observed, a ftUlction T ( w , Yl , Y2) determines the time t transfer from 2 to 1 and 
a function V ( W, Yl, Y2) determines the level of utility promised to agent 2 at t + 1. 
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Both the transfer and the utility promise schedules depend on the incomes observed 
at t. Also the function U (w) determines the payoff to agent 1 at t. Therefore at time 
t + 1, if time t incomes were (Ylt, Y2t) , agent 2 receives Wt+ 1 = V ( Wt, Ylt, Y2t) and in-
dividuals 1 and 2 work al (Wt+l) and a2 (Wt+l) , respectively. IT time t + 1 incomes are 
(Ylt+ 1, Y2t+ 1) , a t + 1 transfer of T ( Wt+ 1, Ylt+ 1, Y2t+ 1) occurs from 2 to 1 and agent 2 is 
promised Wt+2 = V (Wt+l, Ylt+b Y2t+l) at t + 2. Agent 1 receives U (Wt+l) at t + 1, and so 
on. 
In our repeated double moral hazard problem, the transfer and the utility promise 
schedules depend upon the incomes of both individuals. As a result, individuals' lifetime 
expected discounted utilities must be defined with respect to a joint (income) probability 
density function contingent upon the effort choices of both individuals. This implies that 
our recursive reduction of the problem yields a double integral version of the calculus of 
variations problem, which contrasts with the single integral version applicable in Spear 
and Srivastava (1987). 
In characterizing the optimal contract under repeated double moral hazard, we ex-
amine both the contract's within-period characteristics as well as its evolution from one 
period to the next. Although we do not offer a full characterization of the optimal 
contract, several interesting properties emerge. First, a key feature of the optimal long-
term contract under double moral hazard is the way in which this contract handles the 
trade-off between an efficient level of risk-sharing, on the one hand, and the simultaneous 
provision of two sets of incentives, on the other. Because a single transfer schedule must 
offer incentives to two individuals, such a contract is less sensitive to the performance of 
any single individual than would have been the case if there were only one person with 
an incentive problem. This result reiterates the predictions of one-period double agency 
models, however we show that in the infinitely repeated framework, it holds not only 
for the within-period incentives on offer, but also for the incentives that are offered over 
time. 
Second, a well-known condition describing the optimal level of intertemporal con-
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sumption smoothing llllder repeated single agency is generalized to take account of the 
double incentive problem. In the literature on repeated single agency (Lambert, 1983; 
Rogerson, 1985a; and Spear and Srivastava, 1987) it is shown that the expected ratio 
of person i's to person j's marginal utility in any period must always equal the known 
ratio of person i's to person j's marginal utility in the previous period, where i, j = 1,2, 
i =1= j, and only j faces a binding incentive constraint. However when the single agency 
setting is generalized to take accollllt of the double incentive problem, under the optimal 
contract there is some deviation from the level of intertemporal consumption smoothing 
that would have been optimalllllder repeated single agency. We show that this deviation 
can be characterized in terms of its benefits and costs. We also show that when both 
individuals face binding incentive constraints then the expectation of the ratio of person 
i's to person j's marginal utility in period t must always be strictly greater than the 
known ratio of person i's to person j's marginal utility in period t - 1, i, j = 1,2, i =1= j. 
We establish a number of other characteristics of the optimal contract. Although 
different income realizations have an ambiguous effect on the size of the income transfer 
between principal and agent, we show that both agents have current consumption and 
future utility payoffs that are monotonically increasing in their own, current level of in-
come. Therefore ceteris paribus, a higher income realized by agent i at time t is rewarded 
by a higher consumption for i at t, as well as a higher utility payoff for i at t+1 (i = 1,2). 
We also show that there exists a unique pair of incomes, (iiI (w) , ih (w)) , each period for 
which the agent's utility payoff (and hence the contract) is the same tomorrow as it is 
today. Furthermore the transfer and the principal-agent marginal utility ratio, evaluated 
at these critical incomes, can be thought of as 'first-best'. These results generalize those 
obtained by Spear and Srivastava (1987) in their analysis of a repeated single agency 
problem. 
Note that the critical income, Yi (w), offers a benchmark level of income against 
which person i's performance can be judged. Suppose i' income is Yi. Then Yi > Yi can 
be interpreted as saying that person i has performed 'relatively well', while Yi < Yi implies 
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that person i's performance has been 'relatively poor'. 
Combining earlier results we show that whenever the principal performs well and/or 
the agent performs badly in the current period, then tomorrow the principal is rewarded 
(the agent punished) with a higher (lower) utility payoff than the payoffs received today. 
Also the current transfer is chosen so that the current principal-agent marginal utility 
ratio is low relative to the first-best marginal utility ratio. The opposite is true if the 
principal performs badly and/or the agent performs well in the current period. However 
if both principal and agent perform well (or if both perform badly) in the current period, 
then the effect of this on the current principal-agent marginal utility ratio vis-a-vis the 
first-best ratio, and on the future utility payoffs vis-a-vis the current payoffs, is ambigu-
ous. We interpret this as meaning that the optimal contract, in terms of the structure 
of rewards and penalties offered within any given period, is less sensitive to the perfor-
mance of any single individual than would have been the case under a repeated single 
agency problem. Remember that under repeated single agency, a good performance by 
the agent is always rewarded (and a bad performance is always punished) under the 
optimal contract. Furthermore these rewards and punishments are entirely unrelated to 
the performance of any other individual. 
We also examine the evolution of the contract over time. Specifically we look at the 
relationship between the time t + 1 and the time t marginal utility ratios, and between 
the time t + 2 and the time t + 1 utility payoffs. We show that if, at t + 1, both agents 
obtain their t + 1 critical incomes, then the t + 1 marginal utility ratio will be the same 
as the known marginal utility ratio at t, and the t + 2 utility payoffs will be the same 
as the t + 1 utility payoffs. If, however, at t + 1 the principal 'performs badly' and/or 
the agent 'performs well' (i.e. performance being judged relative to the t + 1 critical 
incomes), then the t + 1 principal-agent marginal utility ratio will be greater than the 
known principal-agent marginal utility ratio at t, and the principal's (agent's) t+2 utility 
payoff will also be lower (higher) than his t + 1 utility payoff. The opposite is true if at 
time t + 1, the principal 'performs well' and/or the agent 'performs badly'. Finally, if both 
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principal and agent perform well (or if they both perform badly), then we cannot predict 
the effect of this on the t + 1 marginal utility ratio vis-a-vis the time t ratio, nor on the 
t + 2 utility payoffs vis-a-vis the t + 1 payoffs. Here we see that the optimal contract, 
this time in terms of the structure of rewards and penalties offered over time, continues 
to be less sensitive to the performance of any single individual than would have been the 
case under repeated single agency. 
This chapter is structured as follows. In section 3.2 we set up the model and in section 
3.3 we specify the dynamic problem of choosing the optimal contract under repeated 
double moral hazard. In section 3.4 we adopt the approach of Spear and Srivastava (1987) 
in reducing this problem to a static problem in the calculus of variations. In section 3.5 we 
obtain features of the full-information first-best contract, i.e. the efficient contract, under 
which agents' chosen effort levels are fully observable. This provides a benchmark for 
later comparison with the second-best contract, i.e. the optimal contract under repeated 
double moral hazard. In this section we present the within-period characterization of 
the first-best contract as well as a characterization of its evolution over time. In section 
3.6 the second-best contract is analyzed. AB with the first-best contract we examine the 
main features of this contract within any given time period and discuss the contract's 
evolution over time. Section 3.7 concludes and suggests areas for further work. 
3.2 The Model 
There is an infinite sequence of dates, t E T = {I, 2, .... } , and two infinitely-lived agents, 
i = 1, 2. Agents are risk averse and maximize their expected lifetime utilities. They 
discount the future by the common discount rate f3 E (0, 1) . Although both agents are 
identical, we will refer to 1 as the principal and 2 as the agent. 
At each t E T, agent i chooses an effort level ait E A = [a, a] c R+ and receives 
a stochastic income Yit E [0, Y] , Y > 0, drawn from his effort-contingent distribution 
Fi (Yi, ai) : R ---+ [0,1]. It is assumed that Fi (Yi, ai) has a density denoted by Ii (Yi, ai) , 
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with fiay, and haiO-i well defined for all (Yi, ai) . The joint (effort-contingent) distribution 
of incomes at each t is given by F (Yl, Y2, al,a2) : R2 -+ [0,1]. We assume that the 
joint density f (Yt, Y2, al,a2) exists, with fai and f ay,aj (i, j = 1,2) well defined for all 
(Yl, Y2, al,a2) . 
Throughout we make the following assumptions. 
Assumption 1. Each agent observes his own chosen effort level but not that of the 
other. 
Assumption 2. Each agent's income is observed by both agents. 
Assumption 3. At any time t, individual incomes YI and Y2 are independent ran-
dom variables. Therefore f (Yl, Y2, aI,a2) = fI (Yl, aI) f2 (Y2, a2) and F (Yl, Y2, aI,a2) 
PI (Yb aI) F2 (Y2, a2). 
Assumption 4 (stochastic dominance). A change in individual i's effort alters their 
distribution of income Fi (Yi, ai) such that Fiai (Yi, ai) < 0 for all Yi E R, and Fiay, (Yi, ai) < 
° for some Yi values, i = 1,2. Also a change in individual i's effort has no impact on j's 
distribution of income: Fjai (Yj, aj) = 0, all Yj E R, i =I- j. 
Stochastic dominance means that more effort generally reduces the likelihood of re-
ceiving low incomes. In the standard single agency problem this assumption is both 
necessary and sufficient for increases in the agent's effort to make the principal better off. 
However under repeated double moral hazard this is not the case. Nevertheless we see 
that under stochastic dominance, increases in ai make person i's distribution function 
more favourable to person j (i, j = 1,2, i =I- j) and so we adopt this assumption in the 
current setting. Assumption 4 also states that one person's effort does not affect another 
person's income distribution. 
Assumption 5 (the convex distribution function condition). FiO-iai (Yi, ai) > 0 for all 
Yi E R, i = 1, 2. 
Assumption 5 has the implication that although i's distribution function becomes 
increasingly favourable to j as ai increases, it does so at a decreasing rate. Hence there 
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are stochastically decreasing marginal returns to increases in effort. 
Assumption 6 (the monotone likelihood ratio condition). 
Assumption 6 implies that greater effort will reduce the likelihood of poor outcomes 
and increase the likelihood of better outcomes. This interpretation will become clearer 
when we obtain lemma 1, below. 
In the standard single agency problem, the convex distribution function condition 
(edfe) combined with the monotone likelihood ratio condition (mlre) imply that both 
the principal and the agent have objective functions that are concave in the agent's 
effort. Hence the problem of choosing effort to maximize either person's objective, or to 
maximize a positively weighted sum of the two objectives, is well behaved. Specifically 
there is a global maximum that satisfies standard first order conditions. However under 
repeated double moral hazard this is not the case and so in our setting we will make the 
explicit assumption (assumption 9) that each individual's objective function is concave 
in (a!, a2). 
Assumption 7. The supports of the income distributions Fi (Yi, ai) ,i = 1,2, and 
F (y!, Y2, a!, a2), given by [0, y] and [0, y]2 respectively, are compact and do not alter with 
changes in either agent's effort. 
Assumption 7 means that although, at any date t, if s income distribution Fi varies as 
ait alters, the actual income received by i must always belong to the set [0, y] , irrespective 
of if s chosen effort level. Therefore from any observed income it is not possible to infer 
with certainty the effort level chosen by i. This assumption also ensures that neither 
individual can force the other (by levying a sufficiently large punishment) to choose 
a particular level of effort. If this were possible there would effectively be no agency 
problem. 
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Assumption 8. For any ai E A (i = 1, 2) individual incomes are independently and 
identically distributed over time. 
Assumption 8 means that for the same choice of ai each period, income distributions 
are both time invariant and are independent over time. 
The sequencing of observations and choices are as follows. At each date t, each agent 
chooses an effort level ait E A. Mter period t incomes are observed, a transfer of income 
equal to T t from agent 2 to agent 1 is made and the game moves on to time t + 1. 
The transfer at any date t can depend on any variables that are jointly observable at 
the time the transfer is made. Since the transfer at t is made after period t incomes are 
observed, the transfer at t can depend on the entire history of incomes, up to and including 
incomes at t. Although the transfer at t can also depend on the history of transfers to 
t - 1, note that the time 1 transfer depends only on time 1 incomes. Therefore by solving 
out recursively, the transfer at t will ultimately depend only on current and past incomes. 
Let yt = {Yl, .... , Yt}, where Yt denotes a vector of incomes (Ylt, Y2t), represent the 
history of incomes up to and including t. Then the transfer at t can be written Tt (yt) . 
Note that the function Tt (yt) is parameterized by the history of incomes to t - 1, 
namely yt-l. Therefore at time t individuals face a different time t transfer schedule for 
different histories yt-l. It may therefore be that different histories yt-l imply different 
optimal effort levels at t. Furthermore since time t effort levels are chosen before time 
t income levels are observed, effort at t cannot depend on the incomes realized at t. 
We therefore condition each agent's effort level at t on the history of incomes to t - 1. 
Once again conditioning current effort levels on past transfers makes no difference to this 
specification since solving out recursively shows that time t effort levels will depend only 
on yt-l. We therefore write ait (yt-l) (i = 1, 2) as agent i's effort level at time t. When 
t = 1, we write ail (yO) = ail, where yO refers to the "empty history" {}. 
A strategy at t is therefore given by the functions Tt (yt) and ait (yt-l) ,i = 1,2. Note 
that we do not condition i's effort level at t on i's previous history of effort levels. Since 
we will assume that each person's utility is separable over time, individuals do not need 
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to take account of past effort choices when choosing their current level of effort. 
The time-invariant ex-post utility functions of the principal and agent are additively 
separable in time t own consumption and effort and are given, respectively, by 
and 
where U,V : C -? R, C = [0, 2y] , with uc , Vc > ° and U ec , Vee < 0, for all c E C. 
3.3 The Constrained-Efficiency (Second-Best) Prob-
lem 
Definition 1. Let T represent the sequence of strategies {Tt (yt) }:l , and ai the sequence 
of strategies {ait (yt-l ) }:l (i = 1, 2) .5 Then a risk-sharing contract is the sequence of 
strategies {T, aI, a2} given by 
Definition 2. Given any history of incomes yt, the stream of expected utilities from 
t + 1 onwards, discounted to t + 1, from a contract {T, aI, a2}, is given by 
u (yt, T, aI, a2) 
00 
"{3s-l J J [ ( ( t+S)) ( t+S-l)] d2sF ( t+s. t ) L.-t .. U Ylt+s + Tt+s Y - alt+s Y y ,y, aI, a2 
8=1 
5From now on we use the notation ai to represent both a sequence of effort choices by individual i, 
such as {ait (y t - 1) }:1 ' as well as a single action in Fi (y, ai) or in F (Y1, Y2, aI, a2)' Which meaning is 
intended will be clear from the context. 
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(3.1) 
for the principal, and 
V (yt, T, at, a2) 
00 
'" {3s-l J J [ ( ( t+S)) ( HS-l)] d2sF (HS t ) ~ .• V Y2Hs - THs Y - a2t+s Y y ; y ,aI, a2 
s=l 
(3.2) 
for the agent, where {3 is the common discount factor and F (yHs; yt, at, a2) is a distri-
bution function defined on the space of finite histories (i.e. finite sequences of pairs of 
incomes) to t + s (s = 1, 2, ... ) for a given history to t, and contingent upon a sequence 
of chosen effort levels. The stream of expected utilities from t = 1 onwards, discounted 
back to time 1, can therefore be written as U (T, aI, a2) for the principal, and V (T, aI, a2) 
for the agent. 
Definition 3. A contract {T, at, a2} is feasible if, for every y\ Tt (yt) E [-Ylt, Y2t] , and 
for every yt-l, ait (yt-l) E A, i = 1,2. 
Definition 4. Let ai represent the particular strategy sequence {ait (yt-l) }:l (i = 1,2) . 
Then a contract {T, aI, a2} is incentive compatib le if, for every yt, 
(3.3) 
for all feasible strategy sequences aI, and 
(3.4) 
for all feasible strategy sequences a2. This requires 
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and 
for every yt. 
Definition 5. A contract {T, aI, a2} is optimal (or constrained-efficient or second-best) 
if, from t = 1 onwards, {T, at, a2} maximizes U (T, aI, a2) subject to feasibility, incentive 
compatibility, and subject to the agent receiving the expected discounted utility payoff 
(3.5) 
where w could be the outcome of some (unspecified) negotiation process. 
Our definition of the optimal contract assumes that all contracts are binding and 
enforceable so that it is impossible for either the principal or the agent to renege ex post. 
The requirement that contracts satisfy the double incentive compatibility constraints 
reflects the fact that neither person can observe the level of effort chosen by their partner. 
3.4 Reduction of the Problem of Choosing the Second-
Best Contract 
In this section we follow Spear and Srivastava (1987, p. 603) in reducing the problem of 
finding the optimal contract to a static problem in the calculus of variations. First, note 
that by applying recursive methods and starting from t = 1, conditions (3.1) and (3.2) 





respectively, where f (Yn, Y21, an, a21) is the joint probability density over time 1 incomes 
contingent on time 1 effort levels. (See the Appendix to this chapter for a detailed 
derivation of (3.6) and (3.7)). Suppose {T, al, a2} is the optimal contract. Then, subject 
to feasibility and incentive compatibility, U (yl, T, aI, a2) must be the maximum expected 
discounted utility received by the principal given that the agent receives V (yl, T, al, a2). 
The proof of this statement is straightforward. If it were not true we would be able to 
replace the portion of {T, aI, a2} that corresponds to the subgame beginning in period 
2 with a new contract that maximizes U (yl, T, al, a2) subject to the agent receiving 
V (yl, T, al, a2) , and subject to feasibility and incentive compatibility. But this would 
mean that the new contract, starting from t = 1, would be incentive compatible (note 
that the new contract must relax the time 1 incentive compatibility constraint) and would 
be Pareto superior to {T, al, a2}. It follows that the contract {T, al, a2} could not have 
been optimal in the first place. 
Now let A = {V (yt, T, aI, a2)}:o and \II = {U (yt, T, al, a2)}:O, where these values 
are evaluated at the optimal contract. For any w E A, consider the problem of choosing 
{T, aI, a2} to maximize U (T, aI, a2) subject to feasibility, incentive compatibility and 
V (T, al, a2) = w. Hence {T, al, a2} maximizes the principal's stream of payoffs from 
t = 1 onwards, discounted back to time 1, subject to the agent receiving w, incentive 
compatibility, and feasibility. 
In the solution to this problem and for any payoff w to the agent, let U ( w) represent 
the principal's time 1 payoff, ai (w) (i = 1,2) the time 1 effort choices of the principal 
and agent, T (w, yl, Y2) the time 1 transfer if time 1 incomes are (Yl, Y2) , and V (w, YI, Y2) 
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the time 2 utility payoff (i.e. the stream of payoffs from t = 2 onwards, discounted back 
to time 2) promised to the agent if time 1 incomes are (Yl, Y2) . 
This suggests that if w = V (7, aI, a2), then U (w) = U (7, aI, a2) and ai (W) 
ail (yO) = ail (i = 1,2). Also, if time 1 incomes are (Yl,Y2) , then 7 (W,Yl,Y2) = 71 (yl) 
and V (w, Y!' Y2) = V (y\ 7, aI, a2). We also have U (V (w, Yl, Y2)) = U (y\ 7, aI, a2) and 
ai (V (w, Yl, Y2)) = ai2 (yl) (i = 1,2) .If time 2 incomes are (y~, '12) , then 7 (V (w, Yl, Y2) , y~, '/h) = 
72 (y2) and V (V (w, Y!' Y2), y~, y~) = V (y2, 7, a!, a2) , etc. 
In the solution to this problem therefore, the players' strategies, and hence the risk-
sharing contract, will evolve as follows. At t = 1, the principal offers 7 (w, Yl, Y2) and 
V ( W, Yl, Y2) as the transfer and promised future utility schedules, respectively. The prin-
cipal and agent will choose effort levels ai (w) (i = 1, 2) , which must be incentive com-
patible, and will receive payoffs U (w) and w respectively. At t = 2, if (Yl, Y2) occurred 
at t = 1, the agent receives the utility payoff V (w, Yl , Y2) . In this case, the principal of-
fers 7 (V (w, Yl, Y2) ,y~, y~) and V (V (w, Yl, Y2) ,Yt, y~) as the transfer and promised future 
utility schedules respectively. The principal and agent will choose incentive compatible ef-
fort levels ai (V (w, Yl, Y2)) (i = 1,2) and receive payoffs U (V (w, Yl, Y2)) and V (w, Yl, Y2) 
respectively. Note that at t = 2, U (V (w, Yl, Y2)) is the maximum utility the principal can 
receive given that the agent receives V (w, Yl, Y2). At t = 3, if (y~,~) occurred at t = 2, 
the agent receives the utility payoff V (V (w, Y!' Y2) , y~, y~). In this case, the principal 
offers 7 (V (V (w, YI, Y2) , y~, y~) , y~, 'I;) and V (V (V (w, Y!' Y2) , y~, '/h) , y~, y~), etc. 
The preceding argument suggests that any solution to the problem of finding our 
optimal contract can be characterized by five functions 
V (w, Yl, Y2) 
U(w) 
7 (w, YI, Y2) 
and 
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that satisfy, for each w E A, 
w J 1. [ V (Y2 - T (w, Y!' Y2)) ] f (Yl, Y2, al (w) ,a2 (w)) dyldY2 - a2 (w) 
[0,17]2 +,BV (w, Yl, Y2) 
> J 1. [ V (Y2 - T (w, Yl, Y2)) ] f (Yb Y2, al (w) ,a2) dyldY2 - a2, Va2 E A, 
~m2 +,BV(w,~,~) 
(3.8) 
U(w) J 1. [ U (Yl + T (w, Yl, Y2)) ] f (Yl, Y2, al (w) ,a2 (w)) dyldY2 - al (w) [0,17]2 +,BU (V (w, Yl, Y2)) 
> J 1. [ U (Yl + T (w, Yl, Y2)) ] f (Yb Y2, al, a2 (w)) dyldY2 - a!, Val E A 
[O,y] 2 +,BU (V (w, Y!' Y2)) 
(3.9) 
and 
w' V ( w, Y!' Y2) 
J 1. [V (y; - T (w', y~, Y;)) ] f (' I (') (')) d'd I (') Yl' Y2, al w ,a2 w Yl Y2 - a2 w . ~~2 +,BV(W',~,~) 
(3.10) 
Conditions (3.8) and (3.9) state that w is the agent's expected utility payoff, U (w) is 
the principal's expected utility payoff, and that both al (w) and a2 (w) must be incentive 
compatible. Condition (3.10) tells us the relationship between the agent's payoff in any 
two consecutive periods. If the agent receives V ( W, Yl, Y2) today then he must be offered 
V (V (w, Yb Y2), y~, Y;) tomorrow. Condition (3.9) possesses a similar interpretation for 
the principal. 
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We can now restate the problem of finding the optimal contract (definition 5). First, 
define 
and 
J f [ V (Y2 - T (w, Yl, Y2)) ] Ev i[( f (Yl, Y2, al (w) ,a2 (w)) dYl dY2 - a2 (w) [O,y] 2 +{3V (w, Yl, Y2) 
as the expected discounted utilities of the principal and the agent, respectively, at any 
time t. 
Definition 6. Assuming interior solutions for al (w) and a2 (w) , a contract 
is optimal if, for each w E A, 
U(w) = max Eu 
{T(W,Yl ,Y2), V( W,Yl ,Y2),al (w),a2 (w)} (P) 
subJ'ect to Ev = W 8Ev = 0 and 8Eu = O. 
, 8a2 ' 8al 
Note that in this specification of the problem of finding the optimal contract we have 
replaced each person's incentive compatibility constraint by the first order condition for 
their problem of choosing effort (i.e. ~!~ = 0 for the principal and ~!~ = 0 for the agent). 
In solving (P) we can first choose two intervals A and \II as follows. The smallest 
value of w E A could be the value for which, each period, the agent works as much as 
possible and consumes nothing. The largest value of w E A could be the value for which, 
each period, the agent works as little as possible and consumes the total realized income. 
Then the endpoints of W would be the utility payoffs flowing to the principal, under the 
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optimal contract, at the above extreme values of A. Under any optimal contract therefore 
the agent would receive a payoff in A while the principal would receive a payoff in w. 
As w varies in A, the function U ( w) generates the Pareto frontier. We expect U (w) 
to be non-increasing, i.e. U' (w) < 0, otherwise it would be possible to make the principal 
better off simply by offering the agent a higher expected discounted utility. 
For any w E A, the problem of choosing the schedules T (w, YI, Y2) and V (w, YI, Y2) is 
a problem in the calculus of variations. These functions are chosen from among functions 
that take specified values for each (YI, Y2) on the boundary of [0, y]2 . In the solution to (P), 
the functions T (w, YI, Y2), V (w, YI, Y2) , al (w) , a2 (w) and U (w) describe a stationary 
Markovian solution in which w acts as the state variable. 
In order to ensure that the problem (P) is well behaved, the following additional 
assumptions are required. 
Assumption 9. For each w E A, both Eu and Ev are concave in (a!, a2)' 
Assumption 10. For each w E A and for effort levels al (w) and a2 (w), the in-
tegrands in Eu and Ev are twice continuously differentiable in their four independent 
arguments YI, Y2, T ( W, YI, Y2) and V ( W, YI, Y2) , and are jointly concave in T ( W, YI, Y2) 
and V (w, Y!' Y2)' 
Assumption 11. The functions T (w, YI, Y2) and V ( W, YI, Y2) are twice continuously 
differentiable in YI and Y2· 
To ensure that the optimal contract is incentive compatible it is essential that the 
effort levels specified by the contract are those that would actually be chosen by the prin-
cipal and the agent. Assumption 9 ensures that the first order approach of replacing i's 
incentive compatibility condition by i's first order condition for choice of ai will be valid6 . 
Under assumption 9 these first order conditions will be both necessary and sufficient for 
6 Several papers adopt this first-order approach of replacing an individual's incentive compatibility 
condition by his first order condition for choice of effort. See Spear and Srivastava (1987) and Lambert 
(1983) for examples. Also see Rogerson (1985b) and Jewitt (1988) for a discussion of the first-order 
approach to principal-agent problems. 
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the ai (w) offered under the optimal contract to yield a global maxinllllIl of i's expected 
discounted utility (i = 1, 2) . 
Assumptions 10 and 11 are required to ensure that given a pair of effort levels al (w) 
and a2 (w) , the calculus of variations problem of choosing the schedules T ( W, Yl, Y2) and 
V (w, Yl, Y2) will be well behaved. ill particular, any pair of surfaces which satisfy the 
appropriate boundary conditions as well as the simultaneous system of Euler-Lagrange 
equations will achieve a maximum. 
3.5 A Benchmark: The Full-Information First-Best 
(Efficient) Contract 
When both individuals' effort choices are fully observable, the principal simply has to 
solve (P), ignoring the incentive compatibility requirements. The resulting problem is 
U(w) = max Eu 
{T(W'YI ,Y2), V( W,Yl ,Y2),al (w ),a2 (w)} 
(P') 
subject to Ev = w, \/w E A. 
The solution to (P') yields the full-information first-best (or efficient) contract which 
we will denote by 
and which satisfies 
{T* (w, Yl, Y2) , V* (w, Yl, Y2) , a~ (w) , a; (w)} , 
UC1 (Yl + T: (w, Yl, Y2)) = -.A~ (w), 
V C2 (Y2 - T (w, Yl, Y2)) 
U' [V* (w, Yl, Y2)] = .A~ (w) , 








where Ai (w) is the Lagrange multiplier on the agent's utility payoff constraint. Note 
that both (3.13) and (3.14) are evaluated at the full-information first-be:!t contract. 
3.5.1 The Efficient Contract Within a Given Time Period 
Equations (3.11) - (3.14) provide conditions satisfied by 
{T* (w, Yl, Y2) , V* (w, Yl, Y2) , a; (w) , a; (w) } 
at any given time. Equations (3.11) and (3.12) show that T* (w, Yb Y2) and V* (w, Yb Y2) 
are chosen to keep uq~Yl+T:~W'Y1.Y2jj and U' [V* (W,Yl,Y2)] constant, irrespective of the 
VC2 Y2-T W,Yl,Y2 
incomes realized in any given period of time. Since the marginal utilities of consumption 
are positive, then we must have A; (w) < 0 (from (3.11)). This tells us that the utility 
promise constraint is binding and the agent receiVe:! exactly the utility payoff w at time 
t. 
Also since A; (w) < 0, then equation (3.12) confirms that 
Recall that the function U (w) generate:! the Pareto frontier as w varies in A. Then this 
confirms that the Pareto frontier is negatively sloped. Therefore under 
{T* (w, Yl, Y2) , V* (w, Yl, Y2) , a; (w) , a; (w)} , 
any increase in w must lead to a reduction in the maximized value of the utility payoff 
accruing to the principal. 
From Borch (1962) and Holmstrom (1979) we know that the transfer T* (w, Yb Y2) 
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will be efficient from a risk-sharing point of view only if the right hand side of (3.11) is 
constant. Consider any pair of income levels (Yl, Y2) and (iiI, i12) E [0, y]2. Evaluating 
(3.11) at these income levels, eliminating A~ (w) from the resulting equations (since A~ (w) 
does not depend on incomes) and re-arranging the result yields 
U CI (Yl + y* (w, Yl, Y2)) 
U q (ih + y* (w, ih, Y2)) 
V C2 (Y2 - y* (w, Y}, Y2)) 
V C2 (Y2 - y* (w, Yl, Y2))' (3.15) 
If (y}, Y2) and (y}, Y2) represent the incomes that would be received in any two states of 
the world in a given period, then (3.15) states the familiar result that in each period, the 
first-best transfer, Y* (w, Y}, Y2) , is the transfer for which each person's marginal rate of 
substitution of consumption across any two states will be equalized. This has the stan-
dard interpretation of the first-best risk-sharing outcome. Since effort choices are fully 
observable, the contract does not need to offer incentives for effort. The transfer func-
tion y* (w, Yl, Y2) is used purely to distribute the risks arising from income uncertainty. 
Furthermore if, say, the principal were risk neutral, i.e. u' constant and u" = 0, then 
'UC] ~~1:T:t'~h~2~~ = 1 and under condition (3.15) the agent would receive a constant level 
'UCI YI T W,YI,Y2 
of consumption across states. 
Evaluating (3.12) at (Yl, Y2) and (Yl, Y2) E [0, y]2 implies 
U' [V* (w, Yl , Y2)] = u' [V* (w, Yl, i12)] . (3.16) 
Assuming U" (w) =I 0, then U' [V* (w, Yl, Y2)] = u' [V* (w, Y}, Y2)] if and only if V* (w, Yb Y2) = 
V* (w, Yb Y2) . Therefore (3.16) tells us that for any utility payoff w E A received by the 
agent at t, the promised future utility payoff at t + 1, given by V* (w, Yl, Y2), is the 
same irrespective of the incomes realised at t. So we establish that with U (w) non-linear, 
(W*(~;~1'Y2) = ° (i = 1,2) . We can obtain this result more formally as follows. Under the 
assumption that V* (w, Yb Y2) is differentiable, differentiate (3.12) with respect to Yl and 
Y2 to get 
U" (V* (w, Yl, Y2))~: = 0, i = 1,2. (3.17) 
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Expression (3.17) confirms that under U" =1= 0 we must have ~: = 0, for all i. 
Hence the function V* (w, Yl, Y2) is such that the incomes realised today have no 
impact on promised future utilities. Both principal and agent receive the same utility 
payoffs (wand U ( w) respectively) each period. We may interpret this as follows. If 
effort choices were not observable, the function V* (w, Yl, Y2) could be used to exert an 
intertemporal control over effort by, say, punishing a low (rewarding a high) income today 
with a reduced (increased) utility payoff tomorrow. However since both effort levels are 
observable, each person chooses the optimal level of effort each period and so there is no 
need to control effort by varying the promised future utility payoffs to the agent and to 
the principal. 
We now consider the effect of alternative income realizations, in any given period, on 
the efficient transfer T* (w, Yl, Y2) and on the optimal allocation of consumption between 
principal and agent. 
Proposition 1. Let 
and 
represent the consumption levels accruing to the principal and the agent, respectively, un-
d th fir t-b t t t Als I t * U C1C1 (Yl+r*(W,Yl,Y2» d p* VC2C2 (Y2-r* (W,Yl,Y2» 
er e s es con rac . 0 e Pl = - UC1 (Yl+r*(W,YbY2» an 2 = - vC2(Y2-r*(W,Yl,Y2» 
represent the coefficients of absolute risk aversion, evaluated at the first-best transfer 
function, for the principal and the agent respectively. Then 
8ci 8ci * P2 E [0 1] 
Byl 8Y2 pi + pi ' 
and 
8c* 8ci * 2 Pl E [0,1] . -
Byl 8Y2 pi + pi 
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Proof. See Appendix .• 
This result establishes that llllder the first-best contract (i) each individual's con-
sumption is monotonically increasing in the incomes, and (ii) any increase in income 
is completely shared between the principal and agent according to their degree of risk-
averSIon. 
3.5.2 Evolution of the Efficient Contract Over Time 
In the preceding section we established that llllder U" (.) =1= 0 we have Yy: = 0 (i = 1, 2) 
and so the agent's promised future utility, V* (w, Yl, Y2) , was the same irrespective of the 
incomes realized today. Our next result demonstrates that llllder the efficient contract, 
this promised future utility is the same as the utility received today. 
Proposition 2. For each wE A,w = V* (W,Yl,Y2) for all (Yl,Y2) E [O,y? 
Proof See Appendix .• 
We interpret proposition 2 as follows. If w is the agent's expected disCOllllted utility 
today, then the principal and agent choose effort levels ai (w) and a; (w) , respectively, a 
transfer of T* (w, Yl, Y2) occurs today and the agent's promised expected disCOllllted utility 
tomorrow, V* (w, Yb Y2) , is the same as today's. The contract tomorrow is therefore given 
by 
and 
a; (V* (W,Yl (w) ,Y2 (w))) = a;(w),i = 1,2, 
and is the same as the contract today, irrespective of the incomes realised today. 
Under the efficient contract, therefore, Wt+l = Wt, Vt E T, and tomorrow's contract 
is always the same as the contract today. By contrast, llllder the repeated single agency 
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model of Spear and Srivastava (1987), there was only a single output level (the critical 
output) for which Wt+l = Wt. For all output realizations other than the critical output, the 
promised future utility was different from current utility and hence tomorrow's contract 
in general was different from the contract today. Under the repeated double agency 
problem analyzed later, we will show that there exists a single pair of income levels for 
which Wt+ 1 = Wt and for which the contract tomorrow will be the same as that offered 
today. For all other income pairs realised today, we show that tomorrow's utility payoff 
will differ from today's, and so tomorrow's contract will also differ from today's. In the 
repeated double agency case it is important to note that the rewards and punishments, 
in any given period, must respond not only to the income realised by the agent, but also 
to the income realised by the principal. 
Inspection of condition (3.11) tells us that this expression takes the same form as 
the equilibrium condition for the efficient transfer in a one-period model of risk-sharing. 
The function T* (w, Yl, Y2) therefore exhibits the same qualitative features as the optimal 
transfer function from a static problem. The difference here is that in a repeated rela-
tionship, these features are required to hold each period. Our next result confirms this. 
It simply tells us that T* (w, Yl, Y2) is such that the marginal utility ratio is constant from 
one period to the next. 
Proposition 3. Let Yit-l (i = 1,2) be the incomes realised at t - 1 and T;_l the 
known transfer at t - 1. Then, for each W E A, 
U q (Ylt-l + T;_l) 
V C2 (Y2t-l - T;_l) 
Proof See Appendix .• 
(3.18) 
This result just tells us that the efficient transfer function acts to keep the marginal 
utility ratio constant from one period to the next. Furthermore, re-arranging (3.18) tells 
us that under the efficient contract, the marginal rate of substitution of consumption 
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between any two consecutive periods is equalized across individuals. We can interpret 
this result as saying that the efficient transfer function, in addition to allocating risk across 
states in any given period, will also take advantage of opportunities for intertemporal 
consumption smoothing. 
3.6 The Second-Best (Constrained-Efficient) Contract 
When both agents' effort choices are unobservable, any risk-sharing contract must also 
be incentive compatible. In this case the principal now solves the problem stated in (P). 
The second-best contract, which we denote by 
must satisfy 
and 
U C1 (Yl + f (w, Yl, Y2)) 




where ~l (w) is the multiplier on the agent's utility promise constraint, ~2 (w) is the 
multiplier on the age"t's incentive compatibility constraint, and ~3 (w) is the multiplier 
on the principal's incentive compatibility constraint. ~ote t,hp.t both (3.21) and (3.22) are 
evaluated at the secOl~best contract. Ali?q, in evaluating (3.19) and (3.20) we have taken 
I 
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advantage of assumption 3 that individual incomes are independent random variables. 
3.6.1 The Second-Best Contract Within a Given Time Period 
For any w E A, equations (3.19) - (3.22) provide conditions satisfied by 
{ f ( w , Y1 , Y2) , V (w, Y1, Y2) ,a1 (w) , a2 (w) } 
at any given time. Since the marginal utilities of consumption are positive, (3.19) and 
(3.20) imply that the constrained Pareto frontier is negatively sloped, i.e. U' [V (w, Y1, Y2)] < 
O. Therefore under the second-best contract we can raise one person's utility payoff only 
by reducing the utility payoff of the other. Throughout we assume that the constrained 
Pareto frontier is strictly concave, i.e. U" (.) < 0.7 
From the Envelope Theorem we can show that U' (w) = ~1 (w) and so it follows that 
~1 (w) < O. Also we assume ~2 (w) < 0 and ~3 (w) < 0.8 We can now proceed with our 
characterization of the optimal contract under repeated double moral hazard. From our 
discussion in the previous section we lmow that unless the right hand side of (3.19) is 
constant, then f ( W, Y1, Y2) cannot be efficient from a risk-sharing point of view. Our next 
result shows that f (w, Y1, Y2) cannot be the efficient transfer schedule. 
Proposition 4. AB long as we do not have both ~2 (w) and ~3 (w) being zero, then 
the right hand side of (3.19) is non-constant and the transfer schedule f (w, Y1, Y2) cannot 
be efficient from a risk-sharing point of view. 
Proof See Appendix .• 
An analogous result can easily be obtained for condition (3.20) and so, as long as 
we do not have both ~2 (w) and ~3 (w) being zero, then the second-best utility payoff 
7Spear and Srivastatva (1987) proved this formally for the repeated single moral hazard model and 
we expect this result to also hold for the repeated double moral hazard case. 
8 Because of the high level of generality of the model it is not possible to determine the signs of 
~ (w) and ).3 (w) . However as we shall see, the implications for the behaviour of the optimal contract 
of assuming ).2 (w) and ).3 (w) to be strictly negative actually accord very well with our intuition. 
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schedule, V ( W, Yl, Y2) , must deviate from the efficient utility payoff schedule given by 
V* (W,Yl,Y2) = w, for all (Yl,Y2) E [0,y]2. 
Consider any pair of income levels (Yl, Y2) and (fil, i12) E [0, y}2 . From proposition 4 
it must be the case that 
U C1 (Yl + ~ ( W, Yl, Y2)) =1= U C1 (~l + ~ ( W, ~l' ~2)) . 
V C2 (Y2 - T (w, Y}, Y2)) V C2 (Y2 - T (w, Y}, Y2)) (3.23) 
Condition (3.23) says that as incomes vary across states of the world at any given time, 
the marginal utility ratio does not remain constant across states. Re-arranging (3.23) 
implies 
U q (~l +: (w,~}, ~2)) =1= V C2 (~2 - ~ (w, ~l' ~2)) 
U C1 (Yl + T (w, Y}, Y2)) V C2 (Y2 - T (w, Yb Y2)) (3.24) 
and so llllder the second-best transfer, f (w, Y}, Y2), the marginal rates of substitution of 
consumption across states will not be equalized across individuals. Even if the principal 
were risk neutral (i.e. u constant and u" = 0) so that Uq(~1+~(W'~1'~2» = 1, the agent 
U q (Yl +r(W,Yl,Y2» 
would nevertheless not receive the same consumption in each state and would therefore 
be required to bear some risk. This outcome has the standard interpretation that when 
effort is llllobservable the second-best contract does not provide an efficient level of risk-
sharing. This is necessary in order to offer some incentives for effort. However the 
characterization in condition (3.19) tells us that the second-best transfer, f (w, Y}, Y2), 
must be chosen so as to achieve the correct balance between sharing risk and offering the 
right incentives to both individuals. We will return to this point later. 




This establishes that, for any given W at time t, the promised utility payoffs at t + 1 
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depend upon the incomes realised at t. Equivalently, VYi (w, Y!' Y2) =I- 0, i = 1,2.9 
These features of the second-best contract are in contrast to those of the efficient 
contract. Under the efficient contract perfect risk-sharing was achieved each period. 
A1so under the efficient contract the promised future utility payoffs did not depend on 
the incomes that were currently realised. AB a result, the efficient contract did not 
alter from one period to the next. In contrast under the second-best contract, perfect 
risk-sharing each period is not achieved. Furthermore the contract offered tomorrow 
will be influenced by the incomes realized today. Later on, in propositions 8 and 9, we 
provide more results on the relationship between the first-best (efficient) contract and 
our second-best (constrained-efficient) contract. 
Comparing (3.19) and (3.20) with analogous conditions obtained for the problem of 
repeated single moral hazard (see Spear and Srivastava, 1987, conditions 4.3a and 4.4) 
we see that the characterization of the repeated double moral hazard contract must be 
different from the characterization of the optimal contract under repeated single moral 
hazard. AB we now discuss, the key difference reflects the fact that under double moral 
hazard, the optimal contract must simultaneously take account of incentives for both 
individuals. 
From proposition 4 it follows that as incomes vary across states, the likelihood ratios 
f~:~~~~~(~~~) (i = 1,2) must also vary. Therefore, as long as we do not have both -X2 (w) 
and -X3 (w) being equal to zero, it follows that the right hand sides, and hence also the 
left hand sides, of (3.19) and (3.20) must vary under alternative income realizations. But 
this just tells us that under the second-best contract there is some deviation from the 
efficient level of risk-sharing each period, and from the efficient structure of rewards and 
penalties over the long term. However these deviations must be different in character 
from the deviations generated when there is only single moral hazard. 
From conditions (3.19) and (3.20) we see that the optimal contract under repeated 
9Note that condition (3.25) rules out linearity of the constrained Pareto frontier. If the slope of the 
frontier differs at different points in its domain, then the frontier cannot be linear. 
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double moral hazard depends on the distribution of Yi and on the functional relationship 
between this distribution and ai, i = 1,2. This contrasts with the optimal repeated single 
agency contract which depends only on the distribution of the agent's income and on the 
relationship between that distribution and the agent's effort. It also contrasts with the 
first-best contract which is wholly unrelated to the income distribution of either the 
principal or the agent, or to the relationship between these distributions and the effort 
levels. 
Following Hohnstrom (1979), the larger is Ifiail the stronger the incentive effect, 
for person i, of deviating from optimal risk-sharing. Also the greater is fi the more 
costly, in terms of the risk-sharing benefits lost to person i, are such deviations. Thus 
If~:i I may be interpreted as a benefit-cost ratio, for person i, for deviation from optimal 
risk-sharing. Note that the likelihood ratio, f~i, is just the derivative of the maximum 
likelihood function, log fi, when ai is viewed as an unknown parameter. Therefore If~:il 
measures how strongly one would wish to infer, based on the observation Yi, that person 
i did not take the assumed action. Conditions (3.19) and (3.20 ) therefore say that the 
optimal level of risk-sharing under repeated double moral hazard must take account of 
such inferences for both individuals, and that any punishments or rewards (expressed in 
terms of deviations from first-best risk-sharing) should be proportional to the likelihood 
ratios of both the principal and the agent. Later on, in propositions 8 and 9, we will 
say more about the precise nature of these deviations. We now proceed to offer some 
characterizations of the second-best contract. However before doing so we will first need 
the technical results in Lemmas 1 and 2. 
Lemma 1. For any ai (w) (i = 1,2), under the monotone likelihood ratio condition 
(mlre) there exists a unique income level Yi (w) such that fi~ (Yi (w), ai (w)) = O. For Yi < 
fJi (w) we have fiai (Yi (w) ,ai (w)) < O. For Yi > Yi (w) we have fi~ (Yi (w), ai (w)) > O. 
Proof See Appendix .• 
Lemma 1 implies that under mlrc, more effort by person i will reduce the likelihood 
of receiving incomes below Yi (w) and will increase the likelihood of receiving incomes 
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above Yi (w). 
Lemma 2. For all w E A and (Yl, Y2) E [0, y]2 , 
and 
Proof. See Appendix .• 
In the remainder of this chapter we examine how the second-best contract allocates 
risk and provides incentives. In the rest of this section we examine the second-best trans-
fer and the second-best allocation of consumption under alternative income realizations. 
In the next section we look at certain aspects of the evolution of the contract from one 
period to the next. Throughout we draw comparisons between the double moral hazard 
contract, on the one hand, and the full-information and single moral hazard contracts, 
on the other. We can now state the following result. 
Proposition 5. Under the second-best contract, increases in the level of Yl realized 
today lead to a reduction in today's marginal utility ratio, U q ~Yl~~t'Yl'Y2~~, while increases 
V C2 Y2 T W,Yl,Y2 
in the level of Y2 realized today lead to an increase in this marginal utility ratio. Let 
and 
represent the current levels of consumption that accrue to the principal and the agent, 
respectively, under the second-best contract. Then under mlrc, .\2 (w) < 0 and .\3 (w) < 
o we have BCl > 0 and BBc2 > O. Also, the effect of changes in Yl or Y2 on the transfer 
, BYI Y2 
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T (w, Yl, Y2) is ambiguous. 
Proof. See Appendix .• 
This result tells us that although the effect of different income realizations on the 
size of the second-best transfer between principal and agent is ambiguous, the effect on 
absolute consumption levels is quite clear. Ceteris paribus, a better income realization 
by person i at time t is rewarded immediately by a rise in i's time t consumption level, 
i = 1,2. We also see that a better income realization by person i at time t leads to 
a fall in person i's marginal utility relative to person j's marginal utility (i -=1= j). This 
suggests that greater income for person i is rewarded not only by a rise in i's absolute 
consumption but also by a 'somewhat higher' consumption for person i relative to the 
consumption of person j. 
3.6.2 Evolution of the Second-Best Contract Over Time 
In the repeated single agency model analyzed by Spear and Srivastava (1987) it was 
shown that each period there was a single output level which, if realised, meant that 
next period's utility payoff (and hence next period's contract) would be the same as this 
period's utHlty P9-yqf.f and contract. Our next result demonstrates that this feature of 
the optimal smgJ~ &ge:q.cy contrflCt g(J~~raliz~ unde:r the double agency problem analyzed 
here. 
Proposition 6. Let (:lh (w) ,[12 (w)) E [0, y]2 represent the current income levels 
for which flal (ih (w) ,(h (w)) = ° and f2a2 ([12 (w), 0,2 (w)) = 0. (From lemma 1 we 
established that such income levels existed and were unique). Then for every w E A, 
w = V (w, Yl (w) , Y2 (w)) (3.27) 
and 
U CI (Yl (w) + T ( W, Yl (w) , Y2 (w))) = _ ~ (w). 
V C2 (Y2 (w) - f ( W, Yl (w) ,Y2 (w))) 1 (3.28) 
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Proof See Appendix .• 
We may interpret this rt~ult as follows. If w is the agent's expected discounted 
utility today and incomes (iit (w) , f12 (w)) are realised today, then a1 (w) and a2 (w) are 
chosen today, a transfer of f (w, ih (w), f/2 (w)) occurs today, and the agent's promised 
expected discounted utility tomorrow is given by V ( w, f11 (w) , f/2 (w)) and is the same as 
his utility payoff today. The fact that w = V (w, f11 (w) , 112 (w)) implies that whenever 
incomes (ih (w) , i12 (w)) are realised, the contract tomorrow is the same as the con-
tract today. Note that the utility payoff, V (w, ih (w) , f12 (w)) , can be thought of as the 
'first-best' utility payoff. Also the transfer, f (w, ih (w),fh (w)) , can be thought of as 
the 'first-best' transfer, when -).1 (w) represents the weight given to the agent's prefer-
ences in solving the full-information first-best problem. Note that f (w, ih (w), Y2 (w)) 
. ch . fy uCl (Yl (w)+f-(W,Yl (W),Y2(W))) - \ ( ) F' all th . al tili'ty 
IS osen to satIs C ( ) ~ ( - ( ) - ( ») - - /\ 1 W. ill y, e margm u ra-vC2 Y2 W -7 W,Yl W ,Y2 W 
tio Uq (~1(W)+~(W'~1(W)'~2(W))) can similarly be thought of as the 'first-best' marginal utility 
, vC2(Y2(W)-7(W'Yl(W),Y2(W») ' 
ratio. 
The next result examines the future utility payoff when incomes (Yl (w) , Y2 (w)) -=1= 
(fIl (w) , Y2 (w)) are realised today. 
Proposition 7. Under mlre, U" (w) < 0, A2 (w) < 0, and A3 (w) < ° we have 
and 
Proof See Appendix .• 
This result demonstrates that the schedule of future utilities is monotonic in individ-
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uals' current incomes. fu particular, the agent's future utility payoff is monotonically 
increasing in the agent's own income and monotonically decreasing in the principal's in-
come. Also since U' (w) < 0, it follows that the principal's future utility payoff is also 
monotonically increasing in the principal's own income and monotonically decreasing in 
the agent's income. Proposition 7 also implies that increases in both Yl and Y2 will have 
offsetting effects on tomorrow's utility promises. 
We can now pull together the results of propositions 5, 6 and 7 in order to say 
something about the relationship between the second-best and the first-best transfer, 
and between the second-best and the first-best utility payoff. 
Proposition 8. (i) If Yl < ih (w) and Y2 = f12 (w), or Yl < ih (w) and Y2 > Y2 (w), 
then V (w Y Y) > w and UC1 (Yl+T(W,YbY2» > u C1 (ji1(W)+T(W,Yl(W),'ih(w») 
, b 2 vC2(Y2-T(W,Yl,Y2» vC2(Y2(w)-T(W,111(w),Y2(w»)· 
(ii) If Yl > Yl (w) and Y2 < Y2 (w), or Yl = Yl (w) and Y2 < Y2 (w), then V (w, Yb Y2) < 
d UCI (Yl+T(W,Yl,Y2» < UCI (Yl(W)+T(W,Yl(W),Y2(W») 
w an VC2 (Y2-T(W,Yl,Y2» VC2 (i12(W)-T(W,Yl(W),i12(w))) . 
(iii) If Yl > Yl (w) and Y2 > Y2 (w), or Yl < Yl (w) and Y2 < fh (w), then the 
.tr t VA ( ).. d UC1 (Yl+T(W,Yl,Y2»' . u c1 (ih(w)+T(W,ih(w),i12(w))) euec on w, Yl, Y2 V'ls-a-V'lS w an on (~( » V'ls-a-ms (_ ( ) ~( _ ( ) _ ( ») VC2 Y2- T W,Yl,Y2 VC2 Y2 W -T W,Yl W ,Y2 W 
is ambiguous. 
Proof. These results follow directly by combining the results of propositions 5, 6 and 
7 .• 
Proposition 8(i) can be interpreted as saying that whenever the principal receives 
a 'relatively low income' and/or the agent a 'relatively high one' (i.e. relative to their 
critical income), then the agent is rewarded (principal is punished) tomorrow with a 
higher (lower) utility payoff than the payoff he received today (i.e. than the first-best 
payoff). Also under this outcome the current transfer will be chosen so that the current 
ratio of the principal's to the agent's marginal utility is high relative to the first-best 
marginal utility ratio. On the other hand, proposition 8(ii) can be interpreted as saying 
that whenever the principal receives a 'relatively high income' and/or the agent a 'rela-
tively low one', then the agent is punished (principal is rewarded) tomorrow with a lower 
(higher) utility payoff than the payoff he received today. Also the current transfer will 
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be chosen so that the current ratio of the principal's to the agent's marginal utility is 
low relative to the first-best marginal utility ratio. Finally proposition 8(iii) tells us that 
if both principal and agent receive a 'relatively high' income (or if they both receive a 
'relatively low income'), then the effect this has on the current principal-agent marginal 
utility ratio vis-a-vis the first-best ratio, and on the future utility payoffs vis-a-vis the 
current payoffs, is ambiguous and cannot be established without further information on 
preferences and income distributions. 
The implication of proposition 8(iii) is that the second-best contract, in terms of the 
structure of rewards and penalties offered within any given period, is less sensitive to the 
performance of any single individual than would have been the case under a repeated 
single agency problem. Recall that under repeated single agency a good performance by 
the agent is always rewarded with an increase in today's consumption and an increase 
in tomorrow's utility. Likewise a bad performance on the part of the agent will always 
be punished with a reduction in today's consumption and a reduction in tomorrow's 
utility payoff. In the single agency setting these rewards and punishments are entirely 
unaffected by the performance of another individual (say the principal). In the current 
setting, however, we see that the rewards and punishments offered to one person will 
depend not only on that person's performance but also on the performance of the other 
person. 
The next result discusses the evolution of the second-best marginal utility ratio and 
of the second-best utility promises over time. 
Proposition 9. Let (til, 112) represent the known incomes realized at time t. Let 
w' = V (w, Ih, i12) represent the agent's utility payoff at t + 1, (y~, y~) the incomes realized 
at t + 1, and 
the t + 1 critical income levels defined by 
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and 
'+~ I I I 
F· II I t U q Yl T W 'Yl'Y2 h· f h .. , rna y, e (' ~ I I ')) represent t e ratIo 0 t e prmclpal s to the agent's margm· al 
VC2 Y2- T W 'Yl'Y2 
utility at t + 1, evaluated at the optimal t + 1 transfer, T ( w' , '!h, y~), for given t + 1 
incomes. Then, llllder mlre, 'x2 (w') < 0, 'x3 (w') < 0, and taking account of lemma 2 we 
have the following: 
Proof. See Appendix .• 
This result describes the relationship between the time t + 1 and the time t marginal 
utility ratios, and between the time t + 2 and the time t + 1 utility payoffs. Proposition 
9(i) tells us that if, at t + 1, both agents obtain their t + 1 critical incomes, then the 
t + 1 marginal utility ratio will be the same as the known marginal utility ratio at t, 
and the t + 2 utility payoffs will be the same as the t + 1 utility payoffs. Proposition 
9(ii) can be interpreted as saying that if, at time t + 1, the principal receives a 'relatively 
low income' and/or the agent a 'relatively high one' (this time relative to the t + 1 
critical incomes), then the t + 1 principal-agent marginal utility ratio will be greater 
than the known principal-agent marginal utility ratio at t, and the agent's (principal's) 
t + 2 utility payoff will also be greater (lower) than the agent's (principal's) t + 1 utility 
payoff. Proposition 9(iii) can be similarly interpreted as saying that if, at time t + 1, the 
principal receives a 'relatively high income' and/or the agent a 'relatively low one', then 
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the t + 1 principal-agent marginal utility ratio will be lower than the known principal-
agent marginal utility ratio at t, and the agent's (principal's) t + 2 utility payoff will also 
be lower (higher) than the agent's (principal's) t + 1 utility payoff. Finally, proposition 
9(iv) just tells us that if, at time t + 1, both principal and agent perform well (or if they 
both perform badly), then we cannot predict the effect on the t + 1 marginal utility ratio 
vis-a-vis the time t ratio, nor on the t + 2 utility payoffs vis-a-vis the t + 1 payoffs. Again 
we see that the second-best contract, this time in terms of the structure of rewards and 
penalties offered over time, continues to be less sensitive to the performance of particular 
individuals than is the case under repeated single agency. 
In order to offer a full characterization of the behaviour of the second-best contract, it 
is necessary to know how the critical incomes (ih (w) , Y2 (w)) evolve over time, i.e. how 
they respond as w changes from one period to the next. The current critical income, 
Yi (w) , offers a benchmark level of income against which person i's current performance 
can be judged. Suppose i' current income is Yi. Then Yi > Yi can be interpreted as saying 
that person i has performed 'relatively well' in the current period, while Yi < Yi implies 
that person i's current performance has been 'relatively poor'. Also, if Yi rises (falls) from 
one period to the next, then in the subsequent period it becomes more difficult (easier) 
for person i to do well than it had been in the first period. 
We are therefore interested in knowing the sign of ih (w), i = 1,2. Remember that 
the critical incomes Yt (w) and Y2 (w) were the income levels that satisfied 
and 
respectively. Therefore the probability density function fi (Yt (w) , at (w)) implicitly de-
fines a relationship between i's critical income, Yi (w), and i's chosen level of effort, 
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o'i (w) . For example, under the exponential density function given by 
it is easy to show that ih (w) = o'i (w) 10 and therefore sign iX (w) = sign o,~ (w) ,i = 
1,2. Knowing the sign of y~ (w) , therefore, requires (a) choosing a particular probability 
density function, and (b) knowing the comparative statics of each individual's effort 
level as w changes. In the repeated single moral hazard problem analyzed by Spear and 
Srivastava (1987) the authors show that it is not possible to unambiguously sign the 
derivative of the agent's effort with respect to his utility payoff. Instead they identify 
conditions under which this derivative might be positive and conditions under which it 
might be negative. In some cases this sign is indeterminate. Because of the high level 
of generality of our repeated double agency model, it is unlikely that we will be able to 
obtain simple conditions under which the a~ (w) , i = 1,2, are either negative or positive, 
and so we do not attempt to do so here. 
We now turn to the final result of this chapter. Recall from proposition 3 that under 
the first-best contract 
Under the first-best contract, the marginal utility ratio is held constant from one period 
to the next. IT the principal were risk neutral this would imply that the agent received 
a constant consumption stream over time, and so under the first-best contract the agent 
would obtain perfect consumption smoothing. However when both individuals are risk 
averse we can interpret (3.29) as meaning that the first-best contract tries to achieve the 
optimal level of consumption-smoothing over time, taking account of the risk-aversion of 
both individuals. 
lODifferentiate Ii with respect to ai and evaluate the result at the particular effort level o'i (w). The 
critical income level fJi is the income level for which this expression is zero. 
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A standard result of the repeated single moral hazard model obtained by Lambert , , 
(1983), Rogerson (1985a) and Spear and Srivastava (1987), is that the optimal contract 
must be such that the expected marginal utility ratio at any time t must always equal the 
known marginal utility ratio in the previous period. Suppose T ( W, Yl , Y2) represents the 
optimal transfer schedule under repeated single agency. Then, based on the framework 
and notation developed in this chapter, if only agent v (the 'agent') has an incentive 
problem we must have 
(3.30) 
where Yit-l (i = 1, 2) are the incomes realised at t - 1, T t-l is the known transfer at t - 1 
and E {.} is the expectations operator over incomes (Yl, Y2) at t. Likewise (and as we 
demonstrate later in the proof of proposition 10) if only agent u (the 'principal') has an 
incentive problem then we must have 
all wE A. 
(3.31) 
The inequalities in expressions (3.30) and (3.31) can be derived from Jensen's in-
equalityll whereas the equalities in these expressions represent the standard result of 
the repeated single moral hazard literature. Lambert (1983) interpreted the equality in 
llAccording to Jensen's inequality if h(.) is a convex function and E(X) < 00, then h(E(X)) S 
E (h (X)). In this context let X = ~ and h (X) = Xl =~. Then noting that 1 is strictly convex we 
U q V C2 
have 
By a similar argument we also have 
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(3.30), in the context of a two-period principal-agent relationship with a possibly risk 
neutral principal and a risk averse agent, as meaning that the optimal long-term contract 
" ... smooths the agent's income over time" (Lambert, 1983, p. 449). He also suggested 
that " ... the principal spreads the risk of the first period outcome over as many periods 
as possible. By using the sharing rules to smooth the agent's income, the principal can 
give the agent a lower expected payment in each period and still meet the agent's mini-
mmn utility constraint" (Lambert, 1983, p. 449). Rogerson (1985a) established that the 
equality in (3.30) would apply to any two adjacent periods of a longer principal-agent 
relationship. He argued that ''The repetition of a moral hazard relationship creates the 
opportunity for intertemporal risk sharing. The optimal contract always takes advan-
tage of this, i.e., memory plays a role in the optimal contract. However, because of 
the incentive problem the agent is not fully insured (our emphasis) and the agent is left 
with a residual desire to intertemporally self-insure through the use of credit markets" 
(Rogerson, 19800, p. 70). 
We now present our final result. In doing so note that (3.30) can be equivalently 
expressed as 
Proposition 10. Let (Ylt-l, Y2t-l) be the incomes realised at t-l and Tt-l the known 
transfer at t - 1. Then under repeated double agency (i.e. 'x2 (w) -=1= 0 and 'x3 (w) -=1= 0) 
we must have 
(3.33) 
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where expectations are over incomes (YI, Y2) at time t. If ).3 (w) = 0 and ).2 (w) =1= 0 then 
condition (3.32) holds. If ).2 (w) = 0 and ).3 (w) =1= 0 then condition (3.31) holds. 
Proof. See Appendix .• 
According to proposition 10 condition (3.33) characterizes the optimal contract under 
repeated double moral hazard. It is easy to see that this expression represents a natural 
generalization of the two single moral hazard possibilities that are embodied, respectively, 
in conditions (3.32) and (3.31). Proposition 10 establishes that if only the agent (agent 1') 
has a binding incentive constraint then (3.32) must be true, whereas if only the principal 
(agent u) has a binding incentive constraint then (3.31) must be true. If however both 
agents have binding incentive constraints then the optimal contract is characterized by 
(3.33) and we have an optimum that lies somewhere between the two single moral hazard 
extremes. 
Proposition 10 illustrates that when the single agency setting is generalized to take 
account of the double incentive problem, the creation of an additional incentive problem 
implies that under the optimal contract there must be some deviation from the level 
of intertemporal consumption smoothing that would have been optimal under repeated 
single agency. There are two points to note about this deviation. First, the extent of 
deviation must be proportional to the benefit-cost ratio of doing so. (To see that this 
must be the case consider expressions (3.65) and (3.70) in the Appendix and recall our 
earlier interpretation of If~:il as reflecting the benefit-cost ratio, associated with person 
i, of deviation from optimal risk-sharing). Second, inspection of condition (3.33) shows 
that when both agents have binding incentive constraints then 
and 
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This contrasts with the two single moral hazard cases under which 
and 
V C2 (Y2t-1 - Tt-I) E {VC2 (Y2 - T (W, YI, Y2))} 
U Ci (Ylt-I + Tt-I) < Uq (YI + T (W, Yb Y2)) 
when only agent v has an incentive problem, or 
and 
UCi (YIt-1 + ~t-I) < E {UCi (YI + ~ (w, YI, Y2)) } 
V C2 (Y2t-1 - Tt-I) V C2 (Y2 - T (w, Yb Y2)) 
when only agent U has an incentive problem. 
3.7 Discussion and Areas for Further "Work 
Based on the analysis of this chapter we identify several lines of further inquiry. The 
first is an analysis of the effects of the double incentive problem on the effort choices of 
the principal and agent. It is a well known result that one of the inefficiencies of single 
moral hazard is that the agent chooses a lower level of effort than would have been chosen 
under full-information. However what effect does double moral hazard have on the effort 
choices of both principal and agent? Also how will individual effort levels evolve over 
time? Because of the high level of generality in our model we were unable to determine 
the sign of a~ (w), i = 1,2. Nevertheless it may be possible to establish the sign of the 
a~ (w) under specific assumptions about the shape of individual preferences and about 
individuals' income distributions. 
Second, concerns the role of binding contracts in influencing the properties of the 
optimal long-term contract. We can think of several circumstances under which binding 
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and enforceable contracts are unavailable and risk-sharing can be sustained only through 
infonnal agreements. Development of a tractable analysis of this question, while retaining 
the double agency problem, would be challenging and would represent a further departure 
from existing models. A third line of inquiry could be an empirical investigation into 
whether actual, long-tenn risk-sharing arrangements, in the double moral hazard context, 
possess all or some of the properties suggested by our analysis. 
APPENDIX 
Derivation of {3.6} and {3.7}. For any history yt and for s = 1,2, ... , note that 
since individual incomes are independently distributed from one period to the next, 
then F (yt+s; yt, aI, a2) must be equivalent to F (Yt+1, .... , YHs; aI, a2)' Then from the 
properties of joint density functions we have 
d2sF (yt+s., yt, aI, a2) d2SF (y Y' a a) 
_ t+ 1, .... , t+s, 1 , 2 - f ( .) ---~----=-------'-- - - Y HI, .... , YHs, aI, a2 . 
dY2HsdYlt+s.' .dY2t+ 1 dYlt+ 1 dY2HsdY1Hs" .dY2H 1 dY1H 1 
(3.34) 
Again since incomes are independently distributed over time, and taking account of the 
fact that the probability density over incomes at any time t is contingent only on the 
effort levels chosen at t, we have 
(3.35) 
Combining (3.34) and (3.35) implies that the distribution F (yHS; yt, at, a2) can be ex-
pressed as 
s 
d2s F (yHS; yt, at, a2) = IT {f (Y1Hj, Y2t+j, alt+j (yt+j-1) , ~Hj (yHj-1)) dy1HjdY2Hj} . 
j=l 
(3.36) 
Now note that 
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00 
L {1'-1 J .. J [u (YIHS + THs (yHS)) - alt+s (yHS-l) 1 d2s F (yHS; yt, a" a2) 
s=l 
- J J [u (YIHI + TtH (ytH)) - a'H' (yt) 1 d2 F (ytH; yt, a" a.) 
00 
+ L /3s-1 J .. J [u (YIHS + THs (yt+s)) - alt+s (yHS-l) 1 d2s F (yHS; yt, a" a2) 
s=2 
(3.37) 
and so it follows that 
U (yt+1, T, at, a2) 
00 
'"' fls- 1 J J [ ( + ( t+1+S)) ( t+S)] d2sP (t+1+S t+1 ) L-t .. U Ylt+1+s Tt+1+s Y - a1t+1+s Y Y; Y ,at, a2 . 
s=l 
Substituting from (3.36) into (3.37) gives us 
u (yt, T, aI, a2) 
- f /3s-1 J .. J [u (Ylt+s + THs (yHS)) - a'Hs (yHS-l) 1 
s=l 
s 
X IT {f (Y1t+j,Y2t+j,a1t+j (yt+j-1) ,a2t+j (yt+j-1)) dY2t+jdY1t+j} 
j=l 
(3.38) 
J J [u (YIHI + TtH (yt+l)) - altH (yt) 1 f (Ylt+" Y2tH, altH (yt) , a2t+l (yt)) dY2t+ldYIHI 
00 
+ L /38-1 J .. J [u (YIHs + T H8 (yH8)) - alt+s (yHS-l) 1 d2s F (yH8; yt, a" a2) . (3.39) 
s=2 
Also pre-multiplying (3.38) by fl gives us 
flU (yt+1, T, at, a2) 
00 
- L /38 J .. J [u (YIHl+S + TtH+s (yH1+8)) - a'Hl+s (yt+8) 1 d2s F (yHl+s; yH" a" a2) 
8=1 
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00 L /J'-1 J .. J [u (Ylt+, + T H' (yH')) - a1H, (yH'-l) 1 cf( '-1) F (yHS; y'+1 , at, a,) . 
8=2 
(3.40) 
Taking expectations of (3.40) with respect to t + 1 incomes implies 
SInce 
J J /JU (y'+1, T, at, a2) f (Ylt+t, Y2Hl, a1H1 (Y') , a2t+1 (y')) dY2t+1dY1H1 
J J f. /Js-1 J .. J [u (Y1Hs + T Hs (yHS)) - alt+s (y'+S-l)] d2(s-1) F (yHS; yH t, at, a2) 
8=2 
xf (YIHll Y2HI, alHI (yt) ,a2HI (yt)) dy2HIdYIHI 
00 L /Js-1 J J J .. J [u (Y1HS + THs (yHS)) - a1Hs (yH'-l) 1 d2' F (y'+S; y', a" a2) , 
8=2 
d28 F (yt+8. yt a a) 
, , 1, 2 
8 IT {f (YIHj, Y2t+j, alt+j (yHj- l ) ,a2Hj (yHj- I )) dy2HjdYIHj} 
j=1 
8 IT {f (YIHh Y2t+j, alt+j (yHj- l ) ,a2t+j (yt+j- I)) dy2HjdYIHj} 
j=2 
X f (Ylt+1, Y2H1, alHI (yt) ,a2HI (yt)) dy2HIdYIHI 
d2(8-1) F (yH8; yHI, all a2) f (Ylt+l, Y2Hll alHI (yt) ,a2HI (yt)) dy2HIdYIHI. 
(3.41) 
So it follows, by substituting (3.41) into (3.39), that 
u (yt, T, all a2) J J [u (Y1H1 + TH1 (yH1)) - a1H1 (y') 1 f (Ylt+l, Y2t+1, alt+1 (y') , a2t+1 (y')) dY2t+1dY1t+1 
+/J J J U (y'+1, T, at, a2) f (Y1Ht, Y2t+t, a1H1 (y') , a2t+1 (y')) dY2t+1dYlt+1. (3.42) 
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From inspection we see that expression (3.42), evaluated at t = 0, yields (3.6). Following 
the same procedure for the agent's discounted utility yield., (3.7). 
Proof of Proposition 1. First, derive the partial derivative of the first-best transfer, 
r* (w, Yl, Y2) , with respect to YI and Y2· Differentiate (3.11) with respect to YI and Y2 
and rearrange to obtain, respectively, 
and 
_ UCJCl (Yl+T*(W,Yl,Y2)) 
UC} (Yl +T* (W,Yl ,Y2)) 
VC2C2 (Y2-T * (W,Yl ,Y2)) 
VC2 (Y2-T* (W,Yl ,Y2)) 
UCIC} (Yl+T*(W,Yl,Y2)) + VC2C2(Y2-T*(W,Yl,Y2)) 
UC1 (Yl+T*(W,Yl,Y2)) VC2 (Y2-T *(W,Yl,Y2)) 
Ci~P2) 
E [0, 1] . 
It is now straightforward to establish that 
8c* 8c* * 1 1 P2 E [0 1] 
Byl 8Y2 pi + P; , 
and 
8c* 8c* * 2 2 PI E [0,1] . 
Byl 8Y2 pi +pi 
• 
Proof of Proposition 2. Let w E A given. From the Envelope theorem we have 





and from expression (3.12) we have 
(3.46) 
Combining (3.45) and (3.46) yields 
U' [V* (w, Yl, Y2)] = u' (w), 
or equivalently, 
if U (w) is non-linear. Since w E A was arbitrarily chosen, the result must hold for all 
wEA .• 
Proof of Proposition 3. Let w E A given. Combining (3.11) and (3.12) and taking 
account of the fact that w = V* (w, Yl, Y2) implies 
U' ( ) = - UCI (Yl + T* (W,Yl,Y2)) £ all ( ) E [0 -]2 W (* ( ))' or Yl , Y2 , Y . V C2 Y2 - T W, Yl, Y2 (3.47) 
Also combining (3.11) and (3.12) and evaluating at t - 1 implies 
(3.48) 
Finally, combining (3.47) and (3.48) yields our result .• 
Proof of proposition 4. Suppose f~:i = k, constant, for i = 1,2. Since I: fidYi = 1, 
for all ai, we must have 0 = I: fia..dYi = I: kfidYi = k and hence fia.. - O. But this 
contradicts assumption 4 that Fiai < 0 for some values of y. So we cannot have f~:i 
constant, i = 1,2. But this just means that as long as we do not have both ~2 (w) and 
~3 (w) being equal to zero, then the right hand side of (3.19) can never be constant and 
our claim follows .• 
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Proof of Lemma 1. From the properties of probability density functions we have 
and l Y Ii", (Yi, a, (w)) dYi = 0, 
for all ai (w) (i = 1, 2). But this tells us that there must exist Yi E [0, y] for which 
lial (Yi,ai (w)) < ° and Yi E [O,y] for which lial (Yi,ai (w)) > 0. It therefore follows, from 
continuity, that there must exist Yi E [0, y] for which lial (Yi, ai (w)) = 0. We label this 
income level fJi (w) . To see that fA (w) is unique under mlre, first note that at Yi (w) we 
t h fia· (jii(W),fli(W» ° Th ' f ( ()) ° C all [0 -] , C 11 mus ave fi(jh(w),fli(W» =, en smce i Yi, ai W > lor Yi E ,y, It 10 ows 
from mlre that for all Yi < Yi (w) we have liai (Yi (w) , ai (w)) < 0, and for all Yi > Yi (w) 
we have liai (Yi (w) ,ai (w)) > 0 .• 
Proof of Lemma 2. Let w E A given and let Yl (w) E [0, y] represent the income level 
for which 
Evaluating (3,19) at Yl (w) yields 
S' h 'al ili" 't' t h (, ( ) +, ( ) ha2(Y2,ii2(W») < ° mce t e margin ut ties are POSI lye, we mus ave /\1 w /\2 w h(Y2,ii2(W» 
- ( ) H '( , () '() ha2 (Y2 ,ii2 (W») , 'd d t f th at Yl w. owever sInce /\1 w + /\2 w h(Y2,ii2(W» IS m epen en 0 Yl, en 
for all Yl E [0, y] . It follows that we must have 
( 1 - 'x3 (w) 11
a l (Yl (w) , ih (W))) > ° 
11 (Yl (w), 0,1 (w)) 
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for all Yl E [0, y] . Repeating the argument for i12 (w) E [0, y] , the income level for which 
and taking accOllllt of Uf (w) = ~ 1 (w) < 0 from the Envelope theorem, implies 
and hence 
(~l (w) + ~2 (w) f 2a2 (Y2'A0'2 (w))) < 0, f2 (Y2, a2 (w)) 
for all Y2 E [0, y] . Since w E A was arbitrarily chosen, the result must hold for all w E A .• 
Proof of Proposition 5. Holding Y2 constant, differentiate the right hand side of (3.19) 
with respect to Yl to establish that this derivative is negative when ~3 (w) < O. Therefore 
increases in Yl reduce Uq i Y1 +~t'Yl ,Y2 ~ ~. Similarly, holding Yl constant, differentiate the VC2 Y2-T W,Yl,Y2 
right hand side of (3.19) with respect to Y2 to establish that this derivative is positive 
when ~2 (w) < O. Therefore increases in Y2 increase U C1 i Y1 +~iW'Y}'Y2?? Now note that VC2 Y2-T W,Yl,Y2 




8C2 B(Y2 - f(W,Yl,Y2)) 
-
8Y2 8Y2 
To determine the partial derivative of f ( W, Yl, Y2) with respect to Yl and Y2, differentiate 




A A,\ ~ (ha2(Y2,G.2(W») VC2 
8T(w,Yt,Y2) = P2 + 28y2 h(Y2,G.2(W» tiCl 
8y2 (PI + (2) ( 1 - '\3 f~:t~~~~~(~~?») (PI + (2) , (3.50) 
h A U qq (Yl+f(w,YI,Y2» d A = - V C2C2 (Y2- f (W,YI ,Y2» th ffi' t f bsol t were PI = U CI (YI +f(W,YI.Y2» an P2 V C2 (Y2-f"(W,YI,Y2» are e coe clen so a u e 
risk aversion, evaluated at f (w, Yt, Y2), for the principal and the agent respectively, and 
~ is the marginal utility ratio evaluated at f ( W, YI, Y2). Taking account of Lemma 2, UCI 
mlre, '\2 (w) < 0''\3 (w) < 0 and the fact that C ~~ ) E [0,1] and C ~, ) E [0,1], we can PI P2 PI P2 
establish that aaC1 > 0 and aaC2 > O. Finally it is straightforward to see that the signs of Yl Y2 
Proof of Proposition 6. Let w E A given. From the Envelope theorem we obtain 
(3.51) 
Also evaluating expression (3.20) at (YI (w), Y2 (w)) implies 
(3.52) 
Combining (3.51) and (3.52) implies 
U' (w) = U' [11 ( w, ih (w) , Y2 (w))] , 
or equivalently, 
w = 11 ( w, YI (w) , Y2 (w)) 
since U (w) is non-linear. Evaluate (3.19) at (YI (w), Y2 (w)) to get (3.28). Since w E A 
was arbitrarily chosen, the result holds for all w E A .• 




The result follows by taking account of mlrc, U" (w) < 0, 'x2 (w) < 0, 'x3 (w) < ° and 
Lemma 2 .• 
Proof of proposition 9. Evaluate the first order condition (3.19) at the t + 1 utility 
payoff w' = V (w, fit, f12) and re-arrange. This implies 
-'xl (w') 
UC} (Y~ + f (w',Y~,Y~)) (1-,X (w') ital (y~,al (w'))) +,x (w') f2a2 (y~,a2 (w')). 
vC2(~-f(w',yi,y~)) 3 fl (Yi,al (w')) 2 f2(y~,a2(W')) 
Now notice that 
UC} (111 + i ( w, lit, 112) ) 
VC2 (112 - f (w, 111, 112))' 
(3.55) 
(3.56) 
where the first equality stems from the Envelope Theorem, the second from w' = V (w, f11, f12) , 
and the third from conditions (3.19) and (3.20). Combining (3.55) and (3.56) yields 
U C} (111 + i (w, 111, 112)) 
V C2 (r12 - f (w, fit, f12)) 
UC} (y~ + f (w', y~,~)) (1 -,x ( ') fla} (y'l' al (w'))) +,x (w') f2~ (y~, a2 (w')) 
VC2 (y~ - f (w', ~, ~)) 3 W it (~, al (w')) 2 12 (y'2' a2 (w')) 
(3.57) 
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which simply gives us a relationship between the known marginal utility ratio at time 
t and the time t + 1 marginal utility ratio. This relationship must always be satisfied 
under the second-best contract. Following a similar procedure for condition (3.20) gives 
us 
u' [V ( w , 111, 112) ] 
U' [V(w' Y' Y')] (1-'\ (w') ital (y~,o'l (W'))) _.\ ( ') f2a2 (y;,0'2 (w')) 
, 1, 2 3 f ( , A ( ')) 2 W f ( , A ( ')) 1 YI, al W 2 Y2, a2 W 
(3.58) 
or a relationship between the time t + 1 and the time t + 2 utility payoffs. Finally taking 
account, in conditions (3.57) and (3.58), of mlre, .\2 (w') < 0, .\3 (w') < 0, and the fact 
h ( '(') f1al(y~,al(WI))) • al . 1 't' d h t < - lia- < ° t at 1 - -"3 W f1(y~,al(wl)) IS ways stnct y POSI lve an t a Yi > Yi {::> h > ' 
yields our results .• 
Proof of Proposition 10. Let w E A given. Suppose we reverse the roles of the 
principal and the agent in problem (P) to get a new but equivalent problem given by 
U(w) = max Ev 
{T(W'Yl ,Y2), V(W,Yl ,Y2),al (w),~ (W)} 
(R) 
subject to Eu = w, ~!~ = 0, and ~!~ = 0, where this time 
and 
In (R) the principal and agent now 'swap' positions so that the agent (agent v) assumes 
the role of the principal while the principal (agent u) assumes the role of the agent. 
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Therefore the principal receives utility payoff w in the current period and V ( W, YI, Y2) 
in the next period and we maximze the agent's expected discounted utility subject to 
the principal receiving w today. The agent therefore receives the payoff U ( w) today 
and the payoff U (V (w, YI, Y2)) tomorrow. Because of the symmetry of the current setup 
the problem (R) must be equivalent to the original problem (P) and hence the opti-
mal contract must possess exactly the same characteristics as our original contract. In 
the solution to (R) we write 'xl (w) as the multiplier on the principal's utility promise 
constraint, 'x2 (w) as the multiplier on the agent's (Who now takes the role of principal) 
incentive compatibility constraint, and 'x3 (w) as the multiplier on the principal's (who 
now takes the role of agent) incentive compatibility constraint. 
From the first order conditions for (R) we have 
and 
V C2 (Y2 - f (w, Yb Y2)) 
U q (YI +f(W,YbY2)) 
(3.59) 
(3.60) 
Note that conditions (3.59) and (3.60) provide exactly the same information as our origi-
() 
..l:.tr b· h h \ ( ) ha2 (Y2,G.2(W» 
nal conditions (3.19) and 3.20 , the only Ulllerence emg t at t e terms /\2 w h(Y2,G.2(W» 
and'x3 (W) hal (Yl~G.l(W» have 'swapped' positions in the first order conditions reflecting the 
h(Yl,al(W» 
fact that the roles of the principal and the agent have now been reversed. Apart from 
this nothing else has changed. We now take account of the first order conditions from 
the original problem (P) and the reversed problem (R) in obtaining our result. Applying 
144 
the Envelope theorem to (P) implies 
Uf (w) = ~1 (w) (3.61) 
and re-arranging (3.19) implies 
Combining (3.61) and (3.62) and taking expectations on both sides implies12 
Uf (w) 
Conditions (3.19) and (3.20), evaluated at t - 1, yield 
(3.64) 
and combining (3.63) and (3.64) gives us 
12Under the assumption that individual incomes are independent random variables we have f = hh 
and hence f a 2 = flh a2. This implies tr = ',:2 and so taking expectations implies 
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Note that this can also be expn~sed as 
U q (Ylt-I + it-I) 
V C2 (Y2t-I - it-I) 
E {UCl (YI + ~ (w, Y}, Y2))} 
V C2 (Y2 - T (w, YI, Y2)) 
-'x3 (w) C au {Uq (YI + ~ ( W, YI, Y2)) , Ital (YI, 0,1 (w)) } . 
V C2 (Y2 - T(W,YI,Y2)) 11 (YI,aI (w)) 
(3.66) 
Now apply the Envelope theorem to (R) to obtain (3.61) and re-arrange (3.59) to get 
Combining (3.61) and (3.67) and taking expectations on both sides implies 
Conditions (3.59) and (3.60), evaluated at t - 1, yield 
and combining (3.68) and (3.69) gives us 
Again this can be expressed as 
V C2 (Y2t-I - it-I) 
U Cl (Ylt-I + it-I) 
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(3.69) 
Since the problems (P) and (R) are equivalent this means that conditions (3.66) and (3.71) 
must both characterize the optimal contract llllder repeated double moral hazard. Now 
recall from proposition 5 we had U C1 ~Yl+~~W'Y}'Y2~~ decreasing in Yl whenever ~3 (w) < O. VC2 Y2-T W,Yl,Y2 
It ' als t . ht£ d t th t UCI (Yl +f(W,Yl,Y2» b' .. 18 0 S ralg orwar 0 see a ( ~ ( » must e mcreaslng ill Yl whenever 
V C2 Y2-T W,Yl,Y2 
\ () 0 Als d th l h hal (y},al(W» • " Th £ /\3 W >. 0 llll er e m rc we ave h{y},al(w» mcreasing ill Yl. ere ore whenever 
~ (w) < 0 we must have Coo {UCl (Yl +~(W'Yl'Y2» !tal (Yl~al(W»} < O. Likewise if ~ (w) > 0 
3 V C2 (Y2-T(W,Yl,Y2» ' h(Yl,al(w» 3 
then we must have Cov {uq ~Yl +~t'Y}'Y2j~, f~a( (Yl~a«~~)} > O. Therefore condition (3.66) 
V C2 Y2-T w,Yl,Y2 1 Yl,al W 




which gives us the first inequality in (3.33). Now differentiate the right hand side of (3.59) 
with respect to Y2 to see that V C2 ~Y2 ~~t,YI,Y2~~ is decreasing in Y2 whenever ~2 (w) < 0 
UCl Yl T W,Yl,Y2 
and increasing in Y2 whenever ).2 (w) > O. (Remember that (~l (w) + ~3 (w) f~:(~~~~~(~~?») 
I b .) Al d h l h ha2(Y2,a2(w» • .. It must a ways e negative. so llll er t e m rc we ave !2(Y2,a2(W» Increasmg In Y2· 
£ 11 h t h \ () 0 h C {VC2(Y2- f (W,Yl,Y2» !2a2(Y2,a2(W»} 0 d o ows taw enever /\2 w < we ave ov U q (Yl+f(w,YI,Y2» ' !2(Y2,a2(W» < an 
whenever ).2 (w) > 0 we have 
Therefore condition (3.71) states that as long as ).2 (w) =I 0 we must have 
(3.74) 
which gives us the second inequality in (3.33). Finally, from (3.66) and (3.71) we see that 
if ~3 (w) = 0 and ~2 (w) =I 0 then (3.32) must hold, while if ~2 (w) = 0 and ~3 (w) =I 0 
147 
then (3.31) must be true. Since w E A was arbitrarily chosen these results must hold for 
all wE A .• 
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Chapter 4 
Falllily Insurance and the Welfare 
State: The Role of Public Insurance 
Schellles in the Presence of Falllily 
Risk-Sharing Arrangelllents 
4.1 Background and Literature Review 
An established literature in labour economics and public finance explores questions re-
lated to the provision of llllemployment insurance and the effect this has on the rate of 
unemployment in the economy (see Baily, 1978; Ehrenberg and Oaxaca, 1976; Feldstein, 
1976, 1978; Nickell, 1979; and Shavell and Weiss, 1979). A parallel literature in public 
finance and macroeconomics investigates the appropriate role for the redistributive tax 
system as a device for reducing the risks associated with idiosyncratic income fluctuations 
(see Varian, 1980). However one criticism of this literature is based on the observation 
that the state is by no means the only source of insurance available to individuals facing 
volatile income streams and that there are alternative institutions that also playa key 
role in helping individuals to achieve a smoother consumption profile. We find that many 
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models of unemployment insurance do not take account of the income earned by other 
members of a claimant's household, nor of the important insmance role played by insti-
tutions such as the family.l However as we demonstrate in this chapter the development 
of appropriate policy initiatives will require taking account of the role played by such 
irustitutions. 
There is now growing empirical evidence that the family is an important somce of 
informal insmance and that various forms of risk-sharing arrangements exist between 
family members (see Lucas and Stark, 1985; Rosenzweig, 1988; Rosenzweig and Stark, 
1988). A number of papers assume that, in making intra-family income transfers, family 
members are altruistic (e.g. Barro, 1974; Becker, 1974, 1991; and Ravallion and Dearden, 
1988). Under this assumption one benevolent individual cares about the well-being of 
another and makes income transfers even when there are no penalties for failing to do so. 
However several authors question such altruistic motivations and indeed find evidence 
that observed patterns of intra-family income transfers (Cox, 1987), or of bequests (Bern-
heim, Shleifer and Summers, 1985), are more consistent with exchange-related motives, 
i.e. income transfers are just one part of a broader transaction containing some quid pro 
quo. 
In modelling intra-family insurance arrangements based on exchange-related motives, 
household members are regarded as self-interested and risk averse and so insmance 
arrangements exist because such arrangements are mutually beneficial. Within this tra-
dition there have been two main strands in the literatme. Under the first strand family 
members are able to pre-commitment to upholding their part in the risk-sharing arrange-
ment (e.g. Amott and Stiglitz, 1991). Under the second strand such pre-commitments 
are not possible and so insmance arrangements can be sustained only through reciprocity 
in a repeated relationship (e.g. Coate and Ravallion, 1993; Kimball, 1988; and Ligon, 
Thomas and Worrall, 1997). In this case risk averse agents receive random incomes each 
1 Indeed Atkinson and Micklewright (1991) also argue that the theoretical literature on unemployment 
benefit largely ignores many of the key institutional features of actual social security systems. 
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period and any insurance arrangement will be self-sustaining as long as the long-term 
value to each person of remaining within the arrangement exceeds any short-term benefit 
they might derive from leaving the arrangement. 
Another more recent approach to income-sharing has been to suggest that such 
arrangements are sustained through the existence of social norms (see, for instance, 
Ambec, 2000). This has been suggested as one possible explanation as to why otherwise 
selfish individuals may make income transfers even when they do not expect a quid pro 
quo, or why they sometimes share their income with people who are not part of their 
immediate family, such as members of their extended family, village or kinship group. 
For example Lucas and Stark (1985) provide evidence for the existence of migrants' re-
mittances in the absence of reverse income flows, but argue that neither pure altruism 
nor pure self-interest are likely to adequately describe the more complex and subtle forms 
of interaction that actually take place between family members. Also Fafchamps (1995) 
observes that terminally ill and mentally/physically disabled members of a community 
are not always excluded from mutual assistance networks. In the former case reciprocity 
is unlikely to explain the existence of migrants' remittances, while in the latter case al-
truistic feelings may well be very low and there is also little chance of reciprocity. Under 
the social norm approach proposed by Ambec, an income-sharing norm is designed and 
implemented by elders, and mutually enforced by members of the community. 
Throughout this chapter we take the existence of intra-family insurance arrangements 
as given and explore the consequences for such arrangements of also providing income 
insurance through a welfare state. We also examine questions to do with the optimal 
design of the welfare state in the presence of intra-family insurance arrangements. In 
particular we address three main questions. First, what is the effect of an expansion of the 
welfare state on the level of income transferred between family members and on the overall 
level of insurance available to individuals? Second, what are the mechanisms through 
which family income transfers are affected? Third, what role exists for a public insurance 
scheme to enhance welfare when insurance is also provided within family networks? 
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Our analysis is based on the simple exchange approach to insurance, applied to risk-
sharing arrangements between members of a family. Families consist of two risk averse 
individuals, Hand W, who make credible commitments to each other to honour a risk-
sharing arrangement. Both Hand W receive a stochastic income and interaction takes 
place only once. Within this framework llllemployed family members receive public 
transfers from the state while employed family members pay taxes to the state. We 
assume that in taking their private decisions individuals regard the level of the tax and 
the public transfer as given. Nevertheless it is the collective actions of all persons in the 
economy, as well as the presence of insurance arrangements within family networks, that 
affect the socially optimal level of the tax and transfer. 
We carry out our analysis llllder three different scenarios. Under the first and sim-
plest scenario, the income distribution faced by each individual is exogenously given. 
This allows us to abstract from the effect a person's actions might have on their chances 
of being employed, and from any moral hazard and informational problems that arise as 
a result. Under this simple scenario the role of state-sponsored public insurance schemes 
in raising social welfare, even when insurance arrangements exist within family networks, 
is thrown into stark relief. Although increases in the size of the public transfer cause 
an unambiguous reduction in the level of income transferred between family members, 
a social welfare maximum entails the state providing full insurance to individuals com-
bined with the complete elimination of insurance between family members. The intuition 
behind this result is based on the fact that family insurance occurs within a small group 
of just two risk averse persons whereas a risk neutral government can implement income 
transfers across a much larger group of people. Since there are no incentive problems 
the government is able to offer each individual a guaranteed level of consumption across 
each state of the world, thereby eliminating any consumption variation while preserving 
the level of expected consumption. This must improve the welfare of any risk averse 
individual. 
Under this simple scenario we also shed some light on the extent of the crowding out 
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of family transfers caused by an increase in the size of the welfare state. Suppose p is the 
probability that a family member is employed while (1 - p) is the probability that s/he 
is unemployed. Then we show that an increase in the level of the public transfer will 
crowd out family transfers exactly one-for-one if and only if p = ~. Also an increase in 
the level of the public transfer will crowd out family transfers by more than (less than) 
one-for-one if and only if p < ~ (p > ~). The intuition for this result is straightforward. 
First note that p can also be interpreted as the proportion of employed individuals in the 
economy, with (1- p) representing the proportion of unemployed individuals. Also note 
that under this simple scenario individuals will always offer full insurance to their family 
members, regardless of the level of the tax and public transfer. When the proportion 
of employed individuals is large (say p > ~), a given increase in the size of the public 
transfer paid to the unemployed will require a relatively small increase in the tax paid 
by the employed to support the relatively small numbers of unemployed. Therefore for 
any given increase in the level of the public transfer, the reduction in the net income of 
employed individuals will be relatively small. But since the family transfer is just half the 
difference between family members' realized net incomes, then such changes to the tax 
and public transfer will have a relatively small crowding out effect on the family transfer. 
On the other hand, when the proportion of employed individuals is small (say p < ~), 
then any increase in the size of the public transfer paid to the unemployed will require a 
relatively large increase in the tax paid by employed individuals to support the relatively 
large numbers of unemployed. This time as public transfers increase, the reduction in 
the net income of the employed will be relatively large and so the crowding out effect on 
the family transfer must also be large. 
Under the second scenario we assume that individuals' income distributions are en-
dogenously determined by their level of effort. We also assume that the government is 
unable to observe individuals' effort choices but that family members are in a position 
to make such observations. Under this scenario we show that unless effort incentives are 
such that an increase in the transfer received by the unemployed requires, for balancing 
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the budget, a reduction in the level of the tax paid by the employed by an equal or greatEr 
amount than the increase in the transfer, then increases in the public transfer must lead 
to a reduction in the level of the family income transfer. Additionally and in keeping 
with standard results from the insurance and moral hazard literature we also show that 
when the government cannot observe individual actions, any social welfare maximum 
must entail the state providing less than full insurance to individuals. This is true even 
when insurance is provided within family networks. Finally we also show that under 
this scenario, despite any crowding out of family transfers by increases in the size of the 
welfare state, there remains a clear role for public insurance schemes to improve welfare 
beyond the level that would be achieved if only family insurance were available. To do so 
we demonstrate that when insurance is available within family networks, a social welfare 
maximum can never entail zero public insurance. 
Under our third and final scenario, income distributions remain dependent on indi-
vidual effort and we preserve the assumption that the government is unable to observe 
individual actions. However this time we assume that family members are also unable to 
observe each others actions. We therefore have a problem of moral hazard both between 
the government and family, as well as within each family. In this case the family income 
transfer depends not only on the level of taxes and public transfers but also on the fam-
ily members' effort levels. This contrasts with both our previous scenarios under which 
family members offered each other full insurance and the level of the family transfer was 
independent of the level of effort. Under the current scenario we argue that any feasible 
expansion of the welfare state must have two effects on the intra-family income trans-
fer. First, changes to the public insurance scheme affect family members' net incomes, 
thereby affecting each person's variation in net incomes across states of the world. Such 
changes also affect the difference between family members net incomes in any given state 
of the world. Therefore changes to the public insurance scheme affect the level of the 
intra-family income transfer by affecting the scope for risk-sharing between family mem-
bers. Second, changes to the tax schedule also affect the level of effort chosen by family 
160 
members and this in turn will exert an additional effect on the level of the intra-family 
income transfer. Therefore when there is moral hazard within the family, the overall 
impact of a change in the size of the welfare state on the family income transfer must 
depend on the combination of both these effects. 
Under the third scenario we also show that the optimal welfare state must offer 
less than full insurance to individuals. As before, given the government's inability to 
observe individual actions, this result is in keeping with standard results in insurance 
and moral hazard. However this time the case for having any public insurance scheme at 
all is not so clear cut. Recall that under the second scenario when effort was observable 
within the family, we demonstrated that a social welfare maximum could never entail 
zero public insurance. ill that case some degree of government intervention was always 
optimal. However under the third scenario we identify conditions under which increasing 
the size of the welfare state, from a position of no government intervention, will be welfare 
reducing. Under these conditions a social welfare maximum exists locally at the point of 
no government intervention. This means that for sufficiently small levels of government 
intervention there is no scope for improving welfare via the redistributive tax system, 
and so there is a social welfare (local) maximum that entails the provision of no public 
insurance. An alternative interpretation of this result is that for sufficiently small levels of 
government intervention it is preferable for the government to offer no public insurance at 
all. We show that the occurrence of this outcome will depend on the sign and magnitude 
of the effects of changes in the welfare state on effort and on the family income transfer. 
Several papers also examine different aspects of the relationship between insurance 
provided within the family and the insurance available from non-family sources such as 
the market or the state. For example Arnott and Stiglitz (1991) examine the interaction 
between market and nonmarket (i.e. family) insurance. In their analysis individuals ac-
quire market insurance from insurers who operate in a perfectly competitive environment. 
However because of moral hazard individuals receive less than full insurance from the 
market insurers. Arnott and Stiglitz show that if individuals form risk-sharing arrange-
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ments with family members once they have purchased market insurance, such family 
insurance can be unambiguously harmful in welfare terms. Acquiring additional family 
insurance can worsen effort incentives, causing market insurers to restrict even further 
the level of insurance they provide. Under such circumstances family insurance between 
risk averse agents crowds out the market insurance provided by a risk neutral firm, and 
this must be welfare reducing. 
Arnott and Stiglitz essentially compare welfare consequences across different insurance 
arrangements and assumptions about the observability of effort. They establish that 
where EU1 is expected utility when effort is observable to both market and family (non-
market) insurers, i.e. expected utility under the first-best scenario, EUNMO is expected 
utility when family insurance exists and effort is observable within the family but not by 
the market insurer, EU M is expected utility when only market insurance is available and 
effort is unobservable by the market insurer (i.e. expected utility when family insurance 
is not available), and EU N MU is expected utility when family insurance exists and effort 
is unobservable both within the family and by the market insurer. Based on their analysis 
the authors suggest that if effort is unobservable within families, then " ..... the equililr 
rium without nonmarket insurance cannot be improved upon, and if it were possible, it 
would be desirable to outlaw the provision of nonmarket insurance." (p.186). 
The analysis of this chapter is based on the same framework as that developed by 
Arnott and Stiglitz in which we replace their competitive insurance markets by a state-
provided public insurance scheme. However, although we adopt their basic framework, we 
nevertheless pursue a very different line of inquiry. Whereas Arnott and Stiglitz ask 'what 
happens to social welfare when family members, who have acquired market insurance, 
also form risk-sharing arrangements?', throughout this chapter we take the existence 
of family insurance arrangements to be given and ask 'what effect does the provision 
of public insurance (as an additional source of insurance) have on the level of income 
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transferred between family members, on the overall insurance available to individuals , 
and on social welfare, vis-a-vis the situation with no public insurance?' We also ask 
'how does the existence of family insurance arrangements affect the optimal design of 
the welfare state?' We believe ours is a necessary line of inquiry, particularly in view 
of the fact that, as a policy initiative, outlawing the provision of nonmarket (especially 
family) insurance is likely to be (a) prohibitively costly to enforce, (b) ultimately futile, 
and (c) likely to raise serious ethical questions surrounding the appropriate level of state 
intervention into the economic arrangements between members of a family. 
Di Tella and MacCulloch (1998) examine the effect of public insurance schemes on 
transfers between family members and on the total insurance available to family members, 
as well as questions related to the optimal design of the welfare state. However it is 
interesting to find that the results of their analysis are in stark contrast to ours. Under the 
assumption of enforceable family contracts and no moral hazard (note that the analysis of 
our first scenario rests upon identical assumptions), Di Tella and MacCulloch show that 
public transfers crowd out family transfers exactly one-for-one and that the provision 
of public insurance, when insurance is also provided within the family, does not affect 
the total insurance available to family members. Note that this contradicts our own 
findings that (a) the extent to which family transfers are crowded out by an expansion of 
the welfare state will depend entirely upon the proportion of employed and unemployed 
individuals in the economy, and (b) until the full insurance point is reached, more public 
insurance reduces individuals' consumption variance, thereby increasing their overall level 
of insurance as well as their level of welfare. Di Tella and MacCulloch also establish that 
the size of the welfare state is irrelevant to social welfare. The upshot of their analysis 
is that it does not matter whether family members obtain their insurance from within 
the family or from the state. Again this contrasts strongly with our own findings that 
(a) the size of the welfare state matters in welfare terms, and (b) maximizing social 
welfare entails the state providing full insurance and family members providing none. 
We believe that the key explanation for these differences in results is that whereas Di 
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Tella and MacCulloch assume large families, thereby diminishing the state's advantage 
in pooling risk, we have assumed that families are smail, thus enhancing the capacity of 
the state to improve welfare by pooling risks across families. 
Other papers, in examining the relationship between state-sponsored insurance schemes 
and family insurance arrangements, focus on the situation where family contracts are 
non-binding. We now summarize some of the main results from these papers. Krueger 
and Perri (1999) regard the tax system as a form of forced risk-sharing and assume that 
private contracts can be enforced only by the threat of exclusion from future credit mar-
kets. They examine the welfare consequences of different taxation schemes when agents 
participate in such credit markets, and demonstrate that changes in the tax system can 
reduce the severity of punishment for agents who default. This in turn reduces the in-
centives that agents face to enter into private risk-sharing contracts, and so restricts the 
set of such contracts that it might be possible to sustain2 . They also show that the 
welfare consequences of such changes depend on the extent to which private insurance 
declines in response to the increased risk-sharing forced via the tax system. The authors 
calibrate an artificial economy to United States income and tax data and show that for 
plausible values of the structural parameters, a more redistributive tax system leads to 
less risk-sharing among individuals and to lower ex-ante welfare. 
The paper by Di Tella and MacCulloch (1998) referred to earlier also explores a similar 
set of questions by arguing that the state can provide compulsory insurance through the 
taxation of individuals whereas the family must rely on self-enforcing agreements. Under 
this assumption, increases in the level of unemployment benefit crowd out family income 
2 A number of empirical studies (Attanasio and Davis, 1996; Hayashi et aI, 1996) have challenged 
theories of complete insurance markets by showing that perfect risk-sharing among individuals does not 
exist. In response to this there is a large literature that attempts to incorporate market incompleteness 
into the economic environment. One approach has been to assume market incompleteness from the 
outset (see Bewley, 1986; Kimball and Mankiw, 1989; Huggett, 1993; and Aiyagari, 1994). Another 
has been to generate market incompleteness based on informational problems such as moral hazard and 
adverse selection (see Cole and Kocherlakota, 1998). A third approach, however, has been to suggest 
that the availablity of compulsory insurance, via the tax system, may actually reduce the incentives 
individuals face for entering into private insurance contracts. 
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transfers more than one-for-one. The intuition for this is as follows. AB the state increases 
the level of llllemployment benefit, families reduce their transfers one-for-one as they try 
to return to the initial level of insurance. However, the increased generosity of state ben-
efits also makes defecting from family contracts more attractive. Hence family transfers 
must be reduced even further if family insurance contracts are to remain incentive com-
patible. State-provided insurance therefore changffi the opportunity cost of belonging to 
a family and the pllllishment for those who default on family agreements, thereby chang-
ing the amollllt of insurance familiffi can sustain. Under these circumstances the authors 
show that there still remains a role for state-provided insurance. This time the optimal 
level of insurance will be related to the natural strength of families in enforcing contracts. 
When moral hazard is introduced into this scenario and it is assumed that families are 
more effective at monitoring the actions of its members than the state, then more public 
insurance crowds out family insurance more than one-for-one. In addition to increasing 
the attractiveness of defecting from family contracts, the disincentive effects of increased 
state insurance leads to higher llllemployment and increases the tax burden of employed 
family members to support the greater numbers of llllemployed. This increases their 
willingness to default even further, thereby adding to the reduction in family transfers. 
Concerning the optimal role for state-insurance under such circumstances, Di Tella and 
MacCulloch (1998) show that if families are sufficiently powerful at enforcing agreements, 
then there is no role for the state in providing insurance. Otherwise, the state should be 
the sole provider of insurance. 
Finally, in a couple of papers by Attanasio and Rios-Rull (1999a, 1999b), the authors 
also examine the effects of public compulsory insurance arrangements on private insur-
ance with limited commitment. They show that such insurance improvffi the alterna-
tives to private insurance, thereby reducing the discipline that enforces private insurance 
arrangements, and can both improve welfare as well as reduce it. The authors use data 
on the Mexican Progresa program to document the impact that government programs 
can have in crowding out private transfers. 
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This chapter is organized as follows. In section 4.2 we present a model of family insur-
ance under a welfare state when income distributions are exogenous, family contracts are 
enforceable and there are no moral hazard problems, and we analyze the results for this 
case. ill section 4.3 we extend this basic model to take account of individual effort. Here 
we obtain results under the assumptions that the government cannot observe individual 
actions but that family members can, and that family contracts are enforceable. In sec-
tion 4.4 we relax the assumption that family members can observe individual actions and 
assume instead that there is moral hazard within families. Also we retain the assumption 
that family contracts are enforceable. Finally in section 4.5 we present some areas for 
further work. 
4.2 A Model of Family Insurance under a "Welfare 
State: Exogenous Income Distributions 
We assume that there are n identical families in the economy, each family consisting of 
two members i = H, W H and W each receive a stochastic gross income drawn from the 
finite set {O, Y} . The probability of receiving Y is p, while the probability of receiving 
zero is (1 - p). We introduce the simplest form of a welfare state as follows. Let T > 0 
represent the government transfer received by a family member whenever his/her income 
is zero, and 0 < r < Y represent the tax paid by a family member whenever his/her 
income is Y. Throughout this chapter we will refer to the values {T, r} as either a welfare 
state a public insurance scheme a schedule of redistributive taxes and transfers, or , , 
simply a tax schedule. Any tax schedule {T, r} must always satisfy the government's 
budget constraint 
pr - (1 - p) T = 0, (4.1) 
which simply states that expected deficits or surpluses must equal zero. Note that since 
p can also be interpreted as the proportion of the 2n individuals in the economy who are 
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employed and receive income Y (and (1 - p) as the proportion who are unemployed and 
receive zero income), then (4.1) can also be interpreted as saying that the government's 
total tax revenue must always equal the total transfer payments made. Under this in-
terpretation condition (4.1) says that there can be no actual budget deficit or surplus. 
Under the tax schedule {7, r }, H and W each receive stochastic net incomes drawn from 
the finite set {7, Y - r}, with the probability of receiving 7 given by p and the probability 
of receiving Y - r given by (1 - p) . 
Family members are assumed to be risk averse and to have identical, differentiable, 
state-independent utility functions. Let F y',y" represent the income transferred from the 
person who receives net income y' E {7, Y - r} to the person who receives net income 
y" E {7, Y - r}. First note that by symmetry, whenever both family members receive 
the same net income, there will be no income transfer within the family. Therefore 
F T,T = F Y -r,Y -r = O. Second, whenever family members receive different net incomes, 
then combining symmetry with the fact that income must always be transferred from 
high to low income individuals3 gives us -F T,Y-r = F Y-r,T = F > 0 when Y - r > 7, 
and - F T Y -r = F Y -r T = F < 0 when Y - r < 7. We can therefore write each family , , 
member's expected utility as 
EU = (1 - p)2 U (7) + (1 - p) pu (7 + F) + p (1 - p) u (Y - r - F) + p2u (Y - r) , 
where u (.) represents the utility function of each family member. We assume u' > 0 
and u" < O. We restrict family members' consumption in any state to be strictly positive 
and so we must have 0 < F < Y - r whenever Y - r > 7, and 0 > F > -7 whenever 
3 Since the probability that an individual receives an income transfer equals the probability that s/he 
pays an income transfer of the same amount, then under the current setup with constant probabilities, an 
individual's expected consumption will be independent of the level of the income transfer, F. Therefore 
if positive transfers occured from low to high income individuals, then such an intra-family insurance 
arrangement would increase individual consumption variance while having no impact on expected con-
sumption, thereby making risk averse agents worse off. When income distributions are endogenous and 
probabilities depend on individual effort, this argument holds as long as each person chooses the same 
effort level and therefore faces the same probability distribution of income. 
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Y - r < T. Finally we assume that any intra-family insurance arrangement made ex antE 
will be binding ex post. 
In choosing the family transfer family members take the tax schedule {T, r} as given 
and choose F to 
mt-x { (1 - p) 2 U (T) + (1 - p) Pu (T + F) + p (1 - p) u (Y - r - F) + p2u (Y - r) } . 
It is easy to see that the first order condition for this problem implies /('(T+F») = 1 
u Y-r-F 
or F = Y -;-T. Therefore for any tax schedule {T, r} , when income distributions are 
exogenous and family insurance contracts are enforceable then family members provide 
full insurance to each other. Family members pool their incomes (net of taxes and 
transfers) so that in any state, each family member consumes exactly half of the total 
net family income in that state. 
We are interested in examining the effect of a feasible expansion in the welfare state 
on the level of insurance provided within the family. 
Definition 1. A feasible expansion of the welfare state is an increase in the public 
transfer, T, when such an increase is combined with the change in the tax, r, that would 
be required in order to maintain a balanced budget. 
In this simple framework since the budget constraint stipulates pr - (1 - p) T = 0, 
where p is constant, then as the welfare state increases in size changes in T and r must 
satisfy 
dr (1 - p) 
dTIB1 P 
(4.2) 
in order for such an expansion to be feasible. This simply says that for every dollar 
increase in the level of the transfer, T, paid out to unemployed individuals, the government 
must also increase the tax, r, that it receives from employed individuals by an amount 
equal to (l;P) , in order for the budget to remain in balance. 
We,Can now st?ote the following result. 
Proposition 1. When there are no moral hazard problems and family insurance 
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contracts are enforceable, any feasible expansion of the welfare state must unambiguously 
crowd out family transfers. Furthermore the extent to which family transfers are crowded 
out depends on the size of p. 
Proof. Differentiate F = Y -;-7 with respect to T, taking account of the change in r 
that is required to maintain a balanced budget. This implies 
dF 8F aFdr 1 
-=-+-- =--<0 dT BY ar dTIBl 2p . (4.3) 
• 
Expression (4.3) establishes that under our simple framework, any feasible expansion 
of the welfare state will always lead to a reduction in the amount of income transferred 
between family members. It also demonstrates that the extent to which the family income 
transfer decreases in response to the increased generosity of the state will depend upon 
the size of p. We can now state the following corollary. 
Corollary 1. Any feasible expansion of the welfare state will crowd out family 
transfers exactly one-for-one if and only if p = l. Also any feasible expansion of the 
we~are syafe will crowd out family transfers more than (less than) one-for-one if and 







Proof. These results follow directly from (4.3) .• 
The intuition for this result is straightforward. When the proportion, p, of employed 
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individuals in the economy is large (say p > ~), then an increase in the public transfer, T, 
will require a relatively small increase in the tax, T, in order for the budget to remain in 
balance. Therefore as T increases, the reduction in the net income of employed individuals 
(i.e. the reduction in Y -T) will be relatively small. Since the intra-family income transfer 
is just half the difference between family members' net incomes, such a change to the tax 
schedule will have only a small crowding out effect on the level of F. On the other hand, 
when the proportion, p, of employed individuals is small (say p < ~), then increases in 
T will require a relatively large increase in the tax, T, to maintain a balanced budget. 
This time as T increases, the reduction in the net income of employed individuals will be 
relatively large and the crowding out effect on F must also be large. 
Note that it is important not to confuse a reduction in the level of F due to a 
change in the tax schedule as necessarily implying a reduction in the overall amount of 
insurance available to family members. Suppose we take an increase in the total level 
of insurance to be equivalent to a reduction in individuals' consumption variance, with 
expected consumption remaining unchanged. Then it is easy to show that until the full 
insurance point is reached feasible expansions of the welfare state must increase the overall 
level of insurance available to individuals. First note that the expected consumption of 
person i is just pY and so changes in T and T will have no effect on individuals' expected 
consumption. However it is straightforward to verify that whenever Y - T > T, feasible 
expansions of the welfare state must reduce individuals' consumption variance. Therefore 
despite the crowding out effect that increases in the size of the welfare state have on the 
intra-family income transfer, there is nevertheless a role for public insurance in reducing 
the consumption variance of risk averse individuals below the level that might be achieved 
if only family transfers were available. 
In what follows we seek to identify the main features of the socially optimal public 
insurance scheme under the current scenario. In doing so we assume that the social 
planner takes the existence of intra-family insurance arrangements as given and knows 
that family members make income transfers according to F = Y -;-7. The planner must 
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therefore choose values of T and r that maximize individual expected utility subject to 
maintaining a balanced budget. The socially optimal values of T and r must therefore 
be the unique solution to 
subject to 
pr - (1 - p) T = O. 
Note that we have substituted F = Y -;-T into the expression for individual expected 
utility in order to yield the objective function for the problem S. Let A represent the La-
grange multiplier for the government's budget constraint. Then the first order conditions 
for S are given by 
2 (Y -r+T) T : (1 - p) U' (T) + (1 - p) pu' 2 - A (1 - p) = 0 
and 
( y -r+T) r : -p (1 - p) u' 2 - p2u' (Y - r) + AP = O. 
Combining these conditions and eliminating A implies that the socially optimal levels of 
T and r must satisfy 
(1 - p)2 U' (T) + (1 _ p) pu' (Y -;+T) 




Condition (4.4), along with the government's budget constraint, characterize the values 
of T and r that maximize social welfare under the current scenario. Condition (4.4) 
carries the standard economic interpretation. The left hand side represents the slope 
of an individual's indifference curve in (r, T) - space, namely ~~IEU const. evaluated at 
F = Y -;-T, while the right hand side represents the locus of T and r for which the 
government's budget is balanced, namely ~~IBl' also in (r, T) - space. We can now 
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present our next result. 
Proposition 2. When there are no moral hazard problems and family insurance 
contracts are enforceable, (i) the socially optimal public insurance scheme must choose T 
and r so that Y -r = T = pY; and (ii) T = r = 0 can never be socially optimal. Therefore 
under the stated hypotheses there is always a role for public insurance to improve social 
welfare even when insurance is also provided within family networks. Furthermore the 
size of the welfare state matters for social welfare. 
Proof. To see that the optimal public insurance scheme sets Y - r = T, re-arrange 
(4.4) to get 
(
y - r + T) (Y -r + T) pu' 2 - pu' (Y - r) = (1 - p) u' 2 - (1 - p) u' (T) . (4.5) 
Now suppose Y - r > T. Then T < Y-;+r < Y - r and we must have 
and 
( Y-r+T) (1 - p) u' 2 - (1 - p) u' (T) < 0, 
which contradicts condition (4.5). Likewise suppose Y - r < T. Then Y - r < Y-;+r < T 
and we must have 
, (Y - r + T) , (Y ) 0 pu 2 -pu -r< 
and 
(
y -r+T) (1 - p) u' 2 - (1 - p) u' (T) > 0, 
which also contradicts (4.5). Therefore the optimal public insurance scheme must set Y -
r = T. To see that T = pY, substitute Y - r = T into the government's budget constraint 
and re-arrange. Finally, we have T = pY =1= 0 which also implies r = (1 - p) Y =I- o. • 
Proposition 2 establishes that under the social welfare maximizing public insurance 
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scheme family members would consume their expected income with certainty and there 
would be no further benefits from making income transfers between family members. 
Intra-family income transfers would therefore be completely eliminated lUlder the opti-
mal public insurance scheme. We offer the following interpretation of this result. Because 
family insurance occurs within a small group of people (in our simple model the family 
consists of just two people), the family by itself is lUlable to completely smooth the con-
sumption of family members across all states of the world. Therefore family members 
continue to experience some consumption variation, even after taking acCOlUlt of income 
transfers within the family. However under a public insurance scheme a risk neutral 
government is able to implement income transfers across a much larger group of people. 
For instance, suppose the total realized income of a particular family was zero. Then 
under a public insurance arrangement it would be possible to implement a transfer of 
income from a family that received some positive total income towards the family with 
zero income. In the extreme case where such transfers create no incentive problems, as is 
the case in our simple model, a risk neutral government would be able to offer each family 
member a guaranteed level of consumption in each state of the world, this consumption 
being equal to the individuals' expected consumption in the absence of the public insur-
ance scheme. The public insurance scheme therefore preserves each person's expected 
consumption but reduces their consumption variance. Since individuals are risk averse 
this must improve their welfare. Note that under the optimal public insurance scheme 
r = (1 - p) Y, where r also has the interpretation of being an 'insurance premium' and 
(1 - p) Y is an individual's expected loss. Therefore under the optimal public insurance 
scheme individuals should receive full insurance at a fair premium. 
The model developed so far, although very simple, serves to highlight the possible 
consequences of public insurance for family income transfers and demonstrates the role 
a public insurance scheme can play in improving welfare. We have shown that when 
there are no moral hazard problems and family members enter into binding contracts, it 
is in fact socially optimal for family insurance arrangements to be completely replaced 
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by the public insurance scheme. However our analysis ignores some of the possible 
incentive problems that can arise due to a public insurance scheme. In the next section 
we consider a more realistic scenario in which each person's probability distribution of 
income is contingent upon their own level of effort. We assume that the government is 
llllable to observe individual effort but that family members are able to observe each 
other. 
4.3 The Model with Endogenous Income Distribu-
tions and Effort Observable Within the Family 
In what follows we allow the likelihood of an individual receiving a particular income 
to depend upon that individual's level of effort. This could reflect, say, the time and 
energy put into finding employment or how hard a person works at a given job. Also 
we assume that the government is unable to observe individuals' effort but that family 
members are able to observe each other's actions. Family members H and W continue 
to receive stochastic incomes drawn from the finite set {O, Y}. This time let e and e 
represent the effort levels of Hand W respectively. Then the probability that H receives 
y is p (e) , while the probability that H receives zero is 1 - p (e) . Also, the probability 
that W receives Y is p (e) , while the probability that W receives zero is 1 - p (e) . 
We assume p > 0 and p' < O. In other words greater effort raises the probability of 
being employed and receiving positive income but does so at a diminishing rate. We also 
assume p' (0) = +00. As we shall see later this assumption is required in order to ensure 
that, whenever Y - r > T, there is always an interior solution for effort (i.e. e > 0). 
Note that whenever Y - r < T family members choose exactly zero effort (see lemma 1 
below). Therefore an interior solution for effort, whenever Y - r > T, is essential if the 
problem of designing the optimal welfare state is not to become redundant. If individuals 
chose zero effort no matter what public insurance scheme were in place then the socially 
optimal public insurance scheme would simply entail providing full public insurance, i.e. 
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Y - r = 7. 
Taxes, transfers and the intra-family income transfer are as specified in the previous 
section. Finally, family members' utility function, u (.) ,remains unchanged. Throughout 
this section and the remainder of this chapter we simplify notation and write p for p (e) 
and p for p (e) . We can now write the expected utility of H and W as 
EUH = (1- p) (1- jj) u (7)+(1 - p) jju (7 + F)+p (1- p) u (Y - r - F)+pfru (Y - r)-e 
and 
EUW = (1- p) (1- p) U (7)+p (1 - p) U (Y - r - F)+(l- p) pu (7 + F)+ppu (Y - r)-e, 
respectively. Under this setup the government's budget constraint is given by 
- (1 - p) (1 - jj) 27 + (1 - p) p (r - 7) + p (1 - p) (r - 7) + pp2r = 0, 
which reduces to 
pr - (1 - p) 7 = 0 
whenever p = p. 
Under this expanded framework the family's problem becomes that of choosing e, e 
and F, taking the tax schedule, {7, r } , as given. Since family members are identical then 
symmetry implies that any solution to the family's decision problem must entail e = e. 
We assume that effort can never be strictly negative. Therefore given 7 and r we can 
express the family's problem as 
max { (1 - p) 2 U (7) + (1 - p) pu (7 + F) + p (1 - p) U (Y - r - F) + p2u (Y - r) - e } , 
e,F 
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which yields the first order conditions 
e: {-2 (1 - p) u (T) + (1 - 2p) [u (T + F) + u (Y - r - F)] + 2pu (Y - rn p' - 1 = 0 
(4.6) 
and 
F (1 - p) p [u' (T + F) - u' (Y - r - F)] 
+([-2(1- p)U(T) + (1- 2p) [U(T+ F) +u(Y - r - F)] + 2pu(Y - r)]p' -I} ae 
8F 
O. (4.7) 
Substituting (4.6) into (4.7) implies 







Condition (4.6) simply says that individuals choose effort so that their marginal ex-
pected utility benefit of effort, M EU B (e) , equals their marginal expected utility cost of 
effort, MEUC (e) = 1.4 Condition (4.9) just says that family members offer each other 
full insurance whenever effort is observable within the family. This is as we would expect 
since family members are assumed to be identical and there are no incentive problems 
within the family. Substituting (4.9) into (4.6) implies that any solution to (4.6) can be 
written as 
e=e(T,r), (4.10) 
4Note that since M EU B (e) is monotonically decreasing in effort, then ensuring the existence of an 
interior solution for effort, whenever Y - r > r, requires that for any Y - r > r the marginal expected 
utility benefit of effort, evaluated at zero effort, must be strictly greater than one, i.e. MEUB (0) > 1. 
But note that the expression in {-} in condition (4.6) approaches zero as Y - r > r -4 r. Therefore 
in order to ensure that MEUB (0) does not also approach zero as Y - r > r -4 r we have assumed 
pi (0) = +00. 
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for some function e of the exogenous parameters T and r. Therefore for any T and r 
conditions (4.9) and (4.10) characterize the privately optimal choices of e and F, when 
effort is observable within the family. 
We now examine the effect of feasible changes in the size of the welfare state on the 
level of the intra-family income transfer. First totally differentiate the budget constraint, 
pr - (I - p) T = 0, taking account of the effects of changes in T and r on e and hence on 
p. Re-arrange the resulting expression to get 
dr 
dTIB2 
(I-p) - (r+T)p'lre(T,r) 
p+ (r+T)p' ;e(T,r) (4.11) 
where p and p are evaluated at e = e (T, r) , the solution to (4.6) for some function e of 
T and r. Note that 
~ ( )_ 2(1-p)u'(T)-~(1-2p)[u'(T+F)+u'(Y-r-F)] 
e T,r - ~/~/--------~--~----~~------~--~--------~ 
8T ~/)2 + 2P' [u (T) - U (T + F) - U (Y - r - F) + u (Y - r)] (4.12) 
and 
~e (T, r) = ~pu' (Y - r) + ~ (I - 2p) [u' (T + F) + u' (Y - r - F)] . 
8r ~/)2 + 2P' [u (T) - U (T + F) - u (Y - r - F) + u (Y - r)] (4.13) 
Condition (4.11) simply tells us, for any unit change in T, the change in r that would 
be required to keep the government's budget in balance when income distributions are 
endogenous and effort is observable within the family.5 We can now state the following 
result. 
SExpression (4.11) appears similar to equation (5) of Arnott and Stiglitz (1991, p. 182). However it is 
important to bear in mind the key difference between their expression and ours. Expression (5) of their 
paper characterizes the changes in the insurance premium, {3, and the insurance payout, Q, for which 
zero profits continue to be made in the absence of family insurance. Hence their derivatives g~ and g~ 
do not take account of the effects that changes in Q and (3 have on effort that occur via changes in the 
family income transfer. Also g~ and g~ in their case can be shown to be unambiguously negative. On 
the other hand, equation (4.11) of this chapter takes account of the presence of intra-family insurance 
arrangements and of the effect that changes in 'T and r have on effort, both directly and via changes in 
F. Note that in our case both ~~ and ~~ are ambiguous in sign. 
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Proposition 3. When the government is llllable to observe individual effort but effort 
is observable within the family, and when family insurance contracts are enforceable, a 
feasible expansion of the welfare state will crowd out (crowd in) family transfers if and 
only if ~~ IB2 > -1 (:~ IB2 < -1). Also a feasible expansion in the welfare state will have 
no effect on family transfers if and only if :~ IB2 = -l. 
Proof· Differentiate F = Y -;-T with respect to T, taking accollllt of the change in r 
required to maintain a balanced budget. This implies 
dF 8F 8F dr 
-=-+--
dT 8T 8r dTIB2 
1 1 dr (4.14) 
2 2dTIB2 
From (4.14) it follows that 
dF < dr > 
-=o{::}- =-l. 
dT > dTIB2 < 
• 
Proposition 3 describes the effect on F of a feasible expansion in the size of the 
welfare state when income distributions are endogenous and effort is observable within 
the family. It demonstrates that unless effort incentives are such that an increase in the 
public transfer, T, requires a reduction in the level of the tax, r, by an equal or greater 
amount in order to maintain a balanced budget, then any feasible increase in T must lead 
to a reduction in the level of income transferred between family members. 
We now examine certain features of the socially optimal welfare state when income 
distributions are endogenous and effort is observable within the family. In doing so it is 
important to take accollllt of the fact that family members choose e according to (4.6) 
and make income transfers according to F = Y-;-T. We follow Arnott and Stiglitz (1991) 
in arguing that the social planner knows the relationship between p and e. Therefore by 
observing how p responds to changes in T and r, a social planner can implicitly take 
account of the fact that e also responds to T and r according to (4.10), the solution to 
(4.6). We also assume that the social planner knows that family members make income 
transfers according to F = Y -;-T. In this case, the social welfare maximizing levels of T 
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and r must be the solution to 
{ ( 
2 (Y - r + T) } n;~x I-p) u(T)+2(I-p)pu 2 +p2u(Y-r)-e (SEa) 
subject to 
pr - (1 - p) T = 0 
and 
e=e(T,r), 
where p = p (e). Let A represent the Lagrange multiplier on the government's budget 
constraint. Then the Lagrangian for the problem SEa is given by 
L = (1- p)2 u (r)+2(1- P)pu(Y-;+r) +p2u(Y-r)-e(r,r) 
+A(pr - (1- p)T), 
where p = p (e) and e = e (T, r). The first order conditions for this problem are given by 
T (1 - p) 2 U' (r) + (1 _ p) pu' (Y -; + r) 
and 
+ { [-2 (1 - p) u ( r) + 2 (1 - 2p) u (Y - ; + r) + 2pu (Y - r ) ] p' - 1 } ! e ( r, r) 
.\ [(1- p) - (r +r)p' !e(r,r)] 
r -p(l-p)u' (Y -;+r) _p2u'(Y -r) 
+ {[-2 (1- p)u(r) + 2(1- 2p)u (Y -; +r) + 2pu(Y - r)] If -I} !e(r,r) 
- -.\ [p + (r + r) p' ! e (r, r )] . 
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Substituting from equation (4.6) these expressions reduce to 
and 
( ) ' (Y - r + T) 2' [ a] r : p 1 - p u 2 + P u (Y - r) =.x p + (r + T) P 8r e (T, r) . 
Finally, combining these two conditions and eliminating .x gives us 
(1- p)2u! (T) + (1- p)pu! (Y-;+1") _ (1- p) - (r + T)p/:re (T,r) 
p (1 - p) u' (Y -;+1") + p2u' (Y - r) - p + (r + T) p' ! e (T, r) (4.15) 
Condition (4.15), along with the budget constraint, characterize the values of T and r 
that maximize social welfare when effort is observable within the family. We can contrast 
(4.15) with (4.4) and see that (4.15) carries a similar economic interpretation to that of 
(4.4). The left hand side of (4.15) represents the slope of an individual's indifference 
curve in (r, T) - space, i.e. :~ lEU const. evaluated at F = Y -;-T , while the right hand side 
represents the locus of T and r for which the government's budget is balanced, namely 
~~IB2' also in (r, T) - space. This time, however, :~IB2 takes account of the effect of 
changes in T and r on effort and on the probabilities. Contrasting (4.15) with (4.4) 
demonstrates that taking account of the role of effort and of the incentive effects of a 
public insurance scheme must affect the optimal design of such a scheme. We explore 
this issue in greater detail but in order to do so we will first require the following lemma. 
Lemma 1. Suppose income distributions are endogenous, effort is observable within 
the family, and family insurance contracts are enforceable. (i) If the public insurance 
scheme sets Y - r = T then family members choose F = 0 and e = e = O. (ii) If the 
public insurance scheme sets Y - r < T, then family members also choose e = e = O. (iii) 
In the first case family members consume p (0) Y with certainty, while in the second case 
family members' expected consumption is given by p (0) Y. 
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Proof. (i) If Y - r = T then F = 0 follows directly from (4.9). Suppose Y - r = T = 
Y and F = O. Then EUH = u (Y) - e and EUw = u (Y) - e. It follows that gTeater 
effort will confer no expected utility benefit to the individual making the effort but will 
confer an expected utility cost. Maximizing expected utility will therefore require setting 
effort as low as possible. But since effort can never be strictly negative, individuals will 
be constrained to choosing zero effort. 
(ii) IfY -r < T then this must make effort incentives even worse than they were when 
Y - r = T. When Y - r < T the public insurance scheme rewards individuals for being 
llllemployed and punishes them for being employed. Individuals must therefore continue 
to choose e = e = 0, just as they did when Y - r = T. To see this algebraically, note that 
when Y - r = T = Y and F = 0, conditions (4.12) and (4.13) imply g~ = : = ti' (~) < O. 
<;,)2 
Therefore starting from a position where Y - r = T, individuals would always wish to 
reduce effort if they experienced a change in T and/or r that lead to Y - r < T. But 
remember that individuals chose zero effort when Y - r = T and F = O. Since effort 
can never be strictly negative, individuals must therefore continue choosing zero effort if 
Y - r < T. 
(iii) When Y - r = T and F = 0 family members consume Y - r = T in each state. 
But substituting Y - r = T into the budget constraint implies Y - r = T = P (e) Y and so 
family members consume p (e) Y with certainty whenever Y - r = T. Also taking account 
of the budget constraint gives us p (e) Y as the expression for family members' expected 
consumption. Finally, substitute e = e = 0 into P (e) Y to get our result .• 
We can now state the following result. 
Proposition 4. Suppose the government is unable to observe individual effort but 
effort is observable within the family, and family members enter into binding insurance 
contracts. (i) Assuming p' > 0, p" < 0 and p (0) = +00, then under the optimal public 
insurance scheme T and r must be chosen so that Y - r > pY > T. (ii) T = r = 0 
can never be socially optimal and so some government intervention is always welfare 
improving. Therefore under the stated hypotheses maximizing social welfare requires the 
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provision of some partial level of public insurance. 
Proof· (i) Suppose Y - r = T. Then (4.15) becomes 
(1- p) (1- p) - Yp'~e (T,r) 
p p+Yp'!e(T,r) (4.16) 
Also from the budget constraint we have Y - r = T = P Y and from lemma 1 we have 
F = O. Then from (4.12) and (4.13) we must have :Te (T, r) = :re (T, r) = V./~~) < O. 
(pi) 
But this means that (4.16) entails a contradiction and so Y - r = T can never be 
socially optimal. However Y - r < T must be worse in terms of social welfare than 
Y - r = T. Suppose Y - r < T and the budget constraint is satisfied. Then individuals' 
expected utility must be lower than their expected utility when Y - r = T. The proof 
is straightforward. First, from lemma 1, we saw that when Y - r < T individuals will 
choose zero effort and individuals' expected consumption will be given by p (0) Y. However 
when Y - r < T individuals now experience an increase in their consumption variation 
compared to the Y - r = T case, regardless of the level of F. (Lemma 1 implies that 
consumption variation is zero when Y - r = T). Therefore when Y - r < T individuals 
exert the same level of effort, receive the same expected consumption, but experience 
an increase in their consumption variance compared to the situation where Y - r = T. 
Since family members are risk averse, such a situation must reduce their expected utility. 
However in both cases the budget constraint was assumed to be satisfied and so it follows 
that setting Y - r < T must reduce social welfare vis-a-vis setting Y - r = T. But since 
Y - r = T cannot be optimal, then under the stated hypotheses the optimal welfare state 
must entail Y - r > T. Finally, to see that Y - r > pY > T, substitute T = Y - r - X, 
where X > 0, into the budget constraint and re-arrange to get Y - r = pY + (1- p) X 
or Y - r > pY. Since T + X = Y - r, then T + X = pY + (1 - p) X and so T = pY - pX 
or T < pY. 
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(ii) Suppose T = r = O. Then condition (4.15) reduces to 
(1- p) [u' (0) - u' (~) ] + p [u' (~) - u' (Y)] = 0 
which entails a contradiction since both terms inside the square brackets must be strictly 
positive. Therefore the optimal welfare state cannot entail T = r = O .• 
We interpret proposition 4 as saying that although individuals obtain insurance 
through their family networks, when effort is observable within the family there is always 
a clear role for the state to improve welfare through the redistributive tax system. We 
have established this by showing that even in the presence of family insurance arrange-
ments and despite any possible crowding out effects caused by public insurance, zero 
government intervention can never be socially optimal. However proposition 4 also es-
tablishes that because of the government's moral hazard problem, any social welfare 
maximum must entail the state providing less than full insurance to individuals. This 
result is in keeping with standard results from the insurance and moral hazard litera-
ture which establish that when information is limited, insurance schemes must somehow 
reward good outcomes and punish bad ones. We have demonstrated that this result 
continues to hold even in the presence of family risk-sharing arrangements. 
Interpreting our result in light of Arnott and Stiglitz (1991), those authors argued 
that the presence of family insurance arrangements would ultimately lead a social planner 
to restrict the amount of insurance provided to individuals, compared to a situation in 
which there was no family insurance. Here we have demonstrated that when family 
members insure each other and effort is observable within the family, T = r = 0 can 
never be socially optimal and so in this case the public insurance scheme should never be 
completely eliminated. Finally, in contrast with proposition 2 of Di Tella and MacCulloch 
(1998), our analysis suggests that the size of the welfare state indeed matters to social 
welfare. 
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4.4 The Model with Endogenous Income Distribu-
tions and Moral Hazard Within the Family 
We now consider the scenario under which income distributions are endogenous and effort 
is unobservable within the family. The model is the same as that described in section 
4.3, however since family members can no longer observe each other's effort, we follow 
Arnott and Stiglitz (1991) in adopting the Nash equilibrium concept. Specifically we 
assume that each person chooses the level of effort that maximizes his/her own expected 
utility, given the effort level chosen by the other person and taking the levels of T, rand 
F as fixed. Also each person assumes that everyone else acts rationally and does the 
same thing. 
Therefore under the current setup, person H chooses e to 
max {(1- p) (1 - p) U (T) + (1- p) Pu (T + F) + p (1 - p) u (Y - r - F) + ppu (Y - r) - e}, 
e 
which yields the first order condition 
e: {- (1- p) u (T) - Pu (T + F) + (1- p) u (Y - r - F) + Pu (Y - rn p' - 1 = o. 
( 4.17) 
Likewise, person W chooses e to 
m?-x { (1 - p) (1 - p) U ( T) + (1 - p) Pu (T + F) + p (1 - p) u (Y - r - F) + jjpu (Y - r) - e} , 
e 
which yields the first order condition 
e: {- (1- p) U (T) - Pu (T + F) + (1- p) u (Y - r - F) + pu (Y - r)} p' - 1 = o. 
(4.18) 
By inspection of (4.17) and (4.18) it is easy to verify that any solution to these conditions 
must entail e = e. In this case we write the solution to the family's problem of choosing 
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effort as 
e = e(T,r,F), (4.19) 
for some function e of the exogenous parameters T and r and of the family's choice of 
F. As before equations (4.17) and (4.18) simply tell us that each family member chooses 
their effort level so as to equate their marginal expected utility benefit of effort with their 
marginal expected utility cost of effort.6 
In choosing F family members solve the following problem, taking T, r, e and e as 
given and taking account of conditions (4.17) and (4.18): 
max {(1 - p) (1 - p) U (T) + (1 - p) Pu (T + F) + p (1 - p) u (Y - r - F) + pjju (Y - r) - e}. 
F 
The first order condition for this problem is given by 
F (1 - p) pu' (T + F) - P (1 - p) u' (Y - r - F) 
8e 
+ {[ - (1 - p) u ( T) - pu ( T + F) + (1 - p) u (Y - r - F) + pu (Y - r)] p - 1} 8 F 
) ( )} _, 8e + {- (1 - p) U (T) + (1 - p) u (T + F) - pu (Y - r - F + pu Y - r p 8F 
o. 
Substituting from (4.17) and (4.18) implies 
F (1 - p) pu' (T + F) - p (1 - p) v! (Y - r - F) 
] , 8e + {1 + [u (T + F) - u (Y - r - F) p} 8F 
0, ( 4.20) 
while taking account of the fact that e = e in any solution to the family's problem of 
6Following earlier reasoning the assumption of p' (0) = +00 is sufficient to ensure we have interior 
solutions for the effort levels. 
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choosing effort implies 
where 
F (1 - p) p [u' (T + F) - u' (Y - r - F)] 
+ {I + [u (T + F) - u (Y - r - F)] p'} 8e 
8F 
0, 
Be pu' (T + F) + (1 - p) u' (Y - r - F) 
8F ~:;2 + p' [u (T) - U (T + F) - u (Y - r - F) + u (Y _ r)] < O. 
( 4.21) 
(4.22) 
Condition (4.21) implies that when there is moral hazard within the family, the o~ 
timal intra-family income transfer depends not only on the levels of T and r set by the 
government but also on family members' choice of effort. This contrasts with our two 
previous scenarios, the cases where effort was observable within the family and where in-
come distributions were exogenous. Under both those scenarios we obtained F = Y -;-T 
so that family members offered each other full insurance and the level of F was inde-
pendent of the level of effort. Therefore when there is moral hazard within the family 
any feasible expansion of the welfare state must have two effects within the household. 
First, any changes in T and r will affect family members' net incomes in each state of the 
world, thereby affecting each person's variation in net incomes across states of the world. 
It also affects the difference between family members' net incomes in any given state 
of the world. This must have an effect on the intra-family income transfer by affecting 
the scope for intra-family risk-sharing. In addition however, when there is moral hazard 
within the family, changes to T and r must also affect the family's optimal choice of effort 
and this in turn will exert an additional effect on the intra-family income transfer. There-
fore the overall impact of a feasible expansion of the welfare state on the intra-family 
income transfer must depend on the combination of both these effects. 
From condition (4.21) we can write the solution to the family's problem of choosing 
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F=F(T,r,e), (4.23) 
for some function F of the parameters T and r and of the family's choice of e. Note that 
by combining (4.19) and (4.23) we can write the family's choices entirely in terms of the 
parameters of the problem. Therefore for some functions e* and F*, let 
e* = e* (T, r) (4.24) 
and 
F* = F* (T,r) (4.25) 
represent, respectively, the levels of effort and of the intra-family income transfer that 
will be privately optimal for a given tax schedule, {T, r}, when income distributions are 
endogenous and there is moral hazard within the family. 




Suppose u' (T + F) - u' (Y - r - F) < 0. Then (4.21) implies 
1 + [u (T + F) - u (Y - r - F)] p' < 0, 
(4.26) 
since g; < 0, which in turn implies u (T + F) -u (Y - r - F) < - ;, < 0, a contradiction. 
Suppose u' (T + F) - u' (Y - r - F) = 0. Then (4.21) implies 
1 + [u (T + F) - u (Y - r - F)]p' = ° 
which in turn implies u (T + F) - u (Y - r - F) = - ;, < 0, also a contradiction. It 
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therefore follows that we must have 
u' (T + F) - u' (Y - r - F) > 0 
and so (4.26) follows as a result. This tells us that when there is moral hazard within 
the family, family members offer each other less than full insurance. 
Total differentiation of the budget constraint, p (e*) r - (1 - P (e*)) T = 0, implies 
dr _ (1- p) - (r + T)p'~e* (T,r) 
dT\B3 - p + (r + T) p' :re* (T, r) (4.27) 
where p and p' are evaluated at e* (T, r) . Condition (4.27) tells us, for any unit change 
in T, the change in r that would be required to keep the government's budget in balance 
when income distributions are endogenous and there is moral hazard within the family. 
We will make use of expression (4.27) later. We now present some features of the socially 
optimal welfare state when there is moral hazard within the family, however first we 
present the following lemma. 
Lemma 2. Suppose income distributions are endogenous, effort is unobservable 
within the family, and family insurance contracts are enforceable. (i) If the public insur-
ance scheme sets Y - r = T, then family members choose F* = 0 and e* = O. (ii) If the 
public insurance scheme sets Y - r < T, then family members also choose e* = O. (iii) 
In the first case family members consume p (0) Y with certainty, while in the second case 
family members' expected consumption is given by p (0) Y. 
Proof. (i) Suppose T and r are chosen so that Y - r = T = Y. Then we must have 
F* = 0 since there can be no further gains to risk-sharing within the family. Now suppose 
Y - r = T = Y and F* = O. Then we have EUH = u (Y) - e and EUw = u (Y) - e. 
Following the argument presented in lemma 1, maximizing individual expected utility 
requires setting e* = O. 
(ii) Suppose T and r are chosen so that Y - r < T. This must make effort incentives 
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even worse than they were when Y - r = 7. IT Y - r < 7 then the public insurance 
scheme rewards individuals for being unemployed and punishes them for being employed. 
Individuals will therefore continue to choose e* = 0, just as they did when Y - r = 7. 
(iii) The proof is the same as for lemma 1, part (iii) .• 
For any size of welfare state, let W (7) represent the corresponding level of social 
welfare, expressed entirely in terms of the public transfer, 7. Then 
(4.28) 
where p = p (e*), e* = e* (7, 1;P7) and F* = F* (7, 1;P7) . Note that W (7) is obtained 
by substituting r = I-p 7 into the expected utility expression and taking account of family 
P 
members' privately optimal choices of effort and the family transfer, evaluated at 7 and 
r = I-p 7. We can now present the following result. 
P 
Proposition 5. Let W (7) be as specified in (4.28). Suppose the government is unable 
to observe individual effort, there is moral hazard within the family, and family members 
enter into binding insurance contracts. (i) Assuming p' > 0, P' < 0 and P (0) = +00, 
then under the socially optimal public insurance scheme 7 and r must be chosen so that 
Y - r > pY > 7. (ii) Let e~ = e* (0,0) , F~ = F* (0,0) , Po = P (e~) and Po = pi (eo) . Also 
let 8e* = 8e* (0 0) 8e* = 8e* (0 0) 8F* = 8F* (0 0) and!!.L... = 8F* (0 0) Finally let 
8To 8T ' '8rO 8r ' '8TO 8T' 8rO 8r' , 
dW = dW (0). Then 
dT 0 dT 
if and only if 
8e* 8e* 




Po (1 _ Po) ( (1 - Po) [u' (0) - u' (Y - F~)] + Po [u' (F~) - u' (Y)] ] 
+ [u' (F~) - tt! (Y - F~)] (Po ar* 0 + (1 - Po) atr4 0 ) < -------~~--~--~~~--~--~~------~~~ 
1 + [u (Fo) - u (Y - Fo)] Po 
( 4.29) 
ds 'f ae* ( ) ae* aF* ( ) aF* In wor ,1 Po aT 0 + 1 - Po ar 0 and Po aT 0 + 1 - Po aro are such that (4.29) is 
satisfied, then a social welfare maximum exists locally at the point of no government 
intervention. 
Proof (i) The socially optimal value of T must be the solution to maxT W (T). Dif-
ferentiating W (T) with respect to T and setting the result equal to zero implies 
( dF*) (1- p)2U' (T) + (1- p)pu' (T + F*) 1 + dT 
( , ( 1 - P *) ( ) (dr dF*) +p 1 - p) u Y - P T - F -1 dT IB3 + dT 
2 , ( 1 - P ) ( ) dr +p u Y - T -1-P dTIB3 
{ ( 
- 2 (1 - p) u ( T) + (1 - 2p) u ( T + F*) ]'} de* + p -1 -
+ (1 - 2p) u (Y - 1 ;P T - F*) + 2pu (Y - 1 ;P T ) dT 
0, (4.30) 
where :~ IB3 is as specified in (4.27), 
and 
dF* 8F* 8F* dr 
-=-+--dT 8T 8r dT IB3 
de* 8e* 8e* dr 
-=-+-- . dT 8T 8r dT IB3 
Substituting from (4.17) (or (4.18)) and (4.32) into (4.30) implies 
( 




+p(l- p)u' (Y - 1-P T _ F*) (-1) (dr + dF*) 
p dTIB3 dT 
+p2u' (Y _ 1 - P T) (-1) dr 
p dTIB3 
+ {I + [U (T + F*) - u (Y -1 -P T _ F*)] p'} (8e* + 8e* dr ) 
p 8T 8r dTIB3 
0, (4.33) 
and rearranging condition (4.33) gives us 
(1 - p) 2 U' (T) + (1 - p) pu' (T + F*) 
+ (1 ~ p) p [u' (T + F*) ~ u' (y ~ 1 ; P T ~ F*) ] d;'* 
- [p (1 - p) u' (Y - 1 - P T - F*) + p2u' (Y _ 1- P T)] dr 
p p dTIB3 
+ {I + [U (T + F*) - U (Y -1-P T _ F*)] p'} (8e* + 8e* dr ) 
p 8T 8r dTIB3 
o (~3~ 
as the equation that characterizes the socially optimal value of T. Now suppose T and r 
are chosen so that Y - r = T = Y. Then F* = 0 and (4.34) reduces to 
dW (T) _ ( )' (Y-) , (Y-) dr (8e* 8e* dr ) _ 0 -~ - 1 - P u - pu - + - + -- -. dT dT IB3 8T 8r dT IB3 (4.35) 
Taking acCOllllt of (4.27) and re-arranging implies 
(l-p)u'(Y)+~ _(l-p)-Yp'~ 
pu' (Y) - %* p + YP'~r* (4.36) 
Finally cross-multiplying (4.36) implies 
_ 8e* 8e* , - ,8e* 8e* 
p(l- p)u' (Y) + BT P + YP'fj; (1- p)u (Y) + Yp 8r 8T 
_ 8e* , 8e* , - ,8e* 8e* 
(1- p)pu' (Y) - fj; (1- p) - Yp BTPU (Y) + Yp 8T 8r' 
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or equivalently 
ae* 8e* , , - [8e* ae*] PaT +(l-p)a;:-=-Yp u (Y) P BT +(l-p)&; , 
or 
Yp'u' (Y) = -1, 
a contradiction since we must have Y p u' (Y) > O. Therefore Y - r = 7 cannot be socially 
optimal. However following the same argument as in Proposition 4(i), setting Y - r < 7 
must be worse in welfare terms than setting Y - r = 7. From lemma 2 we saw that 
when Y - r < 7, individuals chose the same level of effort (i.e. zero effort), received the 
same expected consumption (i.e. P (0) Y) but experienced a higher consumption variation 
compared to the Y - r = 7 case. Therefore Y - r < 7 cannot be socially optimal and 
so under our stated hypotheses the optimal welfare state must entail Y - r > 7. Since 
Y - r > 7, following the same argument as in proposition 4(i) implies that we must have 
Y -r > pY > 7. 
(ii) From (4.34) and (4.31a) we have 
(1 - p) 2 u' (T) + (1 - p) pu' (7 + F*) 
+ (1 - p) p [u' (T + F*) - u' (Y - 1 ; P T - F* )] (a;* + a;* :~ IB3) 
[ ( 
1 - p ) 2' ( 1 - P )] dr 
- p (1 - p) u' Y - P 7 - F* + P u y - P 7 d71B3 
{ [ ( 
1 - ) ] } (8e* 8e* dr ) + 1 + U (7 + F*) - u Y - p P 7 - F* p' 87 + 8r d71B3 . 
(4.37) 
Evaluating this expression at 7 = r = 0 (and noting that :~IB3' evaluated at 7 = r = 0, 




(1 - Po) {(I - Po) [u' (0) - u' (Y - F~)] + po [u' (F~) - u' (Y)]} 
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+ (1 - Po) Po [u' (F~) - u' (Y - F~)] (OF* + of* 1 - Po) 
[}yo oro Po 
+ {I + [u(F~) - u(Y _ F~)]p~} (oe* + oe* 1- po) . 
[}yo oro Po 
Finally, rearranging (4.38) implies 
if and only if 
dW < 
- =0 dT 0 > 
8e* 8e* 




Po (1- Po) [ (1 - Po) [u' (0) - u' (Y - F~)] + Po [u' (F~) - u' (Y)] ] 
+ [u' (F~) - u' (Y - F~)] (Po afr* 0 + (1 - Po) ar* 0) 
1 + [u (Fo) - u (Y - Fo)]P'o 
( 4.38) 
(4.39) 
From proposition 5(i) we see that when there is moral hazard within the family, 
under the socially optimal public insurance scheme T and r must be chosen so that 
Y - r > T and so individuals are offered less than full insurance. This is to be expected 
since we assumed that the government was unable to observe individual actions. Under 
the optimal public insurance scheme therefore individuals consume more when they are 
employed than when they are unemployed. One interpretation of proposition 5(ii) is 
that the pn~ence of moral hazard within the family acts to diminish somewhat the 
scope for any welfare improvements via a public insurance scheme. Proposition 5(ii) 
tells us that if Po ~ 0 + (1 - Po) a;; 0 and Po at;* 0 + (1 - Po) ar* 0 are such that (4.29) is 
satisfied, then increasing the size of the welfare state, from a position of no government 
intervention, must be welfare reducing. Therefore under (4.29) a social welfare maximum 
exists locally at the point of no government intervention. In this case, for sufficiently 
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small levels of government intervention there is no scope for improving welfare via the 
redistributive tax system. In other words if (4.29) is satisfied then there is a social 
welfare (local) maximum that entails the provision of no public insurance. An alternative 
interpretation of proposition 5(ii) is that under (4.29), for sufficiently small levels of 
government intervention it is preferable for the government to offer no public insurance 
at all. The results of proposition 5 contrast with those of proposition 4 which established 
that when effort was observable within the family, T = r = 0 could never be socially 
optimal. In this case there was always a role for government intervention in the provision 
of some partial level of public insurance. On the other hand the analysis of this section 
suggests that when there is moral hazard within the family, the existence of a role for 
government in the provision social insurance will depend crucially on the effect of such 
insurance on effort incentives and on the intra-family income transfer. 
4.5 Discussion and Areas for Further -Work 
The analysis of this chapter suggests a number of further lines of inquiry. A natural 
extension of our model is to relax the assumption that family contracts are enforceable 
and to consider only those risk-sharing arrangements that could be achieved through self-
enforcing agreements. A proper treatment of self-enforcing family arrangements would 
require family members to interact repeatedly and to face income risk each period7 . At 
each date, once incomes are realized and given the tax schedule, family members choose 
the intra-family income transfer that maximizes their discounted stream of future utilities 
subject to the appropriately specified self-enforcing constraints. Since family contracts 
are non-binding and family members can choose to renege at any time, the current family 
transfer can only be decided once the current state is known. At this stage each family 
member chooses whether to renege or to cooperate with the risk-sharing arrangement. 
Family members will cooperate as long as the long-term benefits of doing so outweigh any 
7Thomas and Worrall (1984) adopt this approach in analyzing wage contracts, while Ligon, Thomas 
and Worrall (1997) apply this approach to analyse informal insurance arrangements. 
194 
short-term gain from reneging. Under this extended setting we could once again explore 
the consequences for intra-family income transfers of expansions of the welfare state. 
We could also examine the optimal design of the welfare state in the presence of self-
enforcing family insurance contracts. Note that we could also introduce moral hazard into 
this setting to see how this would affect our results. It would be interesting to compare 
the results of such an analysis with those of Di Tella and MacCulloch (1998), Krueger 
and Perri (1999) and Attanasio and Rfos-Rull (1999a, 1999b) who also examine the 
interaction between family and state-provided insurance schemes when family contracts 
are not enforceable. 
We also feel that there are further lines of inquiry suggested by the work of Arnott and 
Stiglitz (1991). As we discussed in section 4.1, Arnott and Stiglitz establish that obtaining 
insurance through family networks when insurance is available through a competitive 
insurance market can be harmful to social welfare. As they point out, when there is moral 
hazard the disincentive effects of family insurance can be sufficiently strong as to lead to a 
reduction in the amount of insurance provided by the market and a consequent increase in 
the amount of insurance provided within families. This must be socially harmful because 
the family has fewer advantages in providing insurance than does a risk neutral firm 
operating in a perfectly competitive market. However these results lead us to ask whether 
there may also be some circumstances under which family insurance is socially beneficial. 
As Arnott and Stiglitz rightly point out, " ... If market insurance against a given accident 
does not in fact exist, voluntary nonmarket insurance is unambiguously beneficial. When 
transactions costs are present, nonmarket insurance may be beneficial if it is provided at 
lower transaction cost than market insurance." (p. 186). And again, " ... Market insurance 
is generally unavailable for the multitudinous small (but cumulatively substantial) risks 
faced in everyday life. How nonmarket institutions handle such risks is an important and 
interesting question." (p. 186). 
One reason why insurance may sometimes be unavailable is adverse selection. Under 
adverse selection there are two types of individuals in the population, high risk types and 
195 
low risk types, and insurers are unable to observe any particular individual's type. Sup-
pose p represents the proportion of low risks in the population. A standard result of the 
adverse selection literature is that there exists a critical proportion, p* , of low risks in the 
population such that if p E (P*, 1) , then no market equilibrium exists, and if p E (O,p*) , 
the market equilibrium is a pair of separating contracts under which high risks receive 
full insurance at the fair premium, while low risks receive less than full insurance at the 
fair premium. One possible avenue for future research is to investigate whether family 
insurance can be beneficial under such circumstances. When p is large, the market fails 
to provide any insurance whatsoever and in this case family insurance may be unam-
biguously beneficial. However when p is small, low risks receive less than full insurance 
yet would prefer to be fully insured at the fair premium. Low risks may therefore find it 
privately beneficial to contract with family members, however the social welfare conse-
quences of doing so will depend upon how such contracting affects the overall demand for 
market insurance and the terms at which such insurance is ultimately provided. Since 
adverse selection lies at the root of many problems of incomplete insurance markets (for 
instance in the case of health insurance), we feel that an analysis along such lines would 
be a fruitful and interesting endeavour. 
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